Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 7

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  STRAWSON P. F.
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

AGAINST 'CORPORISM': THE TWO USES OF 'I'

100%
Strawson G.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
|
vol. 16
|
issue 4
428-448
EN
In his book 'Individuals' P. F. Strawson writes that 'both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong in holding, as each must, that there are two uses of 'I', in one of which it denotes something which it does not denote in the other' (p. 98). The author thinks, by contrast, that there is a defensible 'Cartesian materialist' sense, which Strawson need not reject, in which I (=df. the word 'I' or the concept I) can and does denote two different things, and which is nothing like the flawed Wittgensteinian distinction between the use of I 'as object' and the use of I 'as subject'. The author doesn't argue directly for the 'two uses' view, however. Instead he does some preparatory work. First he criticizes one bad (Wittgensteinian or 'Wittgensteinian') argument for the 'only one use of I' view. Then he offers a phenomenological description of our everyday experience of us that leads to an attack on 'corporism' - the excessive focus on the body in present-day analytic philosophy of mind.
2

'PERSONS' AND PERSONS

88%
Snowdon P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
|
vol. 16
|
issue 4
449-476
EN
In chapter 3 of 'Individuals', entitled 'Persons', Strawson argues against dualism and the no-ownership theory, and proposes instead that our concept of a person is a primitive concept. In this paper, it is argued that the basic questions that frame Strawson's discussion, and some of his main arguments and claims, are dubious. A general diagnosis of the source of these problems is proposed. It is argued that despite these problems Strawson gives an accurate and very insightful description of the way we think about ourselves, which should form the starting point for more speculative accounts of ourselves.
3

ARTEFACTS, NON-PARTICULARS AND MODEL PARTICULARS

88%
Thein K.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
|
vol. 16
|
issue 4
510-528
EN
The paper comments and elaborates on five pages of P. F. Strawson's 'Individuals' (1959, 230-234), together with his 'Entity and Identity' and 'Universals'. The focus is on Strawson's understanding of individual non-particulars as types or universals, and on his contention that the most obvious non-particular entities ('well-entrenched non-particulars') are the broadly conceived artefacts including the works of art. The narrow focus is on the implications of Strawson's suggestion that 'an appropriate model for non-particulars of these kinds is that of a model particular - kind of prototype, or ideal example, itself particular, which serves as a rule or standard for the production of others' (1959, 233). The paper analyzes the relation between Strawson's position and the issue of artefacts and their (largely missing) ontology. It also asks about some less obvious affinities between the problem of the non-particulars (and their entrenchment) and Strawson's concept of a person.
4

DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS AGAIN: SINGULAR REFERENCE, QUANTIFICATION AND TRUTH-EVALUATION

75%
Kotatko P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
|
vol. 16
|
issue 4
552-568
EN
The author defends a combination of Strawson's explanation of definite descriptions as devices of singular reference par excellence with the Russellian truth-evaluation of utterances of sentences with descriptions. The complex Russellian proposition is, according to the author's view, introduced by such utterances into communication as a by-product of the instrumental side of an attempt to make a singular statement. This, precisely like the instrumental aspects of similar attempts exploiting names or demonstratives has to be reflected by analysis but should not be confused with the communicative function of utterances. The success of all these attempts depends on the fulfilment of empirical conditions of various types, given by semantics of descriptions, names or demonstratives (unless the relevance of these conditions is neutralized by another identification factor dominating in given context). But their communicative function does not consist in claiming that these conditions are fulfilled. The author agrees with Strawson that the first two conjuncts of the complex Russellian proposition are introduced into communication as presuppositions: but argues in favour of defining presupposition (in pragmatic sense) in normative, rather than intentional terms.
5

STRAWSONIAN VS. RUSSELLIAN DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS

75%
Duzi M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
|
vol. 16
|
issue 4
587-614
EN
In 1905 Bertrand Russell took on the problem of definite descriptions, and his analysis became the standard until 1950 when Peter Strawson criticised Russell's solution as inadequate. Since then many opponents as well as proponents of the Russellian solution have been involved in a long-term debate on definite descriptions. In this paper the authoress shows that both sides of the contention are partly right and partly wrong, because sentences of the form 'The F is a G' are ambiguous. However, the ambiguity does not concern reference shift of the description 'the F'. Rather, the ambiguity consists in different topic-focus articulations of a given sentence involving occurrences of 'the F'. The authoress demonstrates that when 'the F' is used as a part of the topic of such a sentence the existence of the object denoted by 'the F' is not only entailed by but also presupposed by the sentence. On the other hand 'the F' used in the focus of a sentence triggers merely existential entailment. Thus sentences differing only in their topic-focus articulation should have assigned different logical forms. In order to make such hidden features explicit, she applies the procedural semantics of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL), furnishing sentences with hyper-propositions that are precisely defined in terms of TIL constructions. These are procedures assigned to sentences as their context-invariant structured meanings. Moreover, the authoress generalises the phenomenon of the topic-focus distinction to sentences of any form, proposing an adequate analytic schema of sentences that come with a presupposition.
6

STRAWSON AND KANT ON BEING 'I'

75%
Kunes J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
|
vol. 16
|
issue 4
493-509
EN
Strawson developed his descriptive metaphysics in close relation to Kant's metaphysics of experience which can be understood as a particular version of descriptive metaphysics. At the same time, Strawson rejected the foundations of Kant's version of descriptive metaphysics which, according to him, is a sort of psychology. His argument against Kant's conception of subject, or of the 'I', can be found in his conception of a person. However, a closer investigation of this Strawson's conception can reveal that it is not enough comprehensive compared with that of Kant. Speaking with Kant, Strawson understood the part of being 'I' which can be known via self-knowledge but he failed to appreciate the second part of being 'I', namely self-consciousness. A comparison of Strawson's conception with Kant's conception of being 'I' reveals its systematic shortcomings that rather support, against Strawson's purpose, Kant's version of descriptive metaphysics as a theory of subjectivity.
7

P. F. STRAWSON AND STEPHEN DAVIES ON THE ONTOLOGY OF ART. A CRITICAL DISCUSSION

75%
Pettersson A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
|
vol. 16
|
issue 4
615-631
EN
P. F. Strawson's 'Individuals' (1959) contains a condensed version of the ontology of art. According to this ontology, musical and literary compositions are two similar types. They are abstract entities, instantiated in the performances of the piece of music or the copies of the literary work. Musical and literary compositions are 'well-entrenched', Strawson says - we cannot eliminate these abstractions, or perhaps we have no need to do so. Strawson's ontology of art forms an integral part of what he calls his 'descriptive metaphysics', and his resistance to the elimination of types and type-like entities is one example of his reservations against 'revisionary metaphysics'. Nowadays, Strawson's name is seldom mentioned in connection with the philosophy of art. Yet the general view of the ontology of art advocated in Individuals is still probably the one most widely held in analytical aesthetics today. Thus, for example, Stephen Davies adopts the same general position as Strawson in his article 'Ontology of Art' (2003), the best informed contemporary overview of the complex of problems surrounding the mode of existence of works of art. Unlike Strawson, Davies also adduces explicit reasons why concepts of musical and literary compositions cannot be successfully eliminated. Critically reviewing Strawson's and Davies' standpoints and arguments, the author maintains that concepts of artworks can in fact be successfully eliminated, and that the bracketing of such notions leads to a better theoretical perspective on musical and literary communication. Throughout the paper, he speaks for an open-minded approach to conceptual revision.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.