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Filo-Sofija
|
2008
|
vol. 8
|
issue 8
35-45
EN
The main subject of the fifteenth paragraph of the chapter of Critique of Pure Reason entitled “Transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding” is the concept of connection. It is interesting that in the chapter Kant used the word “connection” thirty two times in the edition from 1787, whereas in the first edition published in 1781 the word occurs five times only. The idea of the present paper is to show the importance of the concept of connection as conjunction by showing that it cannot be used as a synonym of synthesis. The article is intended as an introduction to further and more detailed study on the concept of connection.
EN
The point of departure in the paper is the problem of identification of the foundations of knowledge, its beginning and status in modern philosophy (Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Hume, Fichte, Chisholm, Shoemaker). The author undertakes an analysis of the position taken by Kant in the context of the problem of transcendental deduction of categories and its fundamental principle - the transcendental unity of apperception. He focuses on the connection between transcendental apperception with pre-predicative existence of pure consciousness and intellectual insight. Kant held that consciousness is a result of the self-referring operation of auto-reflection. This means that self-consciousness is not some kind of knowledge, nor is it any sort of mental content through which it would be possible to identify the subject.
EN
In connection with recent research conducted by several contemporary German scholars, such writers as Baum, Wolff and Reich, the author addresses the following problem: If the subject, conceived generally, is a representation formed by the intellect then a combination of various representations into one object as it appears to the subject must also be a product of the intellect. If so much is granted, the question arises: How is it possible that various representations are unified in the intellect in a way adequate to the representations themselves rather than to the patterns of unification used by the subject? And another question becomes important: What is the meaning of the 'objective unity of apperception', and what is its relation to the 'synthetic unity of apperception' in this context? According to Reich, for instance, objective cognition cannot be effected within one concept due to the properties of the self itself. If the thought presenting the subject, conceived generally, to itself is a necessary thought for the subject which in this way acquires knowledge of its own non-productivity, and if this condition characterises all thoughts different from the self then the limitations of the self are transferred to all its thoughts. From these considerations springs the main idea of the article, namely, that the proposition is, by virtue of its own definition, an instance of the use of concepts when the subject wants to gain cognition of objects. With the mediation of the proposition concepts are constituted as synthetically unified in the subject. According to Wolff the concept of intellectual cognition that underlies transcendental deduction is the point of departure and the guiding beacon for the Kantian program. Eventually, the author joins the position of Reich who claims that the meaning of 'proposition' and 'intellect' must be seen in the light of Kant's contention that the unity of intellect and the unifying functions of intellect can be fully discovered only after a comprehensive understanding of the unifying functions of propositions has been achieved.
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