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EN
According to the traditional interpretation, Levi-Strauss' structural anthropology deposes the concept of man and the notion of human nature from its central place in human and social sciences. While it is necessary to acknowledge Levi-Strauss' distance vis-a-vis all philosophy based on intentionality, experience and consciousness of subject, the author argues that the most interesting purpose of the structural anthropology lies elsewhere. Not only Levi-Strauss never declared himself being part of anti-humanism movement, but most of all, his famous polemics with Sartre at the end of 'La Pensee sauvage' should be interpreted as part of his fight against ethnocentrism. The project of 'dissolving the man' can be thus read as deconstructing the idea that western man makes of himself in the light of ethnological findings about universal structures orchestrating all human societies. He further shows that the notion of subject survived its very death announced by the most radical structuralist thinkers and that structural method could be effectively employed in order to study different techniques and modes of subjectivation, revealing that 'becoming subject' is a process structured by our language, symbolic universe and ethical teleology
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 10
769 – 778
EN
What is the nature of the interpellation that enables us to recognize ourselves as subjects of an experience? How do we become subjects and what is the relationship between subjectivity and otherness? The paper discusses the genesis of the subjectivity from a phenomenological and a social standpoint, confronting Levinas’ phenomenological perspective on subjective responsibility with Althusser’s and Butler’s account of the interpellation by the law. If ethical and normative interpellation is often seen as overlapping, this paper discusses their differences as a critical resource for the phenomenological theory of subjectivity.
EN
The following essay is aimed at confining the scope of The Theory of Communicative Action apropos of the problem of personal identity. For Habermas the notion of personal identity may be derived directly from the conclusions of his social theory: it is the specific part of the lifeworld (the meanings connected to the self) reproduced via communicative action. As communicative action is the mechanism of social integration as well, it is impossible to describe theoretically a personal identity that is distinct from the social in the Habermasian approach. This problem is solved in the paper with the help of Foucault's ideas on social power and subjectivation. Foucault introduces a constitutive dimension of power: he originates the modem subject from the individualization of power relations. By examining the subject in its opposition to social power, he offers an opportunity to describe a personal identity that is distinct from the social. In the author's opinion, by approaching to the concept of communicative action from a Foucaultian perspective, certain elements of power in the series of speech acts (that is certain dogmatic language uses) may be introduced as the expressions of the opposition against the logic of action coordination referring to the contours of personal identity. These dogmatic language uses may be specified based on the Kohlbergian-Habermasian ideas on moral development. In these cases the dogmatic language use does not require emancipation as it refers to personal identity, in this sense it reveals the limits of the scope of communicative rationality. In the final part of the paper the recognition-theoretical presuppositions of personal identity are introduced.
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