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Filo-Sofija
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2005
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vol. 5
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issue 5
173-187
EN
The name of Spinoza appears in the notes of F. Nietzsche from the beginning of the eighties. Basing on information contained in K. Fisher’s History of Philosophy he hails the sage of Haga as his predecessor. In the course of next few years the greatest works of Nietzsche are written and his professional, personal and health matters become very complicated. At the end of his life embittered, lonely and deeply misunderstood Nietzsche pens remarks concerning Spinoza’s writings once again – this time drastically different in style and the judgement of their worthiness. As both of the philosophers use the term of ‘power’, both reject personalised God and propose the reversion of the hierarchy of the moral values, many researchers were inspired by Nietzsche’s notes to investigate the connections of the two philosophies. However, is the connection real, or is it but an illusion, a delusion of a link caused by the use of similar devices and terms in different contexts? How did such a radical change in Nietzsche’s views come to pass – a change of views not only of Spinoza’s philosophy, but of Schopenhauer and Wagner’s musical work as well? The answers to those questions may be sought with use of Jung’s theory of archetypes, as an example. In reference to Nietzsche’s biography it shows one of the possible interpretations of his approach to the persons mentioned.
Filo-Sofija
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2004
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vol. 4
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issue 4
141-170
EN
The text tries to answer the question of the sources of misunderstandings connected with the reception of Spinoza’s philosophy, especially with his understanding of the substance, attributes, modifications and infinity in Ethics. Assumptions made by Spinoza, for instance the postulate of describing the human being as a „state in a state” of Nature during a research procedure comply with the rules of model of the modern science. In Ethics, based on The Elements by Euclid, the author presents the attempt to define the basic terms used by the philosophers and scholars of the XVIIth century, and, on this basis and taking axioms into account, he works out a number of theorems concerning Nature, including the nature of a human being. Euclid’s Elements served as a template of the construction of a theory, which in a logically necessary manner, precisely and at the same time „suspending” the interference of destructive human emotions, proves the properties of the objects of geometry. Spinoza tried to establish a theory which would examine the properties of human mind and body treated as a subject of science (geometry and physics as far as body is concerned, psychology and ethics in case of the mind) in an equally rational, precise and motionless matter, starting from the basic definitions. Its basics became, among others, definitions of substance, attribute and modification, inspired by the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition. Those terms, interpreted in Christian Europe through the teachings of the Old and New Testament, have taken a completely different character and meaning in Ethics. Upon encountering the text of definitions and theorems the readers were unable and, quite often, unwilling to resist the temptation of adding their own beliefs to the contents. This article treats of this conflict of language and beliefs.
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Spinoza i Kant o naturze ludzkiego umysłu

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Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 2(17)
101-110
EN
In the paper I try to compare the Spinozian and the Kantian accounts of the mind, underlining their relevance to contemporary debates in the area. I also discuss the problem of the nature of consciousness, in particular whether, on the basis of both Spinoza’s and Kant’s theories, one can claim that consciousness, or mentality, can be regarded as specifically distinctive of human beings. My suggestion is that one cannot.
EN
Medieval Philosophy was shaped by Christian doctrine. The convictions of the existence of God and its influence on the world were not challenged. Atheism, understood as a philosophical vision of the world which denies a possibility of the existence of Christian God i.e. personal and transcendent being, appeared in the Modern Age. However we can indicate at least two thinkers whose systems were in conflict with Christian thought. David of Dinant and Amalric of Bene preached pantheistic views, identifying God with the fullness of reality. Thus they anticipated the modern, initiated by Spinoza, return to the Stoic philosophy of pantheism.
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2005
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vol. 14
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issue 2(54)
103-114
EN
Spinoza searched for a language that could help him to create a monistic system of ethics. Latin was in the 17th century a fairly malleable medium of communication. In its philosophical use it was largely a creation of Descartes. Spinoza wanted to use it in a way that would resemble Euclid's treatment of geometry. He needed a language that would clearly and precisely describe the process by which a man could liberate himself from the power of passions that hamper natural propensity for social peace and mental equanimity. He decided to begin by describing nature, which was responsible for man's proclivities and abilities. Consequently he needed a new concept of substance which on the one hand could be defined by some initial axioms, and on the other hand would be sufficiently flexible to include various aspects of human thought. It is interesting that when Spinoza had to make a choice between flexibility and content, he resolved to adopt a strict method of reasoning at the cost of the received understanding of substance. It is possible that these linguistic considerations led him to adopt the view that substance is identical with God and as such encompasses all principles of operation of the human mind and premises for the deriving of all fundamental concepts popular in his times.
EN
The following article summarises some of the aspects of joy as a spiritual state (Descartes), and as an affect/stimulation of the modi of nature (Spinoza). The psycho-physiological (Descartes) and ontological (Spinoza) placement of joy creates basic differences in evaluation of the said state by the two philosophers. As a result, the moral instructions provided by them to the reader vary in an approach to the emotions and their effect on human actions. Descartes values the importance of sadness as an affect warning us from dangers; Spinoza claims that joy (as different from pleasure) can never be excessive and encourages pursuing it as a mean to achieve happiness.
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 2(17)
83-100
EN
Abstract In this paper I analyze Spinozian ontological arguments for God’s existence from Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. I argue that the first proof suffers from circulus vitiosus, whereas the others have at least one non-obvious premise. I also consider P. Gut’s modification of the first proof, reported to me during the conference “The Philosophy of the 17th Century—Its Origins and Continuations” (Gdańsk, 16.06.2011). Meanwhile, I address D. Chlastawa’s remark that theorem 7 and 14 from Ethica… makes Spinoza’s theory inconsistent.
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