Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 6

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  SELF-REFERENCE
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The study explores when and why speakers in the dialogic communication refer to themselves through a combination of the verbal person with the personal pronoun “I”(i.e., an explicit self-reference), even though a verb endings alone indicate the person in the Slovak language. Traditionally, expressiveness, emotionality, emphasis and functional sentence perspective are considered to be the cause for explicit self-referencing. In this paper, we focus on two questions: (a) What are the verbs’ semantic classes that are used preferentially in the dialogue in the 1st person singular form? (b) Which verbs are used with the explicit self-reference most frequently? The research shows, that cognitive verbs (and those representing the inner world of the speaker) are among the verbs with the highest degree of explicit self-referencing. The paper concludes with the case study of explicit self-reference using cognitive verb “I do not know” as an example compared to implicit self-reference. We used the text-corpus method. The findings of the study are interpreted within the salience theory.
EN
The article describes the qualifying features of the transcendental nature of L. Wittgenstein's formal logic and of the functional manifestation of transcendental level of languages functioning beyond their own sphere and meta-principles fixed by Quine. The notion of the self-referentiality used in order to explain the existence of transcendental dimensions of formal logic and the possibility of mutual understanding between the bearers of different languages beyond the meta-language principles is the most relevant to the question of the essence of the notion of transcendence. The article presents the main Bubner's conclusions about the functional values of the notion of transcendence. These are interrelated conclusions about the impossibility of transcendence deduction in the strict sense of the word, as well as about self-referential nature of the transcendental argument. They testify to a rather formal character of Kant's conception of synthetic character of empirical knowledge which treats the integrated structure of knowledge as a consistent and non-static representation of the unity of sensual experience object, the intuition unity within the judgment and the unity of concepts in judgments relations. Such a formal character of the discussed Kant's conception made difficulties for revealing the self-referential nature of transcendental argument and stimulated the attempts to find its deductive interpretation.
EN
The need to fully realize the interpretation of Kant's notion of transcendence requires critical attitude to the modern debate regarding this notion between the representatives of analytic philosophy (Wittgenstein, Quine, Strawson). Within analytic tradition, the notion of transcendence implies the transformation of the conditions of the possibility of logic, language, and empirical science into formal self-referential structure. The authenticity of the interpretation of Kant's concept of transcendence and the transcendental argument is further supported by: 1) understanding the impossibility of its excessive convergence with the notion of a priori, 2) understanding of the transcendence as self-representative complex structure which includes the coordination between the conditions of genesis and functioning of empirical knowledge and conditions of the exclusion of intellectual alternatives on the levels of logical analysis and empirical knowledge. The space of self-referential functional values of transcendental argument is indicated by Kant quite formally. This transparent disposition of the formally coordinated system of cognitive conditions of the synthesis of knowledge and understanding have caused the insufficient acknowledgement of the self-referential character of the transcendental argument, as well as numerous attempts to return to its interpretation according to deductive reasoning.
EN
The study contributes to knowledge on how a man’s ego develops in an early age. The construal of egocentric perspective is observed in expressions of self-reference (the pronoun I is expressed explicitly). The method of longitudinal case study is used. Since Slovak language is pro-drop language (personal pronouns can be omitted) the research is set in pragmatic and social context. We examine the pragmatic function of utterances with the pronoun I and their dynamics. While at first the child refers to herself in third-person, at the end of toddlerhood the child can use the pronoun I even when talking about others. This indicates comprehension of reciprocity of perspectives (I versus you).
EN
Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterion less self-ascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents at least two diametrically opposed attitudes: the first – exemplified in the works by Hacker, Becker, Sturma and McDowell – considers the features of the I think according to Wittgenstein’s approach to the I as subject while the second, exemplified by Kitcher and Carl, criticizes the various commentators who turn to Wittgenstein in order to interpret Kant’s I think. The hypothesis that I will attempt at articulating in this paper starts off not only from the transcendental apperception form, but also from the characterizations of empirical apperception. It may be assumed that Kant’s reflection on the problem of self-identification lies right here truly prefiguring some features of Wittgenstein’s uses of I, albeit from different metaphysical assumptions and philosophical horizons.
EN
For Niklas Luhmann modern society is a functionally differentiated society, i. e. it is composed of heterogeneous but equal parts which are relatively independent and are defined as social subsystems. Luhmann's analysis presents contemporary society as a whole differentiated into functionally dependent yet autonomous sub-systems that constitute neighbouring worlds for each other. This raises the question of the existence or non-existence of potential unifying forces or integration mechanisms. In Luhmann's view the main problem is the non-existence of means of 'metacommunication'. The development of specialised media and codes in the individual sub-systems increases the overall complexity of the social system, but does not entail the metacommunication that would make possible the self-observation and self-reference of the social system as a whole.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.