Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Searle
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

Searle, Putnam i natura stanów mentalnych

100%
Paleczny P.
Diametros
|
2015
|
issue Diametros 46
74-91
EN
The paper deals with the controversy between internalism and externalism on the nature of mental states, and its relevance to the philosophy of perception. In particular, the controversy between Hilary Putnam's natural realism and John Searle's direct realism is discussed. It is argued that Searle's defense of internalism fails to meet Putnam’s objections. Putnam’s case is even strengthened and the very source of the internalism vs. externalism controversy is identified in their shared assumptions. The rejection of these assumptions, together with the underlying myth of Cartesian Theater, makes the controversy meaningless. Finally, the relations of Searle’s and Putnam’s views to the Cartesian framework in the philosophy of perception are discussed.
PL
Głównym tematem pracy jest spór pomiędzy internalizmem a eksternalizmem w kwestii stanów mentalnych oraz jego znaczenie dla filozofii percepcji. W szczególności praca przedstawia spór pomiędzy realizmem naturalnym Hilarego Putnama a realizmem bezpośrednim Johna Searle'a. Podjęta zostaje próba wykazania, że argumenty Searle'a nie oddalają krytyki internalizmu, którą wysunął Putnam. Postawiona zostaje teza, że spór pomiędzy internalizmem a eksternalizmem oparty jest na wspólnych dla obu stanowisk przesłankach, których podważenie prowadzi do zakwestionowania sensowności samego sporu. Przesłanki te zostają umieszczone w kontekście mitu „teatru Kartezjańskiego”. Przedstawione zostają relacje, w jakich stanowiska Searle'a i Putnama pozostają do założeń uznanych w tej pracy za konstytutywne dla kartezjańskiego schematu myślenia w filozofii percepcji.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Why Moral Norms Cannot be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral “Ought” from “Is”

100%
Załuski W.
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
|
2019
|
vol. 2(20)
63-74
EN
The paper aims at formulating a certain trilemma that applies to justifying moral norms. The trilemma can be succinctly stated as follows: any attempt to derive a “moral-ought-statement” from an “is-statement” with a justificatory goal (i.e. to justify the “moral-ought-statement”), even if it were successful in its “derivation” part (i.e. logically correct), would be unsuccessful in its “justificatory” part for one of the following three reasons: (1) it would consider each human action of which a factual statement can be made as morally obligatory, thus “justifying” a large number of implausible moral norms; or (2) it would presuppose a moral norm not derivable from facts; or (3) it would not explain why the distinction – made based on extra-moral criteria – between those factual statements about human actions from which moral norms can be derived and those from which they cannot be derived should count as morally relevant. The trilemma is illustrated in the paper by an analysis of Searle’s well-known attempt at deriving “ought” from “is”. Some further implications of the trilemma regarding the proper way of justifying moral norms are also examined.
PL
Celem artykułu jest sformułowanie pewnego trylematu dotyczącego uzasadniania norm moralnych. Trylemat ten można ująć zwięźle w następujący sposób: każda próba logicznego wywiedzenia zdania moralnego (formułującego nakaz lub zakaz określonego działania), ze zdania lub zdań faktualnych, nawet jeśli byłaby poprawna w swojej części logicznej, nie mogłaby stanowić jego uzasadnienia z jednego z trzech powodów: albo (1) prowadziłaby do uznania każdego typu czynu za moralnie nakazany lub zakazany, nie pozostawiając tym samym miejscu dla czynów moralnie obojętnych; albo (2) zakładałaby istnienie normy moralnej nie dającej się wyprowadzić ze zdań faktualnych; albo (3) nie tłumaczyłaby, dlaczego dokonana na podstawie poza-moralnych kryteriów dystynkcja między zdaniami faktualnymi mogącymi stanowić podstawę dla derywacji norm moralnych i zdaniami faktualnymi nie mogącymi stanowić takiej podstawy, miałaby zostać uznana za moralnie istotną. Trylemat ten zostaje w artykule zilustrowany w kontekście analizy znanej próby Searle’a wyprowadzenia norm z faktów. Artykuł kończą refleksje na temat implikacji trylematu dla sporu o właściwy sposób uzasadniania norm moralnych.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Kłamstwo. Analiza terminologiczna

100%
Łukowski P.
Studia z Teorii Wychowania
|
2017
|
issue 3 (20)
9-48
EN
It seems that a lie is a well-understood term. However, on the scientific ground, there is no precise and commonly accepted definition of a lie. There are various proposals how to understand it in psychology, in the theory of communication, and linguistics. In the paper, there is proposed such a definition which could be useful in the fields just mentioned, as well as in the educational sciences. Especially, from the practical point of view an accurate meaning of lying should be important for pedagogues, educators, and teachers. Moreover, a proposed definition of a lie can become the base to define, as precisely as possible, another apparently vague term: psycho-manipulation.
4
Content available remote

Kategorizace mluvních aktů řeči víry

71%
Fajmon B.
Studia theologica
|
2014
|
vol. 1
182-195
EN
Briggs’ analysis of the confession “Jesus is Lord” implicitly indicates the limitations of Searle’s categorization of speech acts. In an attempt to classify the confession of faith according to Searle’s categorization, the theologically relevant properties of confession remain blurred. The main area of our interest is “faith discourse”, defined by means of the concept of “pneumatic intentionality”, which functions as a theological supplement to Searle’s intentionality of mind. In this article, we aim at establishing the categorization of speech acts of faith discourse on the basis of their transformative and communicative dimensions.
5
Content available remote

Mluvní akty prosebné modlitby ve Starém zákoně

62%
Fajmon B.
Studia theologica
|
2015
|
vol. 1
45-69
EN
After previously constructing the classification of the speech acts of faith we now address specifically the speech acts of asking in prayer in the Old Testament from the perspective of Austin’s and Searle’s theory. We firstly analyze the declarative and directive dimensions of human blessing while also considering the “sincerity condition”. Searle’s condition of “non‑obviousness”, which is valid for the request, is not relevant in the case of asking in prayer. However, it opens the field of inquiry into the perlocutionary intentions of the one who prays. The last part of the essay examines the connection between the “preparatory conditions” of asking in prayer with various relations between different speech‑acts in the discourse of prayer.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.