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Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 3
192 – 203
EN
The paper deals with the nature of religious knowledge, in particular the legitimacy of cognitive statements in religion. The author suggests that neither science is as objective, nor religion as subjective as logical positivists use to argue. The starting point of his argument is Kuhn’s paradigmatic approach and Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programs. These concepts indicate that scientific models are products of a creative analogical imagination; data are theory-laden; comprehensive theories are resistant to falsification; and strict criteria for paradigm choice can hardly (if at all) be found. Actually, all of these subjective features are more prominent in religion. Nevertheless, on his view, the difference between science and religion is a question of degree rather than absolute contrast.
EN
The problems of effectiveness of scientific and rational methodology in the context of modern social and intellectual practices are considered in this paper. It is shown that a kind of methodological crisis that has emerged in connection with this fact can be solved not by separation and counterposition of scientific and non-scientific components in the content of the rational, but on the basis of revelation of the values of the integral forms of consciousness that characterize the integrity of human world outlook. Attention is drawn to the necessity of changing the strategy of organization and development of science in the contemporary global society.
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