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EN
The author discusses the problem of evil defined by Paul Ricoeur, Jean Nabert and Gabriel Marcel as the basic aspect of human existence. The aim of the article is to analyse the writers' definitions of evil, its origins, how it is possible, ways of reacting on evil and dealing with it. The author compares the viewpoints present in the works of the philosophers under discussion. Paul Ricoeur, the representative of existential phenomenology and hermeneutics, combines philosophical antropology and the analysis of human activity with the problem of human possibilities and weaknesses. He saw evil as the manifestation and result of an individual's freedom. Gabriel Marcel, philosopher and playwright, did an phenomenological analysis of an individual set against today's mass world with evil as one of its components. Jean Nabert, the representative of reflective philosophy, discussed human consciousness, especially an individual's negative experiences, sin and absolute evil. The three standpoints seem to make up one concept, as all of the writers understand an individual as the victim or cause of evil.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 9
711 – 723
EN
The paper proposes a sequence of instructions that corresponds to the method of explanation in its ideal form. The method of explanation is not analytic. Nevertheless, its particular executions may be analytic without affecting its specific cognitive goal (the growth in understanding). Therefore, the method is characterized as “potentially analytic”. Drawing on Zeleňák’s critique of a purely causal view of the explanation relation, as well as on some arguments against Zeleňák’s “mixed view”, the paper argues for a view of the explanation relation as obtaining between abstract objects (the explanans and the explanandum). In the classic case, these are propositions: what is described by (the proposition in) the explanans explains what is described by (the proposition in) the explanandum.
Filo-Sofija
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2008
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vol. 8
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issue 8
35-45
EN
The main subject of the fifteenth paragraph of the chapter of Critique of Pure Reason entitled “Transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding” is the concept of connection. It is interesting that in the chapter Kant used the word “connection” thirty two times in the edition from 1787, whereas in the first edition published in 1781 the word occurs five times only. The idea of the present paper is to show the importance of the concept of connection as conjunction by showing that it cannot be used as a synonym of synthesis. The article is intended as an introduction to further and more detailed study on the concept of connection.
Filo-Sofija
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2004
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vol. 4
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issue 4
225-232
EN
Abstract In his essay The Hermeneutic Function of Distance Paul Ricoeur describes the fundamental concepts of theory of language and text. He criticizes some thesis of Hans Georg Gadamer, but also refers to the notion of “game”, which is essential to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. That gives a chance to interpret Ricoeur’s essay through category of “game” as a basis of human activity. The Hermeneutic Function of Distance has two sources: hermeneutics and structuralism, which is already visible in the nivel of words used by Ricoeur (understanding, disclosure of world, but on the other hand: structure or system). There we can find a possibility of use the notion of “game” in interpreting Ricoeur’s essay: the game is a combination of accident (every move in game) and necessity (rules, conventiones), of system and player’s free will. Ricoeur recognizes the distance, which is fundamental mark of the discourse, as the dialectics of event and meaning: the meaning actualizes itself in the event, and event becomes fill of meaning. In this way the language constitutes it’s reference to the world. Using the notion of “game”, as Gadamer did, one can say, that the world is disclosed through language in the area of self-presenting game. Moreover, being the medium of every experience and every understanding game makes possible to distinguish what is already known and what stays outside the game and needs to be understood. According to Ricoeur the same process appears in the creation and perception of literary works. Both author and lector are the players of this special game, which constitutes the basic relation, questioned by Derrida, between the sender and the receiver of text. At the same time, the literary work loses the reference of the first degree and profit by other reference – to Lebenswelt, the area of literary game. The game-text, through it’s self-presenting activity, attains to predominate over the consciousness of lector and makes possible to experience a text. The basic condition of this process is the distance between the real-self and the player’s-self, the fundamental distance of every communication.
EN
In his highly influential book (The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, first published in 1958), Peter Winch introduces an alternative concept of interpretive social science, in which the focus is shifted from the actors' subjective motives to the common elements found in every understandable action: language games and rule following. This Wittgensteinian, linguistic version of interpretive social science has had its vast array of critics throughout the years: according to some of them, it neglects the practical side of sociology; while others claim that it fails to properly answer the questions raised by the translation from one language game to another, or that it renders critical social theory impossible. In this article, the author tries to critically reflect upon these critiques themselves, showing that the Winchian theory does not overlook the practice in understanding the different forms of life; that with slight modifications it is able to cope with the problem of translating, and that it doesn't aspire to be the critical theory that many of its critics would like it to be.
