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  1. 3 Filozofia (Philosophy)

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  1. 1 2020

  2. 2 2018

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  1. 3 Muránsky M.

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1

TUGENDHATOV PROBLÉM „PRAVDY“ V KONFRONTÁCII S HEIDEGGEROM

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Muránsky M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2018
|
vol. 73
|
issue 10
790 – 803
EN
The aim of the study is to provide a critical commentary on the position held by E. Tugendhat in his work Egocentricity and Mysticism (published in 2003) in terms of his own criteria of the hermeneutic concept of truth. The article presents this concept of truth in its original negative-critical form, and explores two lines of inquiry in an attempt to explicitly grasp the implicitly understood „world as a whole“ in Wittgenstein's perspective of the impossibility of reflecting the boundaries of the language. The second, parallel theme is an attempt to investigate the „universe“ (understood as a whole) as the basis of his theory of mysticism. The first thesis of this study is that both of these levels, on the one hand the enlightenment worldview and on the other hand the existential concept of mysticism, have to be separated and thematized as a relationship between the condition of a possibility and the conditioned. The second thesis is that as a result of his theory of mysticism Tugendhat introduced the concept of „egocentricity“ in two mutually contradictory meanings. The third is that by his essentialism in the concept of „anthropology“ Tugendhat allowed the return of Heidegger's problem of the historical picture of the world to the place of universal truth, and also the return of the problem of authentic and no authentic existence beyond the sphere of ethics.
2

ERNST TUGENDHAT O HEIDEGGEROVOM PROBLÉME „PRAVDY“

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Muránsky M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2018
|
vol. 73
|
issue 8
675 – 688
EN
The paper departs from actual critical reception of Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s notion of truth (Wrathall/Malpas), according to which the failure of Tugendhat consist in his reduction of twofold character of truth (unconcealment / proposition) on the level of propositional stance. The main thesis of the paper is that Tugendhat accepts this basic hermeneutical contribution of Heidegger, but he radically changes the relationship of both levels in the favour of propositional truth. This is possible only due to his analytical interpretation of the principle of non-contradiction – in the Heideggerian area of a relationship of yourself-to-yourself. The loss of critical dimension in the notion of truth as “unconcealment” doesn’t primarily deal with the possibility of propositional truth in Being and Time – also as answer to Tugendhat’s critique, but has to do with the loss of critical responsibility in Heidegger’s concept of consciences. Tugendhat’s critique remains relevant because of hermeneutical situation, in which every “understanding of being” can be uncritically “uncovered” as truth “for itself”.
3

K FILOZOFICKO-EKONOMICKÝM VÝCHODISKÁM SOCIÁLNYCH ĽUDSKÝCH PRÁV U KARLA POLANYIHO A ERNSTA TUGENDHATA

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Muránsky M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2020
|
vol. 75
|
issue 7
569 – 583
EN
The key theses of the study emphasizes the finiteness of meaning in contrast to economic determinism as a normative starting point of K. Polanyi’s and E. Tugendhat’s vision of democratic society, controlled by its citizens. This egalitarian point of departure of defence of social human rights is at the same time the answer to their common dilemma, hidden in conflicting relationship of primacy of right to own to right to life. Taking into account Tugendhat’s critique of libertarian concept of “free” social contract as the will to power in connection with Polanyi’s unmasking of automaton of libertarian spontaneous equilibrium as political construct and self-destructing illusion, the study shows that the drop out of social rights in this concept is based on the nominalist grasp of reality, in relation to which any form of collective self-determination seems to be the enemy of freedom. The second presupposition of this drop out is to be found in the libertarian idea of the natural order of free market connected with the ideal of negative freedom and trickle down economy, based on the illusion of reality consisting of unlimited resources and the cooperation of already self-sufficient, healthy and adult owners of the sources of subsistence.
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