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Cenzura a kulturní regulace

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The revival of censorship studies over the last two decades is due not only to the implosion of the Soviet bloc and the ensuing release of official records from East European states for research purposes, but also to conceptual changes in our understanding of censorship. Proponents of the so-called 'new censorship' have advocated a view of censorship much broader than the traditional one by insisting that apart from institutionalized, interventionist ('regulatory') censorship, social interaction and communication is affected by 'constitutive', or 'structural' censorship: forms of discourse regulation which influence what can be said by whom, to whom, how, and in which context. However, widening the concept 'censorship' in this way carries the risk of equating censorship with any kind of social control, thus endangering its heuristic potential. The analysis of censorship should adopt Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance to distinguish between central and peripheral characteristics of censorship, in addition to using the communication model as a systematic basis for censorial practices and effects.
EN
In the latter half of the 1940s, processes generally known as 'Sovietization' took place in Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania. This meant a total submission of these countries to Moscow. The ruling Communists in the countries of so-called 'people's democracy' were not allowed any more to develop any model of organization and control of society differing from the Soviet one. The Cold War required total obedience in the Soviet block that was not supposed to be weakened by heresy any more (as in J. B. Tito's case). Stalin's death in March 1953, however, and the following search for a 'new course', accompanied by destalinization, caused another slow erosion of the Soviet Empire. The first country to get partly rid of its dependence was Rumania, for the sake of a sort of 'liberalism', followed by Albania, for the sake of dogmatism. Only Bulgaria, where Todor Zhivkov's regime became established for several decades, remained an absolutely loyal and never arguing ally of the Soviet Union in Southeast Europe.
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After 1956 the new Soviet leaders tried to increase the 'unity' of the bloc member countries, including transnational organizations, but their proposals made early in 1966 failed. One of all reactions in the Soviet Bloc was the particular reform evolution in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (the Prague Spring). Moscow rapidly changed positions to policy of the CPCz reform wing leader A. Dubcek and strongly criticized of the development in Czechoslovakia. Soviet leaders increased of pressure tactics to the final decision to crush the Czechoslovak experiment with military power. The preparation and motives of the Soviet intervention and its short-term as well as long-term consequences are analyzed. The intervention made it possible for Moscow to start reintegrating its bloc in the following year, which now faced only little resistance on the part of its allies (Rumania). An important tool in Moscow's hands became the newly formulated and publicly proclaimed Brezhnev Doctrine, which was used by the USSR to justify its intervention in Czechoslovakia, but was primarily intended for the 1970s.
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Sovětizace jako výkladový problém

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EN
The paper focuses on interpretation of Sovietisation as a matter of geography, chronology, and a political process. As a consequence of the Cold War period the interpretations of Sovietisation, being under the strong impact of manichean conceptions of the postwar development as well as of the propaganda schemes, have focused either on internal transformation or on the Soviet expansionism following the turn at the Eastern front in 1943. The paper tries to define fundamental features of Sovietisation in terms of a comparative framework manifesting the affinities and differences of political and socio-economic processes taking place in both, Western and East Central Europe as well. The main goal is to grasp Sovietisation as a process which can be understood within the context of other historical trends emerging in modern European history and not only as a part of exclusively post-war development.
EN
The institutional model designed in the course of Round-table talks should be examined, above all, from the point of view of cognitive horizons of its authors, and not that of the later course of events; particularly because of the very short period of its application (from the end of the debates in April to the appointment of Mazowiecki's Cabinet in September 1989). The basic assumption of the model was retaining control by the ruling party and providing stability in the division between the ruling bloc and opposition, supported by measures determining political results of elections, non-existent in modern democracies. An important factor in the construction of an institutional model by the sides of the Round Table talks is the way in which they have overcome a 'confidence deficit' that prevents a universally recognized order from being built. This requires both reference to political vision of the sides of conflict, and to the manners of distribution of confidence in the very process of negotiation of the model, based on the acceptance of trade union and political pluralism and, thereby, the departure from the underlying principle of the Polish People's Republic, i.e. the principle of non-competitive exercise of power. The causative mechanism was based on wrongly (from the point of view of the government) negotiated electoral law and on the overestimation of the scope of control of their own candidates for deputies to the Sejm. In spite of that fact, in long-term perspective, it provided better position to the authorities of the Polish People's Republic and their powerbase than that available to post-Communist forces in other members of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, it contributed to strengthening of the elements of continuity in the systems of government in the Polish People's republic and the Third Republic of Poland.
EN
The subject of the creation of the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic is not yet sufficiently examined. This is because the most important and crucial decisions on the content of the future constitution were taken by a select group which included state and party leaders of the Polish People's Republic. Having taken power in Poland, the Communists arbitrarily rejected the April 1935 Constitution, and declared that the March (1921) Constitution is in force. The official work on constitution that took place between May 1951 and July 1952 within the Legislative Sejm, as well as in its Constitutional Committee and subcommittee, was a phoney activity. Its purpose was, above all, to give the appearance of legality and social acceptance to the decisions taken outside parliament, or even outside Poland, in the Soviet Union. In order to improve social acceptance, a public debate on the constitution was held between January and April 1952. The debate had, in fact, a proclaiming nature. The contents of the draft of a basic law was determined, most of all, by the leaders of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) and two commissions of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist party existing from June 1949 to March 1951. Moreover, Stalin himself exerted influence directly on some provisions of the constitution inserting (probably in early autumn 1951) around 50 corrections into its text. The contents and origins of the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic show that it was intended to confirm the systemic transformations which were taking place since 1944. The Constitution was one of the last basic laws adopted in the countries of the Soviet bloc in Europe after WW II. Its was consistent with the Stalinist concept of the basic law as the so-called constitution of balance. The circumstances of the creation of the Constitution of 1952 proves that at that time the Polish state lacked democracy and sovereignty. This constitution was, in fact, imposed on the people by the then policy-makers from the PUWP, under the supervision of Stalin.
EN
During the outbreak of the so-called 'Solidarity' revolution in Poland in 1980, Czechoslovakia took an unambiguously negative position towards this movement. This is not at all surprising. However, it is significant that the party and state representatives of Czechoslovakia also adopted a very negative position towards the government of neighbouring Poland after the famous August agreement between representatives of the government and striking workers on the Baltic coast. The situation in Poland, for which the Polish United Workers' Party still bore responsibility, was subjected to very sharp and uncompromising criticism in Czechoslovakia. The author also devotes attention to the considerations and preparations for military intervention in Poland by the USSR, East Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1980.
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