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1

Job-search monitoring and unemployment duration: evidence from a randomized control trial

100%
Micklewright J., Nagy G.
Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
|
2006
|
vol. 53
|
issue 7/8
641-660
EN
The impact of the administration of unemployment benefits on time spent unemployed is a neglected issue in discussion of incentive effects in Central and Eastern Europe. The authors use Labour Force Survey data, administrative registers and inspection of benefit office practices to show that there is good reason to investigate this issue in Hungary. They report results from a field experiment designed to show the impact of tightening the administration of benefits, in which benefit claimants were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. Treatment has quite a large effect on the benefit receiving durations of women aged 30 and over, while no effect was found for younger women or for men.
2

The effect of labour-market institutions on the unemployment rate

80%
Horvath G.
Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
|
2006
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vol. 53
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issue 9
744-768
EN
The study deals with the effects of labour-market institutions and rigidities on the rate of unemployment, analysing four institutions: unemployment benefit, the trade unions, taxation, and dismissal constraints. The pay model presented is a version of those associated with Pissarides. An attempt is made with this to express numerically the individual and compound effects of the institutions on the unemployment rate, and to gauge how much they influence the process of accommodation that follows shocks. The results show that taxes and dismissal constraints do not increase the rate of unemployment significantly; the effect of them becomes significant only when coupled with high unemployment benefit. A greater contribution to high unemployment is made by the bargaining power of the unions and the scale of unemployment benefit, but these effects can be ameliorated only by factors that do not feature in the model. The constraints on dismissal included in the model slow the reaction to the productivity shock, but the extent of this is not significant.
3

AKTUÁLNE ZMENY V SOCIÁLNOM POISTENÍ TÝKAJÚCE SA OSÔB V PRÁVNOM VZŤAHU ZALOŽENOM NA ZÁKLADE DOHODY O PRÁCI VYKONÁVANEJ MIMO PRACOVNÉHO POMERU

61%
Krippel M.
Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)
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2014
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vol. 97
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issue 6
621 – 638
EN
The contribution describes the actual changes of Social Insurance Act No. 461/2003 Coll. as alteredand amended which is effective from 1 January relating to the status of persons who carry out work under agreemanets on work performed outside employment relationship. These changes: 1. they have resulted in, that the work under agreemanets on work performed outside employment relationship has become less attractive (new obligation to pay contributions for employees and employers and increasing the administrative burden for employers); 2. They ensure increase of finance to basic social insurance funds controlled by the Social Insurance Agency; 3. They enhance the social protection for policyholders by fulfillment of the conditions of sickness benefit and unemployment benefit entitlement, in the case of entitlement to pension benefit these changes increase social protection only for certain policyholders; 4. in many cases the changes make worse the status of policyholders by amount of their pension benefit and unemployment benefit. We consider that the increase contributory obligation (contribution payment) should be compensated in any case by more social protection for policyholders, what in many cases will not happen. These legal changes even sometimes reduce the social protection of policyholders.
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