Comparative politics is one of several main subdisciplines of political science. It deals with structures, actors and political processes. The most important goal of comparative politics is to describe and explain similarities and differences between political systems as well as predict consequences that occur. This article provides an overview of the evolution of comparative politics as it has developed over twenty five centuries: from Aristotle and Platon to Weber to contemporary post-modern lines. I begin by assuming that development follows a schema consisting of three phases: 1. pre-modern times; 2. modern times, and 3. post-modern times. In doing so, I exploit the recent proposal of Klaus von Beyme. Moreover, I suggest that this development can be seen from Kuhn’s perspective of scientific revolution. I then move on to the literature on comparative politics that can be found in different social sciences. Finally, I conclude by claiming that the evolution of comparative politics has been shaped by both the shifts of paradigms (approaches and theories in social sciences) and real political processes, however, it is not a clear process with phase-by-phase evolution.
The article concerns the 16th and 17th century epistemological controversy which existed between aristotelics, church authorities and innovatory scientists. Its purpose is to present the philosophical and legal reasoning of Francis Bacon, justifying the achievements of technical and scientific revolution.
The aim of the paper is to offer a new interpretation of the role of Cartesian physics in the scientific revolution. The author argues that many components of Newton's theory of motion are of Cartesian origin, and the Cartesian system was an important stage in the development of a modern science. If this interpretation is correct, then the philosophical side of the Cartesian system can be seen as a mere residuum of the Cartesian physics. When taken separately, as usually done in philosophy, Descartes' philosophical ideas are easily misunderstood and misinterpreted.
Pessimists predict that future scientific theories will replace present scientific theories. However, they do not specify when the predicted events will take place, so we do not have the chance to blame them for having made a false prediction, although we might have the chance to praise them for having made a true prediction. Their predictions contrast with astronomers’ predictions. Astronomers specify when the next solar eclipse will happen, so we have both the chance to blame them for having made a false prediction and the chance to praise them for having made a true prediction. The pessimists’ prediction remains unvirtuous until they specify when scientific revolutions will occur. This critical point applies no less to the selectivist’s prediction.
The article deals with the comprehensibility of the model of empirical science (i.e. the model of hypothetical confirmationism) in Hrusovsky's writings. Further, it examines Hrusovsky's conception of the development of scientific knowledge as related to his concept of 'radical revision' (corresponding to scientific revolution). The authors draw mainly from books written by Hrusovsky in 1935 - 1948.
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