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EN
Two studies investigated whether there is a link between understanding of mind and facial expressions recognition. In Study 1 eighty-nine 4-year-olds completed false beliefs tasks, included also questions about desire and surprise, and two tests of facial expressions processing: recognition and matching. False belief understanding was found to share 16.5% of variance with recognition and matching of facial expressions, independently of age and parents education, which suggests that both domains of social cognition could influence each other in 4-year-olds. There was no link between understanding of surprise and recognition of facial expression of surprise. This result contradicts a hypothesis that errors in recognition of surprise are due to the conceptual problems. In Study 2 with fifty 7-year-olds there was found that matching of facial expressions still accounted for some part of variance in second-order false belief tasks but the relation was not reciprocal. Results are discussed in terms of componential view of theory of mind. .
EN
This paper addresses the problem of relationships between the development of theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF). An overview of empirical findings leads to the conclusion that the complex picture of the relations between EF and ToM development may result from the intertwining of different types and levels of reciprocal influences. It is, on the one hand, the level of emergence-type vs. expressive-type influences, and, on the other hand, direct vs. indirect ones. Data from longitudinal and training studies suggest the asymmetry of reciprocal influences between EF and ToM, with the stronger impact of EF on ToM development, which supports the view that EF is a prerequisite of ToM development. A model is proposed that explains how different EF and ToM skills are involved in the specific types and levels of influences. The issue of disentangling in the analysis the different types of reciprocal impacts is also discussed.
EN
The goal of this article is to provide a cognitive explanation of some aspects of conspiracy theories which influence their spread in society. One important human mental capacity is the ability to produce beliefs about mental states (intentions, motivation, emotions etc.) of others. This ability, also called the Theory of Mind, enables humans to produce complex social interactions and effective cooperation but it is also crucial in creation of coalitions, cheater detection and in prediction of threats from other conspecifics. Previous research shows that socially spread explanations of world phenomena, which trigger these mental mechanisms (i.e. they propose human like intentions as causes of these phenomena), have better inferential potential whereby they become intuitively more relevant as alternative explanations. In this context the author argues that conspiracy theories, just because of how they are defined, are cognitively attractive as they postulate a potential threat as a result of hidden intentions of some group of people.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 8
645 – 655
EN
The paper aims to scrutinize the assumption of direct perception, which plays a crucial role in the interactive approach to social cognition. The author tries to show that the interactive approach is problematic, if we take into account the results of studies focused on the presence of mentalizing capacities in early infancy. He argues that direct perception does not provide a productive explanatory framework and it struggles to provide an account of cognitive processes that enable social perception.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 6
530 – 538
EN
The objective of this paper is to compare the theory and the theory theory of modularity. It is argued that the theory theory approach does not offer sufficient description of the ability to attribute mental states. The focus is on evaluation of evidence coming from various cognitive deficits, especially Autistic Spectrum Disorder. The paper suggests that the attribution of mental states is typically based on an implicit, mandatory and fast processing as opposed to inferential acquisition of knowledge.
EN
The main aim of the presented research is to describe children's ability to generate and understand humorous stories and pictures drawn by their peers and older or younger children. From the perspective of research on children's theories of mind, we assume that in middle childhood we will observe a transition from the basic, copy theory of mind to the interpretative one (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). The authoresses examined 60 five- and nine-year-old children in two phases. During the first phase, the children were asked to draw a funny picture and then justify what made it funny and they had also to present the funny story. Two months later, the children were presented with some pictures chosen after the first phase as the most typical one. They had to justify why these pictures are funny. The obtained results indicate that there is a relation between the age of the subjects and the kind of interpretations of funny pictures which are consistent with the author's intentions. Significantly more nine-year-olds than five-year-olds accurately understood the author's intentions when interpreting his picture. The presented data indicate that changes in the theory of mind take place also in middle childhood and lead to a complex, interpretative theory of mind which can be discovered when researching children's understanding of jokes.
PL
Theory of mind, often called mentalizing ability, is the ability to attribute mental states to other people in order to explain and predict their behavior. This ability, considered as automatic and natural, is very important for social cognition and social functioning. The importance of this ability is well seen when we analyze difficulties in social functioning of people with difficulties in mentalizing, that is people with schizophrenia. The aim of the article is to present this new perspective in research on social dysfunction in schizophrenia. Starting with presentation of contemporary definitions of social cognition which emphasize the crucial role of the theory of mind we then define what the theory of mind is and discuss methods aimed to assess the mentalizing ability. Afterwards we try to answer the question whether social dysfunction in schizophrenia can be explained as a deficit of the theory of mind. Further, we present studies of insight and effectiveness of therapy aimed to improve the ability to mentalize, and we use it as an argument that theory of mind plays a fundamental role in social functioning. In summary we focus on further perspectives for studies in social cognition.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 8
567 – 580
EN
The study deals with methodological and interpretive problems in the current research of early social cognition. The main focus is on implicit false belief tasks, which are considered to provide key evidence for the early presence of theory of mind. I argue that the research based on the analysis of visual behaviour does not offer a sufficient tool to reveal cognitive processes characteristic for mindreading, mainly due to the problem of under determination. However, alternative forms of research that emphasize the role of interactive context could offer a stronger and less ambiguous evidence of the extent to which preverbal children understand minds of others.
