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1

Epistemologia spoleczna dla nauki o informacji

100%
Woźniak-Kasperek J.
Zagadnienia Informacji Naukowej
|
2013
|
issue 1(101)
4-19
EN
The author recalls Jesse Shera’s concept of a social epistemology. She discusses the need of its modification, referring to current works of social sciences, in particular enrichment of the original concept with an anthropological element, what is reasoned in an analysis of science as a “social good practice”. Discussion on social epistemology’s application in developing theoretical framework of information science is preceded by reflections on poor relations of qualified LIS research with library and information practice.
2

CONCILIATIONISM AND FICTIONALISM

80%
Hunt M. W.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2018
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vol. 25
|
issue 4
456 – 472
EN
This paper offers fictionalism as a new approach to the problem of reasonable disagreement discussed in social epistemology. The conciliationist approach to reasonable disagreement is defined, and three problems with it are posed: that it is destructive of inquiry, self-defeating, and unacceptably revisionary. Hans Vaihinger’s account of fictions is explained, and it is shown that if the intellectual commitments that are the subject of reasonable disagreements are treated as fictions rather than as beliefs, the three noted problems are avoided. Whereas beliefs have a “rivalrous” relation to the source of their justification (evidence), fictions have a non-rivalrous relation to the source of their justification (expediency), meaning that disagreement over which fictions to employ is not problematic in the way that disagreement over what to believe is. Some objections to the fictionalist approach to reasonable disagreement are answered.
3
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WHO EXACTLY IS AN EXPERT? ON THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING AND RECOGNIZING EXPERTISE

80%
Hardoš P.
Sociológia (Sociology)
|
2018
|
vol. 50
|
issue 3
268 – 288
EN
The article tackles the problem of defining and identifying experts. The conceptual analysis of what it means to be an expert relies on existing scholarship in social epistemology and sociology of expertise. It draws a portrait of experts as deeply immersed in specialist habits and practices, whose truth-tracing testimonies, publicity, and standards of inquiry bestow on them a tentative, context-dependent epistemic authority. This definition of expertise is closely connected with the question of their recognition by the lay public, i.e. how experts can (and should) signal their reliability and trustworthiness. The signalling is made possible through the culture of responsibility present in scientific practices along with the institutionalization of certain features of ‘epistemic vigilance’.
4

ON SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF EPISTEMIC IGNORANCE

80%
Błahut-Prusik J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
vol. 76
|
issue 6
436 – 450
EN
There are a number of phenomena which can be analysed in relation to epistemic injustice, either as its sources, manifestations or implications. The aim of the study is to show social consequences of epistemic violence, and the related epistemic ignorance, as well as pointing out that social injustice is deeply rooted in the epistemic layer, which sanctions and justifies it, while making it invisible. Wide ramifications of relationships between these two necessitate complementing traditional epistemology with social epistemology focused on practical social effects of particular epistemological assumptions.
5

EVIDENCE VS. VIRTUES IN EPISTEMIC DISAGREEMENT

70%
Bakalova M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2016
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vol. 23
|
issue 1
72 – 82
EN
In situations of peer disagreement there are two kinds of factors that matter. These are the factors internal to the discussion, such as evidence exposed and arguments presented by both sides and there are also factors external to the discussion, also called “independent factors”. The external factors include mainly virtues and competences of the participants. There are two main theories about epistemic disagreement, “the stead-fast view” and “the conciliationism”, and each of them stresses the importance of one group of these factors over the other. This paper is a defence of the greater epistemic significance of independent factors over internal factors. However, it is not a defence of the conciliationism which takes independent factors to be systematically the ultimate arbiter in situations of peer disagreement. The argument in the paper goes like this. Although the steadfast view receives strong intuitive support from two cases presented by Thomas Kelly: “Right and Wrong” and “Wrong and Wronger”. The author argues that the view is undermined by Timothy Williamson’s recent “Very Improbable Knowing” argument. This argument shows that for some basic type of evidence E when S uses it in favour of p, it is very improbable that S knows that S knows that p. Therefore, in situations of peer disagreement, S is unjustified to push her evidence in support of her side. There are arguably some exceptions, e.g. when one claims to have knowledge based on a priori evidence and on holistic evidence, but these are not sufficient to save the day for the steadfast view. In contrast to that, the reflective knowledge of one’s first order competences and virtues (i.e. external factors) is not vulnerable by Williamson’s argument. One reason for that is because we know about independent factors on the basis of holistic evidence. The author claims that our epistemic goal in the face of peer disagreement is to end up on the side that is non-accidentally closer to truth. In accordance with achieving this goal, it is safer to stick to independent factors in resolving peer disagreement situations than to follow one’s nose concerning first-order evidence disclosed by the opponents. This might seem a counterintuitive result, which makes it worthy of further discussion.
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