Filo-Sofija
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2006
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vol. 6
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issue 6
153-170
EN
The task of the article is to show the consequences of the understanding of philosophy by Jürgen Habermas, one of the most outstanding philosophers of our time. Some limitations in his philosophy appear in his utterances on the problems of man related to the possibilities offered by the recent achievements in genetics. As a philosopher he seems to be very distant from the reality of human existence. He proposes to cultivate a pure philosophy, striving first of all to ensure a universality for its solutions. This way he narrows the tasks confronting modern philosophy; besides, he wants to answer the questions concerning the humankind in a way valid for all times, making absolute the legal and constitutional frame being now in force.
7
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Fenomen rozumienia

100%
Filo-Sofija
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2004
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vol. 4
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issue 4
95-116
EN
Abstract In my paper I develop a cognitive model of understanding and its close kin – intellectual intuition. The model is based on my concept of information, by which I mean any detected difference. Information may take two basic forms – qualitative and structural – depending of what is meant by “difference”. The first one is attained when a system with appropriate detectors detects which of elementary states it is able to distinguish has just occurred. A system gains structural information if it is able to detect difference of concurrent states. Qualitative information is an elementary, first-order information. Structural information is built of elementary information and is therefore a second-order information. There are higher-order information also; I collectively term them synformation. A synformation integrally treated by a cognitive system as one, I call representation. In most cases representations are mappings of external world onto states of asensory system of the brain, preserving some relations, and therefore being a kind of morphism. Due to such morphisms, information contained in representation is – objectively – information of something, and representation has cognitive content. If a system is able to know that a representation is representation – i.e. that it represents (stands for) something else - the representation becomes a sign and thus can be treated either syntactically or semantically. (The representation in question is not an original, dynamic representation to which some causal role is attributed, but its inert copy – let’s call it a secondary representation - taken from a working memory). Within the realm of the mental I distinguish two levels: lower (psychical), available to all animals possessing senses/brains, and higher (spiritual), exclusively available to humans. The second I further divide into mental part (“mind” in narrower, technical sense of a power to manipulate with secondary representations on purely formal – in most cases associational or mnemonic – ground, i.e. regardless of their content) and intellectual part (“intellect”). Intellect operates on data taken from working memory. Intellect is thus a semantic power of making the cognitive content explicit to an agent (a person), and especially of grasping/constituting what is being represented by a sign. The power presupposes that the agent possesses an intuition of reality, a kind of understanding which is a base of all other forms of understanding (higher-order understanding). Intellectual intuition is a kind of understanding wherein all conventional signs (symbols) have been superseded (replaced) by representations having cognitive content. In the second part of the paper I try to substantiate the above ideas neurophysiologically.
EN
The need to fully realize the interpretation of Kant's notion of transcendence requires critical attitude to the modern debate regarding this notion between the representatives of analytic philosophy (Wittgenstein, Quine, Strawson). Within analytic tradition, the notion of transcendence implies the transformation of the conditions of the possibility of logic, language, and empirical science into formal self-referential structure. The authenticity of the interpretation of Kant's concept of transcendence and the transcendental argument is further supported by: 1) understanding the impossibility of its excessive convergence with the notion of a priori, 2) understanding of the transcendence as self-representative complex structure which includes the coordination between the conditions of genesis and functioning of empirical knowledge and conditions of the exclusion of intellectual alternatives on the levels of logical analysis and empirical knowledge. The space of self-referential functional values of transcendental argument is indicated by Kant quite formally. This transparent disposition of the formally coordinated system of cognitive conditions of the synthesis of knowledge and understanding have caused the insufficient acknowledgement of the self-referential character of the transcendental argument, as well as numerous attempts to return to its interpretation according to deductive reasoning.