EN
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the lifespan developing ability to attribute mental states. This ability enables the individual to predict and interpret one’s own and others’ behaviour. In this respect, beliefs about one’s own capacity to attribute mental states represent a fundamental component of this construct. The present study aims to compare the unidimensional structure of the Mind-reading Belief Scale, evaluating beliefs about personal ToM skills, with an alternative two-factor model, which could better explain the latent structure of the scale outlining the relational nature of the construct through the articulation self-other. Moreover, the relations with self-construal, as a pivotal element for subjective differentiation, were also investigated. Our data support the two-factor model as a better structuring of the pool of original items. Finally, the correlations found with self-construal scales indicate that self-construal is involved in defining beliefs about one’s own meta-representational skills.
EN
Social understanding is usually conceptualized as consisting of understanding emotions (i.e., empathy) and understanding the other’s mental states (i.e., theory of mind or mindreading). Both these aspects of social understanding are hypothesized to be related to pro-social orientation. Therefore, the purpose of the presented study is to examine whether theory of mind or empathy is the stronger predictor of pro-social orientation. As a secondary aim, the authors also explored the question of gender differences as an important differentiating factor in both theory of mind and empathy. 197 preadolescents aged 11 to 15 participated in the study. Participants filled out two tests of theory of mind skills, three empathy questionnaires and the pro-social orientation was determined by peer-nominated questionnaire. The results corroborated the idea that the higher the social understanding, the higher the pro-social orientation. Moreover, theory of mind predicted pro-social behaviour better than empathy. Girls outperformed boys in both empathy and mindreading measures. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 7
591 – 603
EN
The paper’s focus is on the social cognition in humans and other great apes. Both the traditional debate on the theory of mind in chimpanzees, and the current influential account of shared intentionality as the locus of anthropological difference are based on questionable representationalist and intellectualist views of the mind. The proponents of the so-called interactive turn in social cognition research reject these views and propose an alternative interactionist and inactivist account of human social understanding. The author will argue that the interactive turn is to be extended and applied to other animal species as well, especially to non-human great apes.
EN
The ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ Test (RMET) is a test of a Theory of Mind, i.e., the ability to infer the states of minds of other people. The purpose of this study was to evaluate a Polish adaptation of the RMET. The sample consisted of 447 participants, aged 18-85. The internal consistency of the RMET was 0.668; the upper confidence interval was 0.718. The score in the Polish version of the RMET was positively correlated with the English version. Test-retest stability was acceptable, with ICC = 0.886. The correlation of RMET and the cognitive empathy measure confirms the theoretical assumptions. There were significant gender differences in RMET scores: women had higher scores than men. Elderly groups of participants differ statistically from younger groups of participants in the RMET. The Polish version of the RMET showed satisfactory psychometric parameters, comparable to those of the original version.
EN
The article starts from the notion of the human mind as the main topic of all branches of scientific psychology and specifies its general functions, namely, to represent the external and internal worlds and to influence and control both these worlds. Language is treated here as the best tool or medium to fulfill these functions: representational and pragmatic. A model of language knowledge as a component of the individual human mind is presented. In this model, language knowledge is composed of two competences: purely linguistic competence that fulfills the representational function, and communicative competence with its communicative (pragmatic) function. Each of these competences has its independent biological basis: Universal Grammar (UG) being a biological endowment of linguistic competence and Theory of Mind (ToM) playing the same role for communicative competence. Different genetically-based disturbances are specific for each of these competences, such as Specific Language Impairment (SLI) for language competence and autism for the communicative (pragmatic). The socio-cultural influences on the development of the two competences are realized through the acquisition of meta-linguistic and meta-pragmatic skills.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2008
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vol. 63
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issue 4
305-310
EN
The aim of the paper is to define the problems, which one has to handle in order to understand 'meaning' on the universal-systematic level. The starting point is the famous Searle's thesis 'Syntax cannot keep with semantics'. This thesis is confronted with Dennett's homuncular functionalism, which underlines the fundamental role the evolutionary processes play in the production of an organism endowed with 'meaning'. The author comes to the conclusion that 'meaning' is an inevitably biological evolutionary process in which the hierarchically ordered domains as the results of evolution merge together.
Studia Psychologica
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2022
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vol. 64
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issue 3
268 – 282
EN
The previous research has suggested that one-time literary fiction exposure facilitates the ability to infer the other’s emotions/intentions, but the effect has a relatively low statistical power, and the mechanism remains poorly understood. To obtain greater statistical power and understand the mechanism, the index of cumulative reading engagement (CRE) with fiction is being proposed in the present research. College students (N = 408) described their reading engagement by completing questionnaires about reading interest, reading time, diversity of reading materials, and fiction exposure. Next, participants assessed the moral judgment of actions and interpersonal reactivity scales. We analysed the data using the structural equation technique to study the three-path mediation model. The results indicated that 1) CRE was related to social processing tendencies; 2) CRE contributed to moral intentions toward moral dilemma; 3) the effect of CRE on moral judgment was mediated by empathic concern, but not by perspective-taking and imaginary engagement. This study suggests that CRE is a reliable indicator of fiction exposure. Alternatively, reading fiction may involve exploring and expressing complex emotions, which in turn helps individuals increase their ability to infer and prioritize actors’ moral intentions.
EN
The authors propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: 1. the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and 2. a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.
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