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EN
The aim of this article is to present the legitimacy of power in Russia. The special emphasis is placed on the correlations between Russian political culture and the legitimacy of the power of Vladimir Putin. Taking into consideration that social acceptance and support given to the authorities are the result of the relationship between the values pursued by the government and the values recognized by the society, the author presents the example of this mechanism in Russia. As many theorists note, investigation of the degree of legitimacy of the authorities should be determined by the compatibility of arguments that are used by the rulers and values and attitudes approved by the society. Therefore, this paper will present the relations between the authorities and society as well as the perception of Vladimir Putin’s domestic and foreign policy by residents of the Russian Federation.
EN
In the paper Autor to explores so called conservative backlash, which took place in 2012 and which is still ongoing. The conservative backlash can be understood as a process of spreading the conservative ideas and traditional values for political purposes – primarily to legitimized Vladimir’s Putin’s third tenure as a President after economic crisis and mass protests. As a consequence of the conservative backslash Duma passed range of law i.e. „foreign agent” law, blasphemy law and forbid of homosexual propaganda among minors. What is also worth emphasising is that the conservative reform created a noticeable split in Russian society (traditional Russians vs. westernized liberals), with is widespread in public and media discourse. As a result some citizens started to be consider as a not only worse citizen, but in fact excluded them from Russian community.
EN
Wladimir Putin is one of the most well-known politicians in the present international arena. Many prominent writers devoted books to him, in which he is either the positive “spirit of Russia” or the complete opposite of “the father of nation”. Almost each of them sought an answer to the question about who Putin is. Constantly high popularity of Russian prime minister still remains a political puzzle for many analysts. Some even described this tendency as “the Putin's phenomenon”. However, it should be stressed that the analysis of Putin by those scholars concerned only his behaviour. His gestures, his clothing style and also his conduct during negotiations with foreign partners were interpreted. So his facial expression and gestures came first with them. The author tried to present a pragmatic interpretation of linguistic predispositions of this politician. The aim of this work is to answer the question: how Putin, using the meticulous selection of words influences his electorate and manipulates their consciousness. Therefore, the main task of this work is to explain the linguistic phenomenon of Putin, as well as to prove the proposed thesis that the ex-president of the Russian Federation personifies the phenomenon of the political activist not present on the Russian political scene until now.
EN
The author of the article analyses the last two programmes (from 2009 and 2010) entitled „A Conversation With Vladimir Putin. Continuation” paying attention to the way Putin constructs his public utterances. The analysis includes eight images of Putin: Putin-moralist, Putin-authority, Putin – risk-taker, fair Putin, Putin-„our man”, Putin-workaholic, all-knowing Putin, Putin-reformer. The analysis shows that these kinds of meetings between the Prime Minister and the nation follow a well-developed pattern. Apparently, the language is an instrument of power with which politicians create their own images and reality, and using appropriate methods of social engineering impose their model on people.
EN
This article aims to analyze religious and mystical elements contained in Putin’s public statements by referring to selected examples characteristic of contemporary Russian identity politics. In order to demonstrate the importance of religious and mystical threads in Putin’s speeches, we chose five specific cases. The analysis of these statements indicates that religious and mystical motifs in Putin’s language are an attempt at self-creation for the purpose of domestic policy. We claim that this self-creation is more of an effort to strengthen Putin’s public support than proof that he borrows patterns for shaping Russia’s political life from the Russian religious and political tradition. Putin’s rhetoric is not so much a desire for an axiological renewal of Russian politics but an attempt to search for the new legitimization of the power system he created in confrontation with the West.
