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ARMED ATTACK IN INTERNATIONAL LAW - IN SEARCH OF CONTEMPORARY DEFINITION (Napasc zbrojna w prawie miedzynarodowym - w poszukiwaniu wspólczesnej definicji)

100%
Kowalski M.
Studia Prawnicze
|
2008
|
issue 3(177)
59-82
EN
The text analyses one of the key notions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, namely the armed attack notion. The interpretation of this notion - which still misses the generally accepted definition - is of crucial significance as it determines the scope of the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which together with the collective security system create the only two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of armed force in international law. The notion is interpreted in relation to the use of force notion and the act of aggression notion. The understanding of the armed attack notion as the gravest form of the use of force is challenged. Also, the problem of the source of an armed attack is analysed. It is submitted that non-state actors themselves may not be perceived as a source of an armed attack. However, the standards relating to the attribution of non-state actors' military actions to states should be extended. In general, the presented interpretative approach towards defining the armed attack notion shows that it is indeed possible to interpret the 'jus ad bellum' norms in such a manner as to, on the one hand, carefully adjust them to new threats in order to let states respond individually more adequately, but, on the other hand, to remain within the framework of the UN Charter and keep all the system safeguards.
2

Agresja czy samoobrona? Prawo Gruzji do użycia siły w sierpniu 2008 roku

86%
Marcinko M.
Międzynarodowe Prawo Humanitarne
|
2011
|
vol. 2
85-104
EN
According to the commonly shared opinion and experts’ views contained in various reports prepared by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (inter alia OSCE, EU and Amnesty International) an incident that triggered the so-called five-day war in August 2008 was the artillery fire aimed at Tskhinvali, the capital city of the breakaway region of South Ossetia, launched by the Georgian armed forces during the night of 7 to 8 August, 2008 in an attempt to “restore constitutional order” in South Ossetia by Georgia. It was, doubtless, the climax of the tensions that escalated in the region over the years, caused by mutual instigations and incidents often involving the use of military force. However, taking into consideration the stipulations of international law, we must ask a question whether Georgia was right to launch a military action in order to solve the Ossetic problem. The launch of the military action in South Ossetia is recognized by some politicians and lawyers preoccupied with international law as an act of aggression, whereas according to others it was an intervention aimed at the protection of Georgian civilians inhabiting the region of South Ossetia. Moreover, questions are being asked concerning the legitimacy of the Georgian army’s hostilities against the Russian troops that stationed in the aforementioned republic. Finally, actions in Abkhazia, in particular, in view of the legitimacy of the right to self-defence as quoted by Georgia, deserve a separate analysis.
3
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Użycie siły w stosunkach międzynarodowych według koncepcji Johna Rawlsa

86%
Bieszke K.
Międzynarodowe Prawo Humanitarne
|
2012
|
vol. 3
199-209
EN
John Rawls is considered to be one of the most important political thinkers of the 20th century. In his last original work, The Law of Peoples, he included his comprehensive theory of international relations. Following the idea outlined in his former work, A Theory of the State, author divides participants of international affairs into five types of domestic societies: “reasonable liberal peoples”, “decent peoples” (to liberal and decent peoples Rawls refers together as “well-organized peoples”), “outlaw states”, “societies burdened by unfavourable conditions” and “benevolent absolutisms”. The Author intentionally uses the term “peoples”, in order to clearly distinguish “the law of nations” from “the law of peoples”. He claims that in international politics traditionally conceived “nations” or “states” are moved mainly by their own particular interests — reason of state. Unlike states, well-organized peoples are just, or decent; they have a certain moral character, and in international relations reasons for their conduct accord with corresponding principles. Furthermore, governments of states consider their right to go to war to be undeniable, and derive this right from positive international law. Yet Rawls claims that ius ad bellum is not an innate right of every actor of international relations: only well-organized peoples are entitled to it, provided the reason for the use of force is the necessity to defend themselves from the aggression of an outlaw state. The distinction between non-aggressive well-ordered peoples and aggressive outlaw states is a basic assumption for Rawls’ further reflections on possible ways of coexistence of well-ordered peoples with peoples that fail to meet the criteria of “liberalism” or “decency”, leading to the main question: how to bring eventually all societies to honour the law of peoples and to become full members of the society of well-ordered peoples.
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