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1

Does the Theory of Intelligent Design Meet Scientific Standards?

100%
Sagan D.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3(51)
37-54
EN
The author presents briefly Michael Behe's concept of irreducible complexity in biochemical systems. Next, he considers whether this concept has features which are characteristic of theories currently recognized as scientific. He examines whether Behe's concept is falsifiable, whether the design inference is permitted within science at all, and if so, whether design could be inferred from the findings of biological sciences. Finally, he shows that the theory of intelligent design isn't science stopper, and points to researches which can be conducted on its basis.
2

Some Generalization of the Popperian Demarcation Criterion

100%
Nowak L.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3(51)
73-80
EN
The paper discusses some possible generalization of the Popperian demarcation criterion. Proponents of various theoretical schools, argues the author, tend to present their views as new and groundbreaking, and to obtain that effect they concentrate only on arguments that support their theory. They are guided by the conviction that their opponents will not help them to find confirming evidence, and in most cases it is probably true. But one should not hope that they can be more critical to their own theory. It is reasonable to make some allowance for the human nature-one cannot be very efficient when placed in two roles at the same time, that of proponent and that of the opponent of the same theory. It is more promising, therefore, to direct the appeal for criticism only to the opponents of the theory that has been presented. The author discusses this proposal in some detail and gives it a formal interpretation, too.
3

In Search of the Social Border of Science; the Perspective of Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

100%
Sojak R.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3(51)
127-140
EN
The main purpose of the paper is to reconstruct insights into the borders of science. This task is undertaken within sociology of scientific knowledge. The article presents a synthesis of the concepts provided by three different programmes within sociology of scientific knowledge.: neo-Durkheimian approach of Stephan Fuchs, historical analyses by Steven Shapin of Edinburgh School and empirical studies of Harry M. Collins and Trevor Pinch concerning the modern science. The main conclusion of the article is that problem of demarcation is rather practical and sociological than theoretical and philosophical.
4

Merits and Faults of Wojciech Sady's multi-application of Demarcation

80%
Jodkowski K.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3(51)
27-36
EN
Wojciech Sady has proposed that the hallmark of scientific theory depends heavily on the existence of a set of mutually connected empirical applications of the theory in question. The author claims that from the point of view of his philosophical interests the main merit of the new criterion of demarcation is that it gives a new support for his own analyses of the philosophical hard core of an evolutionary theory. He founds also a few faults of Sady's proposal. The major one is that he drew his conclusion from a detailed analysis of Roentgen's discovery only, and as such it does not necessarily fit to every scientific activity in every epoch in the history of science. It seems that it does not fit e.g. to more and more popular string theory in physics which does not have any empirical applications. Probably Sady has formulated only a sufficient condition for a theory with the scientific status, not a necessary one. Also his a-historical standpoint is very doubtful.
5

Science and Non-Science. The Problem of Demarcation

80%
Wolenski J.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3(51)
81-95
EN
Criteria of demarcation to distinguish science from non-science are considered. The author argues that formal criteria, for example, proposed by logical empiricism, tried to fulfill simultaneously two tasks: (a) to find a logical standard of science, and (b) to discriminate science as it is customary conceived in scientific communities. However, both tasks conceive of science in two different meanings. The issue (a) is addressed to science as a system of sentences, propositions, etc. suitable for logical analysis, but the issue (b) treats science as a social phenomenon. Hence it is difficult to expect that one simple formula could effectively distinguish science from non-science and be applicable to both conceptions of what science is like. On the other hand, philosophical analysis of science is too atrractive to be abandoned as an enterprise. At the end of the paper, an account of rationality of science is outlined which is based on the concept of fair game. The proposal contrasts rational thinking and irrational ways of stating and solving problems.
6

Two Versions of Constructivism, or is Historiography Scientific?