EN
The Great Patriotic War in Russian history textbooksThe topic of this article is presenting how the Great Patriotic War (GPW) is depicted in Russian national history textbooks. Here, I consider textbooks not only as a source of knowledge about the past times, but first and foremost as a tool to create the state’s historical policy. I examine the GPW, in turn, as a fundamental myth of the Russian society which-without any doubt-constitutes one of the main pillars of identity of modern Russians. Another subject of this study is the changes in Russian education that took place in 2013-2015, that is during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. In so doing, I focus primarily on the creation of the concept of a new educational and methodological complex for teaching national history and the introduction of new national history textbooks (the idea of the so-called “single textbook”). I strive to show in the article that the picture of the GPW in the new textbooks is mainly based on success-of the Red Army, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet nation. Wielka Wojna Ojczyźniana w rosyjskich podręcznikach do historii ojczystejTematem niniejszego artykułu jest sposób przedstawiania Wielkiej Wojny Ojczyźnianej (WOW) w rosyjskich podręcznikach do historii ojczystej. Podręczniki traktuję przy tym nie tylko jako źródło wiedzy o czasach dawnych, lecz przede wszystkim jako narzędzie kreowania polityki historycznej państwa. WOW rozpatruję z kolei w kategoriach podstawowego mitu społeczeństwa rosyjskiego, który – ku czemu nie ma wątpliwości – stanowi jeden z podstawowych filarów tożsamości współczesnych Rosjan. Przedmiotem badań są także zmiany w rosyjskiej oświacie, które miały miejsce w latach 2013-2015, a zatem w trakcie prezydentury Władimira Putina. Skupiam się przy tym przede wszystkim na powstaniu koncepcji nowego kompleksu edukacyjno-metodycznego w zakresie nauczania historii ojczystej oraz wprowadzeniu nowych podręczników do historii ojczystej (idea tzw. „jednego podręcznika”). W artykule staram się pokazać, że obraz WOW w nowych podręcznikach oparty jest głównie na sukcesie – Armii Czerwonej, Związku Socjalistycznych Republik Sowieckich i narodu sowieckiego.
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Content available remote

The Ruling Elite in Russia: Continuity or Change?

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EN
The third Vladimir’s Putin presidential term (2012-2018) was a significant period for the Russian Federation political security. Social protests, the annexation of Crimea, conflicts in eastern Ukraine and Syria, as well as economic sanctions and the deepening Russian isolationism - these are just some of the problems that Russian authorities had to face to ensure political stability. The aim of this article was to examine the changes and conflicts that occurred within President Putin’s inner circle between 2012 and 2018. The research was conducted according to content analysis method. It revealed that in 2012-2018 the attempts to weaken the decision-making power elite as a whole failed.
EN
The article aims to answer the question to what extent demographic and migrational determinants may influence the geopolitical situation of the Russian Federation. It is no secret that the Kremlin's authorities have for nearly two decades endeavoured to reintegrate the post-soviet area, fortifying Russia's political and economic position in the region and thus attempting to challenge the EU and the US in an effort to modify the present system of international relations. A multi-polar system of international relations is meant to terminate the North America's domination in global politics, restoring an imperial role to Russia. It is not just hollow rhetoric; the Russian authorities have undertaken a number of steps to realise these plans. The war with Georgia, the Ukrainian crisis, the intervention in Syria, but also the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union, are vivid signs of activity and determination of the new Russian elites, consistently executing their neo-imperialist projects. They may, however, be thwarted by economic difficulties and demographic crisis in the Russian Federation. Wanting to secure the neo-imperial course, the Kremlin must find a solution to these two strongly intertwined problems.
PL
10 kwietnia 2010 roku Donald Tusk i Władimir Putin spotkali się na miejscu katastrofy samolotu prezydenckiego. Jedno ze zdjęć dokumentujących to spotkanie ukazało się (trzy lata później) na okładce tygodnika “W Sieci”. Publikacja fotografii wywołała gorącą debatę publiczną dotyczącą uchwyconego na niej gestu polskiego premiera. Tekst jest analizą sposobu jej funkcjonowania w odbywającej się w polu wizualnym społecznej grze, a także próbą dostrzeżenia stawki wymiany, którą uruchamia ten obraz.
EN
On 10 April 2010 Donald Tusk and Vladimir Putin met on the site of the catastrophic crash of the Polish presidential plane. One of the photographs documenting this event appeared (three years later) on the cover of the “W Sieci” weekly. Its publication gave rise to an intense public debate concerning the gesture made by the Polish Prime Minister. The presented text is an analysis of the manner it functions in the social game taking place in the visual field; it is also an attempt at perceiving the stake of the exchange set into motion by this image.
EN
The article investigates an issue of a new concept for teaching Russian history in secondary schools as a tool of creating the historical policy of the Russian Federation. It is also an attempt to prove the thesis that the new concept imposes the only version of the historical truth and provides an example of limiting the ideological pluralism. The author assume that the analysis of the document allows the reconstruction of the major historical policy directions of the Russian Federation during the third presidential term of Vladimir Putin (it is especially important in case of the controversial XX and XXI century). The subject of the research is however not only the document itself, but also the changes it brings to the teaching of history in Russian schools and its impact on the historical consciousness of the Russian youth.
