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1

AGAINST 'CORPORISM': THE TWO USES OF 'I'

100%
Strawson G.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2009
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vol. 16
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issue 4
428-448
EN
In his book 'Individuals' P. F. Strawson writes that 'both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong in holding, as each must, that there are two uses of 'I', in one of which it denotes something which it does not denote in the other' (p. 98). The author thinks, by contrast, that there is a defensible 'Cartesian materialist' sense, which Strawson need not reject, in which I (=df. the word 'I' or the concept I) can and does denote two different things, and which is nothing like the flawed Wittgensteinian distinction between the use of I 'as object' and the use of I 'as subject'. The author doesn't argue directly for the 'two uses' view, however. Instead he does some preparatory work. First he criticizes one bad (Wittgensteinian or 'Wittgensteinian') argument for the 'only one use of I' view. Then he offers a phenomenological description of our everyday experience of us that leads to an attack on 'corporism' - the excessive focus on the body in present-day analytic philosophy of mind.
2

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTERNALIZING PROBLEMS IN ADOLESCENCE: MODERATING EFFECT OF FAMILY VARIABLES

100%
Šeboková G., Popelková M.
Studia Psychologica
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2016
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vol. 58
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issue 2
105 - 121
EN
The aim of this study was to examine the association between self-consciousness and internalizing problems in adolescents, and to analyse moderating effects of family dimension. The research sample included 294 adolescents aged 14 – 21 years. Respondents completed the UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russel, 1996), the Scale of Social Anxiety and Stage-fright (Kondáš, 1978), The Self-Consciousness Scale (Fennigstein et al., 1975), The Family Adaptability and Cohesion Evaluation Scale (Olson, 2010) and Family Communication Scale (Olson & Barnes, 2010). A direct association between self-consciousness and internalizing symptoms was not found. However, results confirmed the moderating effect of family dimensions. Family cohesion moderates the relationship between private self-consciousness and loneliness; and public self-consciousness and social anxiety in boys. Family communication and adaptability moderates the relationship between public self-consciousness and social anxiety in girls. Findings indicate that family relations may serve either a risk or protective role in association with adolescent maladjustment, dependent on the family dimension and gender.
3

CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERIPHERAL SELF-AWARENESS

100%
Hatipoğlu S. E.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 3
323 – 340
EN
It has been argued that consciousness is not possible without peripheral self-consciousness; i.e., without an implicit awareness of oneself as the subject of one’s mental state. The author ś purpose is to undermine this view. He contend that a subject’s first-personal access to her conscious mental states and an awareness of them as hers, along with a particular approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things motivate the view that consciousness is not possible without self-consciousness. In order to undermine this view he argues that not all conscious states are accompanied by a sense of mineness. He rejects also the reasons for endorsing an approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things. Then he examines critically Kriegel’s arguments for the dependence of consciousness on self-consciousness based on the first-personal access a subject has to her conscious mental states and discuss the difficulties involved.
4

Man as a Sick Animal - From Anthropology of E.M. Cioran

100%
Piechaczek S.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2008
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vol. 17
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issue 3(67)
107-123
EN
History is not propelled by sin, argus E.M. Cioran, but by a disease operating as a principle of individuation. In the past human beings were one with nature. We became separated from one another and from nature by pain. We have been awakened from our slumber and forced to acquire consciousness which puts us in the same row with animals. The moment of the gaining of self-consciousness is presented by Cioran as a cosmic tragedy. The invasion of mental processes into bodily tissue is a 'biological scandal', a pathology which came to rule of nature. Other animals suffer in peace reconciled with their fate and prepared to bear all damages that their bodies sustain. Humans try to rebel, fully aware of the infirmity of the corporeal structures, and they make their misery a thousandfold more painful. We understand that our death is imminent and unavoidable. Moreover, death will not meet us unexpectedly at the end of our life, but it is heralded to us in every hour of our life, and marks our ordinary acts with finality and agony. Human life is a pilgrimage to oblivion, or perhaps even more emphatically it is a 'walking in daily death towards the ultimate death'. Every step we take brings us closer to annihilation. Cioran eagerly seeks a remedy for our plight but finds none. Precipitating our death is not a viable cure against it, putting it off is futile, and forgetting about it is no more that self-induced deception.
5

GENDER-RELATED LANGUAGE LEARNING BELIEFS IN POLISH ADOLESCENTS

100%
Piechurska-Kuciel E., Bernat E.
Linguistica Silesiana
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2009
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vol. 30
223-238
EN
The aim of the paper is to investigate language-learning beliefs of 488 (164 males and 324 females) Polish high school students in relation to their gender. Their responses to the Beliefs About Language Learning Inventory by Horwitz (1988) were explored by means of the U Mann-Whitney test. The main results show that for females English is a language of medium difficulty, but they believe they have a talent for language learning. They are also strongly motivated to learn English and ready to work hard in spite of feeling self-conscious when speaking in front of others. Males believe English is an easy language, and they are not keen to practice.
6

WHAT INDUCES PRIVATE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS? EFFECTS ON/OF SELF-CONCEPT, SELF-ESTEEM, IRRATIONALITY AND BASIC BELIEFS

