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EN
The recent financial crisis showed that the institutions of the European Union (EU) and its member states are poorly prepared for solving current problems of banks, which are experiencing financial difficulties in European markets. In order to be able to further provide services for citizens and companies, member states’ governments had to support banks with public finances and provide guarantees on an unprecedented scale. It did help to avoid a collapse of banks and a disturbance of the economy, but only by putting the burden on taxpayers and thereby causing deterioration in public finances. An agreement about the right course of action in the face of these difficulties experienced by cross-national banks has not been reached either. The major situation changer should be the European Banking Union (EBU), also called the Integrated Financial System, which is in the process of being created. The foundations for it have been laid during Lithuanian presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2013. For Lithuania and all other EU member states, joining the banking union will mean handing over important national state powers to the European Union institutions.
PL
The article provides an overview of the legal structure of the Banking Union consisting of two pillars – the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism. As a point of departure, it discusses the reasons for the creation of the Banking Union. Then, it analyses the legal structure of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in order to compare it to the legal framework of the Single Resolution Mechanism and shows that the differences in their design are a corollary of disparate legal bases for both instruments. Finally, it argues that the disputed legal basis for the regulation establishing the Single Resolution Mechanism is sufficient in light of Meroni doctrine as formulated in the Short-selling case.
EN
Complexity and uncertainty in the application of the regulations of the European system of financial supervision are due to the fact that its particular elements were implemented over a period of time. First, it was a system of European financial supervision authorities i.e. the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and the Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), whose main objective was to coordinate national actions. Then there were established the European Banking Union, including the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), as well as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which constitutes also a part of the system of support for endangered banks. Legal interpretation problems are a result of differences in the scope of competences of these entities. For example, there is uncertainty whether the regulations refer to the eurozone or the whole European Union and if they refer to banks only or to other financial institutions as well. An analysis of the SSM, the SRM or the ESM does not always offer a clear answer to questions such as: who, when and using what tools should act; when, for example, the ECB may and should correct the decisions of national supervisors; what is the role of the ESRB, if we take account of the enhanced competences of the ECB in the banking union; if and when banks may question supervisory decisions concerning, for example, establishing a buffer or classifying an institution as SIFI, etc. Similarly, the role of the EBA or the ESM is unclear in the context of the establishment of the banking union, the SSM, the SRM, the ESM and the delegation of power of the ECB and the European Commission to regulatory agencies (Meroni doctrine) or the practice of establishing regulatory agencies outside the bounds of the treaty (Pringle doctrine). Therefore the regulatory landscape in this context requires impact assessment.
EN
This paper deals with legal instruments and their assesment of the Single Resolution Mechanizm regulated in recommendation 806/2014 and directive 2014/59/UE, which set up the second pillar of the European Banking Union, being a new conctruction enlarging and complementing the European Stability Safety Net.
PL
W opracowaniu dokonano analizy prawnych instrumentów urzeczywistnienia stabilności finansowej w UE w dyrektywie 2014/59/UE oraz rozporządzeniu 806/2014 wprowadzających jednolity mechanizm restrukturyzacji i uporządkowanej likwidacji stanowiący II filar Europejskiej Unii Bankowej, a zarazem element konstrukcyjny poszerzający Europejską Sieć Stabilności Finansowej.
EN
The article describes the concept of creating a banking union. It analyses the structure of each of its pillars as well as their evolution during the negotiations amongst Member States. The author also describes the attitude of Poland towards the project of a banking union.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza ewolucji koncepcji unii bankowej od momentu jej powstania do czasu przedstawienia ostatecznej formy jej wprowadzenia w życie, tj. do sierpnia 2014 r. W poszczególnych punktach omówione zostały trzy filary unii bankowej, a także poruszono kwestię Polski i jej stanowiska wobec nowego systemu nadzoru.
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