EN
The basic question of this article is the following: do religious people and, more broadly, those engaged in spiritual life, when entering into a state of quietude through keeping silent, proceed in a manner that is rational? It seeks answers to this question from within the philosophy of religion, which breaks with the methodological postulate that says that one should, for the sake of making rational philosophical sense of religious phenomena, maintain a distance from the subject of investigation. An examination is proposed of the rationality of religion itself, and of what it means to maintain silence for religious purposes – the rationality of “being someone maintaining silence in a state of quietude”. This prompts us to ask the following question: does reason’s capacity for passively remaining silent and listening create an opportunity to save the spiritual identity of human beings, lost amidst a civilization built on prosperity and scientific knowledge, on a continuous hum of information and the dictatorship of noise?
EN
Typically, if I understand a sentence, then it expresses a proposition that I entertain. Nonsensical sentences don’t express propositions, but there are contexts in which we talk about understanding nonsensical sentences. For example, we accept various kinds of semantically defective sentences in fiction, philosophy, and everyday life. Furthermore, it is a standard assumption that if a sentence is nonsensical, then it makes no sense to say that it implies anything or is implied by other sentences. Semantically uninterpreted sentences don’t have logical characteristics. Hence, the riddle of understanding nonsense arises. We seem to use nonsensical sentences in reasoning, thinking, judging, and drawing conclusions, but they convey no propositions, which are the vehicles of their semantic properties. In this article, I propose the pretence theory of understanding nonsense to explain the riddle of understanding nonsense, and discuss alternative frameworks that are insufficient to solve it.
11
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UMENIE AKO (NE)DOROZUMENIE

88%
ESPES
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2016
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vol. 5
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issue 2
38 – 45
EN
The author considers arts (on the axis between the author-work-perceiver) as various forms of understanding and misunderstanding at the same time. The misunderstandings have several causes (cultural, religious, political, social, personal, artistic, aesthetic) and complicate or transform the way of perception and understanding of artworks and produce what the author calls "hushing" or shading aesthetic and artistic qualities of the work. The inability of recognize aesthetic qualities of an artwork complicate its aesthetic effect on the recipient and causes various forms of hostility towards art as a creation and against specific works of art and their authors.
12
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Hermeneutyka i nauki kognitywne

88%
Avant
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2011
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vol. 2
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issue 2
197-212
EN
Philosophical hermeneutics, understood as the theory of interpretation, investigates some questions that are also asked in the cognitive sciences. The nature of human understanding, the way that we gain and organize knowledge, the role played by language and memory in these considerations, the relations between conscious and unconscious knowledge, and how we understand other persons, are all good examples of issues that form the intersection of hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences. Although hermeneutics is most often contrasted with the natural sciences, there are some clear ways in which hermeneutics can contribute to the cognitive sciences and vice versa.
EN
The study is aimed at investigating understanding emotions in relation to aspects of antisocial behavior and substance use with respect to parenting styles. The sample was 397 early adolescents from two countries (Slovakia and South Africa). The authors applied exploratory analysis, calculating Spearman correlations and Mann-Whitney U-test in SPSS (since not all variables were normally distributed) and linear regression (in R) with quasi-poisson distribution, in order to examine associations between ability to understand emotions, antisocial behavior and other variables. A Generalized Linear Model UNIANOVA with quasi-poisson distribution was the most suitable for our data as they were not normally distributed, and did not fulfill the condition of the Poisson model. The analyses were conducted separately in samples of Slovak and South African early adolescents with regard to examining the relationships between key variables in both groups separately, and then to study the differences between them. The obtained results only partly support expected significant associations between higher level of emotion understanding and lower level of involvement in antisocial behavior. Regarding the method used to measure emotional intelligence, the authors conclude that the performance test of emotion understanding (STEU) is only partly a suitable tool for exploring this construct. First, the STEU – even though modified for this population – had some problems with internal consistency; and secondly, the degree to which these instruments serve as indicators of real life behavior is also questionable. Although their findings support only some relationships they expected to find, they believe that even these findings of associations of ability to understand emotions with some aspects of behavior and influence of parenting style in early adolescence could assist as baseline facts and offer new ideas and inspirational base for further research studies.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 6
526 – 535
EN
The paper tries to answer the question why contemporary (Slovak) undergraduate students have difficulty with moral dilemmas. According to the author the reason is the lack of classical moral stories in their education. First, he takes as an example the Plotinus’ One (En. 3,2,8) and shows how his moral story, trivial at first glance, is carefully structured and leads to a non-trivial inference. Then author turns to famous Plato’s “slave boy passage” from Menoś dialogue (82b-86c) to point out how our understanding works. Finally the author tries to figure out how important the classical moral stories can be in developing our interpretation and decision making skills, and argues that student’s low ability of moral dilemmas of understanding is a consequence of the absence of clever moral stories in previous education.