PL
Potencjał i społeczne przyzwolenie na zmiany w Rosji zostały wyczerpane już w 1993 r. Kolejne lata przynoszą coraz większą i coraz bardziej jawną kontynuację rozwiązań z przeszłości. Pewne specyficzne uwarunkowania przywództwa władzy są rzecz jasna typowe dla każdego systemu politycznego, w tym artykule chodziło jednak o podkreślenie czynników, które wpływały na polityczną pozycję przywódcy, a także tych, które przesądziły o klęsce „projektu demokratycznego” w Rosji. W tym kontekście szczególną uwagę zwrócono na uwarunkowania historyczno-kulturowe, cechy osobowościowe prezydenta oraz spuściznę czasów komunistycznych. Ta ostatnia kwestia była kluczowa z punktu widzenia budowy systemu quasi-autorytarnego i autorytarnego (po 2000 r.). Pewnym paradoksem rosyjskiej rewolucji lat 90. było to, że w walce „starego” i „nowego” zarówno władza, jak i elity, walczyły o przeniesienie do nowej Rosji jak największej liczby rozwiązań z ZSRS. Rosja miała być zreformowaną kontynuacją państwa komunistycznego pozbawioną jedynie kilku istotnych wad dawnego systemu. Polityczne zmiany w latach 1991–1993 nie skruszyły prawdziwych fundamentów życia politycznego ZSRS. W znacznym stopniu były więc tylko mniej lub bardziej udaną adaptacją istniejącego systemu do zmieniających się realiów. Tym samym wiele elementów składowych Rosji było jedynie prostą kontynuacją tradycji i rozwiązań sprzed 1991 roku.
EN
In Russia potential for “change” and its social acceptance by the year 1993 have long since expired. The following years mark a stronger and more open “continuity” – that is, the revival of mechanisms of the past. Each political system has, of course, it’s own specific circumstances of leadership, however, this article intended to display those factors, which played a crucial role in building of a political position of the leader in rule as well as those, that determined the collapse of the democratic project in Russia. In this context a special attention was given to cultural and social circumstances, president’s features of character, and the legacy of the communist regime. The last question played a crucial role first in building of a semi-authoritarian and later, after the year 2000, an authoritarian system. The Russian revolution of the 90’s displayed a paradox. In the struggle of the old and the new, both the state power and the elites insisted on implementing as many Soviet mechanisms in new Russia as it was possible. Russia was supposed to be a reformed continuation of the communist state free of a few flaws of the past regime. Political changes that took place between 1991 and 1993 did not shatter real foundations of the political system of the Soviet Union, and turned out to be a more or less successful adaptation of the existing system to the changing circumstances. This meant that many elements that the Russian state consisted of were merely a simple continuation of the tradition and solutions from before year 1991.
13
Content available remote

USA-Rosja w XXI wieku. Wielka gra o strefy wpływów

75%
EN
The author of the article discusses selected issues of American-Russian relations in the first decade of the 21st century, which was marked by reevaluation and changes in the position of both the USA and Russia. During this period the assumptions of the policies of both states engaged them in a tactic game for spheres of influence. American unilateralism led to a gradual degradation of the USA’s position in the world. The circumstances accompanying the assumption of presidency by Barack Obama were determined by the need to abandon unilateralism and focus on a conciliatory solution of problems, which in turn resulted in self-imposed limitation of the USA’s role in the world. On the other hand, following the rise of Vladimir Putin to power, Russia launched a consistent strategy of resuming the status of a global power. Therefore, in the period under discussion the two countries started competing for spheres of influence. The latter phenomenon is analyzed with reference to the major areas of overlapping interests, i.e. to the territory of the former sphere of influence of the USSR and to the region of the Near East, especially Iran, which is one of the vital regions of American strategy.
