In this article, the philosophy of biology of the German philosopher Hans Jonas (1903– –1993) is presented in a concise form. According to this approach, it is necessary to project an anti-reductionist view of the human mind back into the whole evolutionary order, the climax of which is man. In this respect, only man, as embodied subjectivity, is capable of such a retrospective view. A disposition to the emergence of the inwardness of the organism is already contained in material nature itself, and it then develops in the course of evolution by its own powers up to the emergence of the human spirit. It exploits, in this regard, “openings“ in the causal nexus of nature, provided by quantum physics. Jonas is, here, characterised as a panpsychic and an attempt is made to categorise his panpsychism in terms of todays context, both from a philosophical point of view (G. Strawson, D. Chalmers), and a biological one (the phenomena of self‑assembly and self-organisation as sources of “order for free”).
The article tries to show the relations between P. M. Churchland's and J. Hick's reference to T. Nagel's „bat argument" and is based on Nagel's, Mortal questions, Chuchralnd's The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul. A Philosophical Journey into the Brain and J. Hick's The New Frontier of Religion and Science. Religious experience, neuroscience and the transcendent. The clue is that Churchland and Hick beg the main point of the Nagel's argument about the difference between mind and brain. Churchland agrees with Nagel in assuming of the self and only self knowledge about mind states. But the former author and Hick misunderstand that indeed Nagel argues that it is still impossible to identify subjective states as objective. Moreover, Hick avoids Churchland's counter-argument. Therefore, not all of the dispute concerns the same problem.
The article discusses the problem of moral luck described by T. Nagel and B. Williams. It also presents the critique of N. Richards. In terms of Nagel moral luck causes a paradox: we judge morally random acts and break the principle of estimating only those acts which are under the con- trol of the perpetrator. Richards criticizes the sole use of the criterion of effects of the act, without intentions. This criticism is extended and includes the objection of too far-reaching generalization of the role of luck made by Nagel.
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.