EN
The interest in history always played a significant role in Simmel's writings. In this regard his lecture 'Vom Wesen des historischen Verstehens' from 1918 is of key importance. Simmel discussed the particular features of historical understanding within the general problem of understanding. In his view historical understanding may be possible only through the understanding of the soul. This position presumes that the internal events of the soul in the past is inserted into the totality of life in the past. Understanding does not mean the mechanical (photographical) repetition of the psychic processes of a past person, on the contrary, it is a creative act.
EN
The attempt to build philosophy beyond metaphysics and the theory of cognition was dubbed by Paul Hofmann 'philosophy as the investigation of sense' (Sinnerforschung). The merit of Paul Hofmann's philosophical project - presented here only in its basic features - lies in overcoming a mental stereotype according to which 'sense' belongs to a group of indefinable basic concepts. Deep formal analyses of sense as such do not focus on the sense of objectivity alone, but also strive to grasp the sense of the subject as someone who is capable of an objective (objectifying) reflection on himself. Hofmann's studies on the sense of objectivity and subjectivity can enrich our existential understanding of the sense of life with new forms of the consciousness of sense. This is because a clarification of the coherence of the objective content of the concept of sense facilitates the development of subjective forms of experience-relevant consciousness of sense. However, a basic drawback of Hofmann's philosophy consists in the fact that a formal (a priori) definition of sense, even if it is a penetrating and accurate one, cannot replace what is currently experienced as senseful. The concept of the sense of life will never itself be the sense of life, but just its mental representation and a cognitive-volitive experience.
EN
Guelincx (1624-1669) is known as the one who laid the foundations for a modern theory of Occasionalism. He also belongs to a group of philosophers for whom the reference point was R. Descartes' system. However, in this paper we will concentrate neither on the theory of Occasionalism (even though we might mention it) nor inspirations by Descartes (even though they will, of course, arise). We will consider Guelincx's answer to the question: who am I?
EN
In the following paper I propose an argument against internalism about thought content. After a brief preview of the recent debate between Sarah Sawyer and Åsa Wikforss, the paper outlines the central issue in their discussion. I show that, even if Wikforss’ objections against Sawyer are granted, externalism about thought content can still prevail. For my argument, I use Wikforss` own objection against externalism and show how, if accepted, it binds one to the mythical figure of the perfect speaker – an infallible creature that possesses complete understanding of all of her concepts.
EN
Over the centuries, mankind has undergone a great revolution, but not before the pace of change was not as deep and fast as it is now. The process of globalization, the disappearance of borders, integration of the countries of Europe, the growing number of multi-ethnic states that the process of unification in the economy and the occurrence of different values underlines the importance of multiculturalism. For centuries, different cultures mutually displaced, destroy, seek to dominate and expansion and single action aimed at mutual understanding were not effective. But a different world is possible. Lead to a different way in the economy, politics but also and above all in the culture. And it is intercultural education has lead to the understanding of cultural differences – from the subcultures in their own communities to the culture of remote communities, prepare to interact and strengthen their own identity. Cooperation with representatives of the different cultures of the global world is a very important and responsible task for the modern system of education aimed at preparing the public to new challenges. They consist in building a global culture, to deepen their own identity of individuals, groups and communities by promoting tolerance and dialogue, because of globalization, despite the trend towards integration and unification of people from all over the world, our actions and choices are determined by history, tradition and the culture in which we were raised and grew up. Intercultural education includes a dialogue, so that creates a culture that results in contact with others. This dialogue is the basis of all culture and dialogue is a way to co-existence of cultures and intercultural education and dialogue is a service to the dignity of man.
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