Results found: 2

Search results

Search:
in the keywords: Suárez

Sort By:

Limit search:

Suárezova teorie poznání a její vztah k tomismu

100%

Heider D.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2011

vol. 59

issue 6

865-896

Suárez’s theory of knowledge, worked out in his On the Soul (1621), presents a significant philosophical addition to the famous Metaphysical Disputations (1597). Even if On the Soul was published posthumously, its basic thoughts were developed, by Suárez himself, as early as in the first half of the 1570’s. For this reason this work of pure philosophy provides the indispensable context for Suárez’s metaphysical reflections. The article presents the fundamental characteristics of Suárez’s theory of knowledge, with emphasis on knowledge of reason, and with a view to its critical relation to Thomist theory. It is above all Thomist theory which Suárez was addressing. Next to the brief presentation of the historical context of the work and a sketch of the basic anthropological tendencies connected with Suárez’s particular form of dualism with regard to the question of the soul and body, the author presents four basic characteristics of Suárez’s theory of knowledge. 1) Suárez’s theory of knowledge is characterised as a doctrine that puts emphasis on the vital nature of knowledge. The whole principle of knowledge cannot be considered without the factor of the attentive soul; passive reason, as really identical with active reason, cannot be treated as passive primary matter; the intentional species represent extramental objects only in an embryonic way; intentional connections of the knowing subject with the known thing can be understood as, at most, an accidental one. All these theses are clearly signs of non-Thomism. 2) Suárez’s theory of knowledge is characterised by direct cognitive realism. The rejection of the expressed species (species expressa) really distinct from the cognitive act and the rejection of the definition of a formal concept as that in which (id in quo) we grasp extramental things, shows that Suárez unequivocably advocates a conception of direct realism. He views Thomist theory as approaching too closely to an undesirable representationalism. 3) Suárez’s teaching is further characterised by a theory of the sympathy of cognitive potencies having their root in a common soul. It is this theory – widely accepted in Renaissance philosophy – which understands the relation between sensory and rational knowledge acausally. Suárez conceives it in contrast to the Thomist theory which works with a causal understanding of this relation. 4) In the final part of the study Suárez’s epistemological theory of the direct rational knowledge of material individuals is presented. Thomist teaching on the reflexive rational knowledge of individuals is rejected by Suárez for the same reason as Thomist theory on the real distinction between the concept and cognitive act: both offend against direct realism and thus also against the objectivity of our knowledge. The author comes to the negative conclusion that Suárez’s theory of knowledge is positively not primarily inspired by Thomist theory. The main influence – one which the author does not attempt to elaborate – seems to be the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition. At the same time attention is drawn to some of Suárez’s themes that are taken up by modern philosophy, such as occasionalism, innate ideas, predetermined harmony and the unity of apperception – these bring Suárez close to the conceptions of early modern rationalists.

Scholastic Sources of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s Treatise Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui

85%

Koszkało M.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

2017

vol. 65

issue 2

23-55

The object of this article is the scholastic inspirations found in the metaphysical disputation De principio individui by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The purpose of this study was, on one hand, a reconstruction of Leibniz’s theory concerning the principle of individuation, and on the other hand, a presentation of some texts by medieval scholastic authors (Henry of Ghent, Peter of Falco, Thomas Aquinas, Aegidius of Rome, Robert Kilwardby, William of Ockham) to whose ideas Leibniz refers in the named work, even though he had, for the most part, only second-hand information concerning them. In his juvenile treatise, Leibniz states that the individuating principle has to be universal, which means relevant to all kinds of being; it has to be metaphysical in character and not merely epistemological. He regards individuality as synonymous with unity combined with difference. He resolutely takes sides with nominalism and rejects the reality of all kinds of universal beings and beings whose unity is weaker than numerical unity. As a consequence of this assumption, he rejects the conceptions in which the principle of individuation is formed by: double negation, existence or the haecceity. By contrast, he embraces the solution (close to the tradition originated by Ockham and also related to Suárez), according to which the whole entity (tota entitas) of an individual thing is the principle of individuation. In effect, for Leibniz, any real thing is simply singular, which comes down to the thesis that a thing is singular owing to its own metaphysical subcomponents, which are singular by themselves.

Przedmiotem artykułu są scholastyczne inspiracje zawarte w dyspucie metafizycznej De principio individui Godfryda Wilhelma Leibniza. Celem artykułu jest, z jednej strony, rekonstrukcja stanowiska Leibniza dotyczącego zasady jednostkowienia, z drugiej zaś strony przedstawienie tekstów średniowiecznych autorów (Henryka z Gandawy, Piotra z Falco, Tomasza z Akwinu, Idziego Rzymianina, Henryka z Gandawy, Roberta Kilwardby’ego, Wilhelma Ockhama), do których poglądów Leibniz się odnosi, a które najczęściej znał z drugiej ręki. W swym młodzieńczym dziele Leibniz deklaruje, że zasada jednostkowienia ma być uniwersalna, to znaczy dotyczyć wszystkich rodzajów bytów oraz musi mieć charakter metafizyczny, a nie epistemologiczny. Indywidualność z kolei traktuje jako synonim jedności i różnicy. Opowiada się po stronie nominalizmu, odrzucając istnienie jakichkolwiek form bytów ogólnych, czy bytów o jedności słabszej niż numeryczna. W związku z tym odrzuca koncepcje, w których zasadę jednostkowienia stanowi: podwójna negacja, istnienie czy haecceitas, przyjmując rozwiązanie (bliskie tradycji Ockhama i odnosząc się do Suáreza), według którego cała bytowość (tota entitas) indywiduum jest zasadą jednostkowienia. W efekcie według niego rzecz jest jednostkowa po prostu, co sprowadza się do tezy, że jest jednostkowa dzięki swym subkomponentom bytowym, które same są jednostkowe.

Refine search results

1 Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

1 Roczniki Filozoficzne

1 Heider D.

1 Koszkało M.

1 2017

1 2011

Search results

Suárezova teorie poznání a její vztah k tomismu

Scholastic Sources of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s Treatise Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui