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EN
This article analyses the Soviet experiment in recreating the great narrative of history in Lithuanian society. While seeking to demolish the traditional interpretative context of the Lithuanian society, which was established during the interwar period (the great narrative on the nation’s past, present and future, the system of values, traditional social institutions etc.), the founders and apologists of the Soviet system tried to “re -educate” the old political, academic and cultural elite. Simultaneously they tried to form the new elite and foster their artistic and intellectual activity in order to create a new great narrative on the Lithuanian nation’s past, present and future and to present society with the works of art which could help to build the Soviet interpretative context and to ensure its vitality. As noted in this article, the emotional and notional accents of the new great narrative, which existed for almost fifty years of the Soviet epoch, did not manage to overshadow the interwar narrative on the Lithuanian nation’s past. Thus, the Soviet epoch “conserved” the great narrative of the interwar in the consciousness of society; there were neither thematic subjects nor intellectual capacities to create alternatives for them. Furthermore, the ideologists of the Soviet epoch ingeniously exhausted the notional accents of the interwar narrative related to the anti -Polish, anti -German, antichristian attitude; in such a way they contributed to the formation of resistant identities that are still visible in the contemporary Lithuanian society. Some works of art that were produced by the cultural elite during the Soviet epoch survived the break of 1990 and the post -Soviet transformation processes to become the sites of memory for the Lithuanian society. Some of them (e.g., the film Nobody Wanted To Die by Vytautas Zalakevicius, 1965) have ensured the survival of the images that were important for the Soviet ideologists (such as the presentation of guerrilla war against the Soviet occupants as “fratricidal war”) in the historical memory of the society; other works of art, such as the dramatic trilogy Mindaugas, Mazvydas, Katedra (1968 -1977), succeeded in liberating themselves from the notional and emotional canons imposed by the epoch and helped to fortify the national identity back in the Soviet epoch and also established symbiotic relations with the newly constructed great narrative after 1990. The socio -political elite of the Soviet epoch often used to hide the lack of ideological and intellectual self -identity behind the ideologically correct “masks of thinking”. The essential shift of political elite which failed to emerge in Lithuania during the last twenty years allows us to regard the dominant politics of today (which is not based on values) as a significant sequel of the Soviet experiment, where individuals and social groups wear “masks of thinking” and are able to conform to the new favourable conjuncture.
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Kierunki polityki pamieci na Litwie sowieckiej

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EN
Soviet model of narrative on history of Lithuania was shaped during the first decade of the Soviet rule in Lithuania. Later on, elements of pre -soviet, nationalist historiography had been gradually integrated into this model; primarily those which had strong anti -occidental, anti -Christian (anti -Catholic) or anti -Polish connotations. As a result, during the soviet period historical narrative, originated from the turn of 19th and 20th century and built on the paradigm of ethnic nationalism, was consolidated in the historical imagination of the Lithuanian society. Under totalitarian control over public discourse this historical narrative became not only predominant, but also in some way purified, as no alternatives (particularly those accepting Christianity or Western culture) were allowed. Communist regime always tried to use ethnonationalistic symbols for its own legitimization. This tendency was strongest during the late 1980s crisis of the regime. Some Lithuanian Communists were advanced on this path, what made much easier their later integration into political elite of already democratic state after 1990. The soviet regime in Lithuania was much less successful in promoting its vision of Lithuanian history of the 20th century, although from mid 1950s onwards the communists tried to demonstrate the existence of authentic, communist tradition in the country. At the end of 1980s this “tradition” failed to answer new challenges in historical discourse: it could be to some degree reconciled with the condemnation of Stalinist crimes, but it gave no answer to the question of present and historical Lithuanian statehood. Changes on the symbolic map of capital – Vilnius give good insight in the main tendencies of soviet politics of memory. The city was desacralized: secularized cathedral became rather “the temple of arts”, while Vilnius University was deprived of great part of its authentic (mainly Jesuit) history. In official view (expressed in guide and scholarly publications, celebrations of anniversaries etc.) the Gate of Dawn, with the representation of the Virgin Mary in it, was no longer the main symbol of the city. For communist authorities it was rather a tower on the hill – a remnant of pagan grand duke of Lithuania Giediminas’ Castle.
EN
This article analyses the influence of Soviet religious politics on society’s attitude to religion, as well as on the transformation of religious practices taking as an example the Komi Republic. I focus on the Orthodox tradition, as the vast majority of residents of the Komi Republic were Orthodox (Russian Orthodox Church, Old Believers). The article starts with a brief review of theoretical approaches to the study of the religious transformations during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The churches’ closing in the 1920s – 1930s and their partial reopening in the 1940s – 1950s are used to discuss changes in the manifestation of religiosity in public space. A correlation between gender, age and religious activity is demonstrated. The total control by the state over the church rituals led to a privatization of religious life, which significantly limited both the state and the church control over them. The article also describes how folk religious practices, unrelated to the church, influenced the believers’ resistance and adaptation to the political and ideological changes.
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