14
75%
PL
Poziom popularności Władimira Putina od lat pozostaje bardzo wysoki. Analizując ten swoisty fenomen należy zwrócić uwagę na czynniki systemowe, polityczne i osobowościowe. O ile uwarunkowania systemowe (autorytaryzm i silna pozycja przywódcy) i polityczne (społeczna redystrybucja środków, idea antyzachodnia, kontrola mediów) są powszechnie rozpoznawalne, moim zdaniem istotne znaczenie mają czynniki związane z osobowością Putina. Istotne jest również określenie zagrożenia i umiejętna konsolidacja społeczeństwa wokół wspólnych wartości. Popularność i silna pozycja Putina w państwie nie wynika jedynie z postawy antyzachodniej. Ich źródłem jest tworzenie wizji wroga i ciągłego zagrożenia. Wizerunek ten kształtowany przez zmanipulowaną w dużej mierze telewizję i zafałszowane sondaże, jest konstrukcją odzwierciedlającą podstawowe wartości społeczne i zapotrzebowanie na silnego przywódcę. Powodzenie Putina wynika z efektywności jego przekazu, w którym odbiorcy otrzymują to, czego potrzebują.
EN
High Vladimir Putin’s popularity over his presidency depends on some factors. They are connected with systemic and political factors and Putin’s personality. While systemic (authoritarianism and the strong position of the leader) and political conditions (social redistribution, the anti-Western idea, the media control) are widely recognized, there are other serious factors associated with the personality of Putin. It is also necessary to determine the risks and society consolidation because of the threat. Putin’s popularity and his strong position in the country do depend on the anti-Western attitude and the objective or imagined enemy in Russian society as well. This image created by largely manipulated and falsified satellite surveys, is a structure that reflects the basic social values and the need for a strong leader. Putin's popularity success is the result of the effectiveness of the message in which Russian society receive what they need.
15
75%
EN
The presented paper discusses the changes in the Russian education system that took place in the years 2013–2016, during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. The analysis encompasses all dimensions of changes in the education system: personnel changes (replacement of Dmitri Livanov by Olga Vasil’eva in the position of the RF Minister of Education and Science), formal ones (development of the new: Concept of a new educational – methodological complex for teaching national history), institutional (reform of the Russian Academy of Sciences) and finally also qualitative changes (introduction of new history textbooks). The article attempts to show that the above changes are in fact manifestations of tightening state control over education and its treatment as a vehicle to create the historical policy of the Russian Federation.
EN
Under Vladimir Putin’s regime Russia seeks to whitewash Soviet history and promote an anti-Western narrative in order to legitimize its territorial claims and political demands in Eastern Europe. Drawing on electronic sources such as social media posts, articles from the Russian media, newspaper comments and media statements, the author demonstrates that one of its tools is the exaggerated condemnation of the Munich Agreement of September 1938 and the emphasis on the historical guilt of the Western powers in the Nazi expansion, made to avoid discussion of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, signed less than a year later.
CS
Rusko se pod vládou Vladimira Putina snaží překreslovat sovětskou historii a propagovat protizápadní narativ, aby legitimizovalo své územní nároky a politické požadavky ve východní Evropě. Na základě elektronických zdrojů, jako jsou příspěvky na sociálních sítích, články z ruských médií, komentáře v novinách a mediální prohlášení, autor ukazuje, že jedním z nástrojů tohoto narativu je účelové zdůrazňování Mnichovské dohody v září 1938 a historické viny západních velmocí na nacistické expanzi, které má odvádět pozornost od diskuse o paktu Molotov–Ribbentrop, uzavřeném o necelý rok později.
EN
The deliberations presented in this text are an attempt to capture the tendencies in the discussion on the phenomenon of the Russian political regime and its process of transformation in the Vladimir Putin era. The author presents different ways of defining the political regime and different approaches to the subject of the researched phenomenon presented by researchers from Poland, Russia and representatives of Western political science. The text is a overview since the dynamics of the changes and the multiplicity of elements involved have resulted in more or less consistent concepts and the lack of effective completion of the transition processes results in topic's non-exhaustion, despite the great interest in the issue.
PL
Rozważania przedstawione w niniejszym tekście stanowią próbę uchwycenia tendencji w dyskusji nad fenomenem rosyjskiego reżimu politycznego i jego procesu przemian w epoce Władimira Putina. Autorka prezentuje różne sposoby definiowania reżimu politycznego oraz odmienne podejścia do tematyki badanego zjawiska prezentowanego przez badaczy z Polski, Rosji oraz przedstawicieli zachodniej politologii. Tekst ma charakter przeglądowy, gdyż dynamika dokonujących się zmian i wielość zaangażowanych w nie elementów spowodowały powstanie mniej bądź bardziej spójnych koncepcji a brak skutecznego zakończenia procesów tranzycji powoduje, iż mimo dużego zainteresowania problematyką, nie została ona w pełni wyczerpana.
