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PL
Human dignity is one of the most fundamental ideas in the entire international human rights system. As from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1948, the concept of the human dignity become used as a tool to protect the basic needs of humans. The other formal instruments of international human rights also make reference to dignity. Whereas international law widely accepted the inherence of dignity, controversies still arise around the source of the dignity. Polish lawmakers, on the other hand, have no doubt about the fact the concept of dignity comes from natural law. Poland, in her Constitution, refers to the teaching of John Paul II about the source, value and meaning of human dignity. There is no doubt that concept of human dignity, even when it is controversial, is the most widely accepted by all religions and political society in the world.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu są rozważania na temat prawa do ładu społecznego i międzynarodowego na przykładzie działań ONZ. Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych przyjęła wiele aktów dotyczących praw człowieka, takich jak deklaracje i prawnie wiążące prawa. Wniosek jest taki, że niekwestionowanym osiągnięciem Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych jest przyjęcie dużej liczby aktów prawnych, które gwarantują porządek społeczny i międzynarodowy. Mimo to nie ma skutecznych mechanizmów gwarantujących te prawa i szukania sprawiedliwości na forum międzynarodowym.
EN
The subject of the article are the reflections on the right to social and international order on the example of the activities of the United Nations. The United Nations has passed many human rights acts, such as declarations and legally binding laws. The conclusion is that, the unquestionable achievement of the United Nations is the adoption of a large number of legal acts, which guarantee the social and international order. In spite of it, there are no effective mechanisms to guarantee these rights and to seek justice on the international forum.
PL
Zgodnie z art. 15 ust. 1 Powszechnej Deklaracji Praw Człowieka (PDPCz), „każdy człowiek ma prawo do posiadania obywatelstwa”. Choć cytowany przepis wygląda prosto, w istocie ustalenie jego treści nie jest zadaniem łatwym. Większość pozycji w literaturze koncentruje się na problemie bezpaństwowości, która była historycznym powodem włączenia prawa do obywatelstwa do PDPCz. Tymczasem podstawową tezą niniejszego artykułu jest stwierdzenie, że samo posiadanie obywatelstwa nie jest wystarczające do zagwarantowania wszystkich z nim związanych uprawnień. Aby to wykazać, po pierwsze, analizuję różnicę między pojęciami „narodowości” i „obywatelstwa”, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem kulturowego komponentu tożsamości narodowej. Następnie przedstawiam rozumienie obywatelstwa jako „prawa do posiadania praw”. Na podstawie istniejących badań nad bezpaństwowością pytam, jakie wyzwania stoją przed osobami nieposiadającymi formalnego obywatelstwa żadnego państwa i pokazuję, że bycie obywatelem niektórych państw jest de facto równoznaczne z byciem bezpaństwowcem, jeśli chodzi o zakres posiadanych praw podstawowych. W konsekwencji, sugeruję, że (1) każde państwo-strona PDPCz powinno być gotowe do przyznania obywatelstwa tym osobom, których pierwotne obywatelstwo nie gwarantuje ochrony ich podstawowych praw; (2) osoby te powinna mieć możliwość uzyskania nowego obywatelstwa w kraju o maksymalnym podobieństwie kulturowym, z uwzględnieniem wydolności gospodarczej tego kraju; (3) uzyskanie nowego obywatelstwa może być uwarunkowane akceptacją norm kulturowych państwa przyznającego obywatelstwo.
EN
According to Article 15(1) of the UDHR, ‘everyone has the right to a nationality’. Although the quoted provision looks deceptively straightforward, the determination of its content is not an easy task. Past research has been mainly focused on the problem of statelessness which was the historical reason for the introduction of the right in question. In this paper, I argue that holding the status of a formal national is not enough to have the right to a nationality secured. To show this, first, I analyse the difference between the concepts of ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ with special attention paid to the cultural component of national identity. Second, I investigate the understanding of a nationality as ‘the right to have rights’. On the basis of the research on the statelessness I ask what challenges are faced by people without the formal nationality of any state and I show that being a national of certain states is equivalent to being stateless with respect to certain fundamental rights of an individual. Thus, the right to a nationality is indeed ‘the right to have rights’, but only if it is a right to a right nationality. In consequence, I suggest that (1) any state which recognises the right guaranteed in Article 15 of the UDHR should embrace its full content by readiness to accept as nationals those whose original nationality does not guarantee the protection of their first-order rights or is based on values clearly contradictory to their own; (2) peoples from failed states should be able to acquire new citizenship in a country of maximal cultural affinity, with regard to the economic effectiveness of the latter; (3) the obtaining of new citizenship may legitimately be conditioned by demand on compliance with the system of values of the nationality granted.
EN
The article constitutes an attempt at describing the evolution of human rights, a process that began when the idea was born and culminated when a binding decision concerning an individual was made by a competent body. We deal, then, with a process that led to a presentation of human rights in terms of values that are protected much as subjective law.
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PL
The article focuses on human dignity, which is so strongly underscored nowadays. After World War II, we witnessed a certain departure from legal positivism, and inclination towards natural law. Hence, it was indicated that dignity and human rights are the fundamentals upon which the after-war reality ought to be founded. Moreover, only the innate and immanent human dignity could be the basis for all human rights. This indication can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Again, this indication of the UN document was followed by numerous international organizations among which the European Union, especially, points to human dignity as the essential. Similar laws and principles can be found in the Constitutions of the discussed here states: Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Republic of Italy. So, the aim of the article is to show in what way the idea of human dignity, as presented in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, exerted influence upon the Constitutions of the examined states and their legal systems.
EN
The human rights doctrine and in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is undoubtedly an important step towards the search for an adequate formula, which would protect man and his rights. This statement points out that despite the efforts, which have been made in the last 70 years, this formula has not been effective. Many authors mentioned that and they were critical towards that idea, presenting many contradictions and problems related to that issue. Alfredo Cruz Prados is one of them. The objective of this article is to present the criticism of human rights by Alfredo Cruz Prados. Its perspective is a classical political philosophy. Thanks to this approach the author seems not to be entangled in modern philosophical terminology and its significance. It allows his criticisms to obtain certain freshness and novelty in relation to other proposals which criticize the human right ideas in philosophical literature. Alfredo Cruz Prados suggests we should reconsider the formula, in which we express the truth about human dignity and greatness, and we should again base it on the foundation of the classical political philosophy. For this author this project does not concern only the human rights doctrine, but it is a wider vision of the political philosophy renewal.
ES
El artículo responde brevemente a la pregunta si los derechos humanos tal como expuestos en la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos son compatibles con la teoría clásica de la ley natural. Dando la respuesta positiva el autor observa algunas condiciones bajo lascuales hay que entender los derechos humanos para evitar los abusos del individualismo, de la autonomía relativista y de la dictadura de los „derechos del deseo”.
PL
Czy współczesne prawa człowieka, w stosunku do określonych w Powszechnej Deklaracji Praw Człowieka, są zgodne z prawem naturalnym? Artykuł krótko odpowiada na to pytanie i próbuje opisać prawa człowieka, które korygują nasze obecne nadużycia: indywidualistyczne rozumienie praw, rozwój nowych praw roszczeniowych, które zostały uznane za prawa człowieka i relatywizm.
EN
Are modern human rights, particularly as drafted in the UDHR, compatible with the natural law? This article briefly answers this question and tries to give an account of human rights that corrects our current abuses: individualistic rights-talk, the development of new desire-rights defended as human rights and relativism.
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