Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  TRUTH CONDITIONS
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

REPRESENTATIONS AND RELATIONS

100%
Koťátko P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2014
|
vol. 21
|
issue 3
282 – 302
EN
The paper focuses on Uriah Kriegel’s non-relational account of representation, based on the rejection of the widely shared assumption that “representing something involves (constitutively) bearing a relation to it”. Kriegel’s approach is briefly compared with another version of non-relational theory presented by Mark Sainsbury. The author discusses several reasons why the relational aspect of representation should stand in the centre of our theoretical interest, despite the arguments of non-relationists. They concern (1) the origin of the very capacity to represent in our interactions with elements of our external environment; (2) the externalist arguments attempting to show that some of our states and acts are irreducibly embedded in our relations with external environment and these relations play an in-eliminable role in the constitution of their content; (3) the fact that representations typically have conditions of satisfaction which relate the representing states or acts to the external world in such a way that if the conditions are not fulfilled, this counts as a representation-failure; (4) the fact that the representation ascriptions are often based relationally and the claim that two subjects think about the same often admits only relational interpretation. The author concludes by pointing to the wide variety of phenomena called “representation” and argues that there is no a priori reason to presuppose that all such cases admit, or even require a unified analysis.
2

EPISTEMICKÝ KONTEXTUALIZMUS A JEHO MOTIVÁCIA

100%
Zouhar M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue suppl. 2
171 – 186
EN
According to Keith DeRose, the best argument for epistemic contextualism is supplied by communication intuitions ordinary speakers have when evaluating utterances of sentences of the form “S knows that p” and “S does not know that p”. It is claimed that utterances of “S knows that p” and “S does not know that p” can both be true with respect to the same S and p because the speakers of the utterances employ different epistemic standards. The aim of the paper is to show that one can accept this claim as true while denying epistemic contextualism. A handful of possible contenders to epistemic contextualism are given. Thus, the alleged best argument for contextualism has to be supplemented by other arguments to show that epistemic contextualism should be given preference to the other approaches.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.