88%
Gurnakova J.
Studia Psychologica
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2004
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vol. 46
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issue 4
265-272
EN
A sample of 74 students of the Slovak Technical University (37 males, 37 females, mean age 21 and 19, respectively) were administered these methods: the Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ, Trapnell, Campbell, 1999), the Self-Concept Complexity Scale (SCS, Gurnáková, 2004), The Masculinity-Feminity Scale (MFS, Kusá, 2000), the Self-oncept Clarity Scale (SCCS, Campbell et al., 1996), the Basic Belief Inventory (BBI, Epstein, 1990) and the Scale of Irrational Beliefs (IPA, Kondás, Kordacová, 2000). From intergroup comparisons it ensues that although four types of subjects with different intensity and modes of private self-consciousness do not significantly differ as regards the adjectives they use to describe themselves, they significantly differ at the level of affective relations towards themselves and the world about them. While rumination is connected with a lower level of self-esteem, more frequent irrational beliefs concerning higher vulnerability and hopelessness and, in general, with less positive basic beliefs about the world, (self-)reflection - with a certain risk of undue idealization - is connected with a more positive view of the world and self, whereby it can compensate, up to a certain degree, for the negative consequences of rumination.
7
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KINDS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS (Rodzaje samoswiadomosci)

88%
Poczobut R.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2008
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issue 7
5-31
EN
The notion of self-consciousness (self-awareness) has been the subject of a reach and complex analysis in the phenomenological and analytic tradition. On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. For the phenomenologists, self-consciousness is not something that comes about the moment one reflectively introspects one's experiences. In the most basic sense of the term, self-consciousness is pre-reflective or implicit self-awareness. The notion of pre-reflective self-awareness is related to the idea that conscious experiences have a subjective feel to them or phenomenal quality of what it is like to have them. In the article the author attempts to show that if phenomenal character of conscious experience can be explained in terms of implicit self-awareness, then the problem of phenomenal character (what-it-is-like dimension of conscious experience) just is the problem of implicit or pre-reflective self-awareness. His conclusion is that phenomenology, neuroscience, and analytic philosophy would profit from a more open exchange.
8
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Phantom Body As Bodily Self-Consciousness

88%
Nowakowski P.
Avant
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2011
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vol. 2
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issue 1
135-149
EN
In the article, I propose that the body phantom is a phenomenal and functional model of one’s own body. This model has two aspects. On the one hand, it functions as a tacit sensory representation of the body that is at the same time related to the motor aspects of body functioning. On the other hand, it also has a phenomenal aspect as it constitutes the content of conscious bodily experience. This sort of tacit, functional and sensory model is related to the spatial parameters of the physical body. In the article, I postulate that this functional model or map is of crucial importance to the felt ownership parameters of the body (de Vignemont 2007), which are themselves considered as constituting the phenomenal aspect of the aforementioned model.
9

STRAWSON AND KANT ON BEING 'I'

75%
Kunes J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2009
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vol. 16
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issue 4
493-509
EN
Strawson developed his descriptive metaphysics in close relation to Kant's metaphysics of experience which can be understood as a particular version of descriptive metaphysics. At the same time, Strawson rejected the foundations of Kant's version of descriptive metaphysics which, according to him, is a sort of psychology. His argument against Kant's conception of subject, or of the 'I', can be found in his conception of a person. However, a closer investigation of this Strawson's conception can reveal that it is not enough comprehensive compared with that of Kant. Speaking with Kant, Strawson understood the part of being 'I' which can be known via self-knowledge but he failed to appreciate the second part of being 'I', namely self-consciousness. A comparison of Strawson's conception with Kant's conception of being 'I' reveals its systematic shortcomings that rather support, against Strawson's purpose, Kant's version of descriptive metaphysics as a theory of subjectivity.
10
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Kartezjańska koncepcja zwierzęcia-maszyny

75%
Pasieka P.
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 2(17)
51-64
EN
According to standard interpretations, Descartes asserted that animals were mere automata and did not feel pain. This interpretation is based on his notion of the beast-machine. In this article, I revise John Cottingham’s sevenfold analysis of that thesis. In Cottingham’s view, Descartes did insist that animals were automata and denied them consciousness and self-consciousness but it did not involve that animals do not feel. I support this view with some new arguments. I also point to the difference between Descartes’s original conception of animal and animality and the standpoint of his followers.
11
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SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE. EPISTEMOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW. (Samoswiadomosc i samowiedza z punktu widzenia epistemologii)

75%
Zieminska R.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2008
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issue 7
33-51
EN
Self-consciousness is the source or set of information about our own present mental states. My self-knowledge is the set of all my information about myself, not only about my present mental states, but also my past mental states, my personality, my body or even my unconsciousness. Many philosophers thought that self-consciousness data are certain knowledge (Brentano, Husserl, Ingarden) but many contemporary philosophers claim that the first-person knowledge does not exist (Wittgenstein, Ryle, Dennett). Davidson refutes both behaviorism and subjectivity myth and takes some moderate position: first-person knowledge is dependent on third-person knowledge but third-person knowledge is dependent on first-person knowledge. There are some problems to reduce consciousness to physical states and to know about it. So, first-person knowledge is not certain and autonomous but it does exist and play important role. The two interdependent kinds of knowledge are two pillars of human knowledge. According to Davidson there is also some third pillar and it is the second-person knowledge.
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