80%
Rosner K.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3(51)
113-125
EN
Constructivism is an anti-positivistic position pursued in many branches of social sciences and the humanities. In philosophy of science this position is identified by the tenet of the object of research. Regardless whether it be a social world or the posterity, or the physical world, it is not external reality independent of the cognising subject, but a product of the process of construction or constituting. Some authors equate constructivism with postmodernism. Other authors profess more moderate relativistic views and point out that there are credible considerations that are used to constrain the process of constituting or construction
7

Two Faces of Mathematics, and is it a Science?

80%
Mrozek J.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
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vol. 13
|
issue 3(51)
65-71
EN
With reference to certain ideas of Reuben Hersh, the paper attempts to present and confront two approaches concerning the essence of mathematics. On one hand mathematics is presented as an inflexible stronghold of truth in which what is established is considered final. However, on the other hand, as R. Hersh points, it does not differ from other forms of scientific research; it is burdened with uncertainty and it can be modified. Appreciating the importance of Hersh's social-mathematical observations, the author indicates that mathematics simply has two different facets. In one mathematics is a process of achieving the truth, in the other, it is a generally accepted way of presenting this truth.
8

Methodological Naturalism as a Condition of Science in a Context of Relationship between Science and Religion

80%
Bylica P.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3(51)
163-175
EN
The author presents the thesis assumed by most scientists that the principle of methodological naturalism is a necessary condition of science. He also shows the role of this thesis in the context of the relationship between science and religion (by religion he means here Christianity). He tries to show that contemporary science does not leave any gaps in our knowledge that would call for any supernatural or transcendent sphere of being, postulated by religion. Christianity admits events in the history of the universe in such a way that for their explanation it is necessary to appeal to supernatural agents disrupting the order of nature. If this is so, then we can claim, he argues, that contemporary science is incompatible with Christian doctrine. The author also argues that if we assume a realist interpretation of scientific theories, formed on the basis of methodological naturalism, and if we take into consideration the role of science in contemporary culture of the Western civilisation then we should consider the scientific model of realty as making atheism a more rational option.
9

Punctuated Equilibria from the Point of View of Imre Lacatos' Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes

80%
Jodkowski K.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3(51)
55-64
EN
In the paper the author has presented traits of the theory of punctuated equilibria and of methodology of scientific research programmes. From the point of view of the latter, the evolutionary theory stepped into the degenerative phase of its development, because it does not predict any new discoveries from the fossil record. Moreover, there are two major doubts. First, the punctualist theory may lead into a blind alley rather than opening a new vista. Second, Lacatos' theory does not seem to be a proper instrument in evaluating the progress of science, because it does not compel anyone to make methodological evaluations and decisions.
10

Why was Roentgen's Discovery of X-Rays scientific?

80%
Sady W.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3(51)
7-20
EN
It is research procedure that is scientific or not rather than its product, i.e. a theory. To be the scientific one, both experimental research and theoretical investigations must be systematic. There are three necessary conditions of the scientific character of research procedure. (1) The same set of laws should be applied in the theoretical analysis of different phenomens. (2) In different applications of the set of laws there should appear the same groups of additional conditions in recurring configurations . (3) While choosing additional conditions the whole knowledge about supposed elements of the system under study should be taken into account. The general principle is that if nothing is known that a theoretical property of a given element can change, it should be ascribed to the same element present in subsequent experiment. The author tries to show that all those conditions were satisfied in case of Roentgen's 1895 research.
11

Demarcation. A Home Made Version

80%
Koterski A.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3(51)
21-26
EN
The paper evaluates W. Sady's criterion of demarcation between science and non-science according to a metacriterion proposed by L. Laudan. The outcome of the examination is rejection of Sady's proposal. First, it is not-adequate, as it eliminates all discoveries not made in a systematic, planned way, even if they are of scientific importance and contribute to development of science. Secondly, it is not sufficiently precise, at it gives only the necessary condition of scientific status. Additionally, this short review points out some other flaws in Sady's theory.
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