PL
Rosja pod rządami przez Władimira Putina jest państwem, w którym propaganda odgrywa szczególną rolę. Rosyjski budżet na 2020 r. przewidywał, iż nadająca na zagranicę stacja telewizyjna RT otrzyma 325 mln EUR, podczas gdy Rossija Siegodnia (w tym agencja prasowa RIA Novosti i radio Sputnik) 106 mln EUR. Wobec tak intensywnie prowadzonych rosyjskich działań propagandowych, istotne jest czy i jak będą kontynuowane w razie zmiany władzy. Przyszły kształt rosyjskiej propagandy zależy przede wszystkim od tego, kto obejmie władzę po Władimirze Putinie. Demokratyzacja Rosji może prowadzić do rezygnacji z agresywnej propagandy, dojście do władzy przedstawicieli sił skrajnie nacjonalistycznych będzie powodować jej nasilenie.
EN
Ruled by Vladimir Putin, Russia is a country where propaganda plays a special role. The Russian budget for 2020 predicted that RT television broadcasting abroad would receive 325 million euros, when Rossiya Syegodnia (including RIA Novosti news agency and Sputnik radio) 106 million. Since Russian propaganda is currently being conducted so intensively, it is important whether and how it will be continued in the event of a change of leadership. The future shape of Russian propaganda depends primarily on who will take power after Vladimir Putin. Russia’s democratization may lead to the abandonment of aggressive propaganda; coming to power of representatives of extremely nationalist forces will cause its intensification.
19
63%
PL
Stosunki Niemcy – Rosja pozostają kluczowe dla przyszłego, nowego ładu międzynarodowego. Równie kluczowe w tych stosunkach pozostają silne umocowanie kanclerza Niemiec i prezydenta Rosji w systemach politycznym swoich krajów, a co za tym idzie – znacząca rola obecnych przywódców tych państw Angeli Merkel i Wladimira Putina. Tymczasem niezwykle dynamicznie rysuje się perspektywa zakończenia urzędowania przez oboje polityków. Zaakceptowana przez referendum w Rosji zmiana konstytucji tego kraju daje Władimirowi Putinowi możliwość sprawowania swego urzędu do 2036 r. W Niemczech z kolei nie milkną spekulacje co do możliwości zmiany decyzji kanclerz Angeli Merkel w sprawie rezygnacji z kandydowania na urząd kanclerza Niemiec w następnej kadencji, co przedłużyłoby okres jej rządów do 2025 r.
EN
Germany-Russia relations remain crucial for the future new international order. Equally crucial in these relations is the strong legitimacy of the German Chancellor and the Russian President in the political systems of their countries, and thus the significant role of the current leaders of these countries, Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin. Meanwhile, there is a very dynamic prospect that both politicians will end their positions. The change in Russia’s constitution approved by the referendum gives Vladimir Putin the opportunity to hold office until 2036. In Germany, on the other hand, speculation about the possibility of changing the decision of Chancellor Angela Merkel to resign from her candidacy for the office of German Chancellor in the next term of office, which would extend her term of office until 2025, will continue.
EN
Sharply dressed, smooth, and sporty—these are probably among the first attributes associated with the Russian president Vladimir Putin. This image is promoted by television which still remains a powerful medium in Russia. While the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 initially led to an increase in the popularity of Putin, his approval rating has significantly fallen since the signing of pension reforms in autumn 2018. This could explain why in September 2018 a new talk show called Moskva.Kreml’.Putin, which offers a synopsis of Putin’s working week, began its broadcast. By analyzing the „new“ image of Putin portrayed in this show and comparing it with his visual presentation in the news program Vremia and the annual talk Priamaia Linia s Vladimirom Putinym, the following paper examines the visual portrayal of Putin transmitted on television. By focusing on the visual, the analysis reveals that the president’s image, and the attributes assigned to him, are established and communicated mostly via the content and arrangement of (moving) pictures. Thus, the study suggests that visual communication on television significantly shapes and influences the perception of the Russian president. This work therefore contributes to a better understanding of television in general and of mass media communication in Russia in particular.
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