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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 2
93 – 104
EN
The paper deals with three problems concerning Cicero’s reflections on Chrysippus’ theory in his De fato: 1) methodological differentiation between two types of sympatheia; 2) the critique of the stoic secondary causes; 3) the conception of powerful independent human will. The author comes to the conclusion that the sphere affected by sympatheia and secondary causes is with all probability divided by Cicero into two heterogeneous spheres: natura and fortuna. Due to this distinction the everyday life activities are not determined by the stoic fatum anymore. The conception of a powerful will gradually cultivated to be able to decide correctly and independently, is to underline his conviction. Further, other problematic theories incommensurable with independent human will can be thus rendered anew and more correctly.
EN
The subject of the paper is appetite and its role in human intellectual cognition. The analysis is based on St. Thomas Aquinas' works, especially on his 'Summa Theologiae' and 'Quaestiones disputatae de veritate'. Only intellect and will, powers of the rational part of soul, are considered. According to Aquinas, the presence of appetite on this level is not limited to free acts of will. Appetite can be found in the very structure of these powers - in both intellect and will there is a natural appetite, which inclines them to acting. These powers naturally desire: to cognize the truth, and the object of cognition as such. Consequently, there are three types of appetite that influence the acts of intellect: free acts of will, natural appetite of will, and natural appetite of intellect. Their essence, mutual relations, and their influence on intellect are discussed. It is shown that according to Aquinas the natural appetite of intellect and will enables any cognitive activity.
EN
In the context of the various ethical theories the concept of autonomy achieves various meanings. The aim of the paper is to show, how the idea of autonomy established itself in a moral philosophy. It pays attention also to the different conceptions of autonomy: beginning with its understanding as the highest principle in I. Kant and J. Rawls up to the conceptions, in which the autonomy is the basic condition of authenticity (the discussions of virtues and ideals by Ch. Tylor and B. Williams). Attention is paid also to the objections against underlining the importance of autonomy.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2013
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vol. 41
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issue 4
117-129
EN
The paper considers Paul Ricoeur’s ideas about psychoanalysis. It focuses on three elements that show the evolution of Ricoeur’s views. The first pertains to the early period of his work and is connected with the first volume of the Philosophy of the Will. Here psychoanalysis was placed in the context of a broad project which examines the relationship between what is either dependent on or independent of man’s will. The second element concerns the best known interpretations of psychoanalysis, which were presented in two works, Freud and Philosophy and The Conflict of Interpretations. In these works the science of the unconscious becomes one of the branches of hermeneutics, more precisely the hermeneutics of suspicions. The third, least known aspect of Ricoeur’s work has to do with a new interpretation of psychoanalysis and can be found in Autour de la psychanalyse. Ecrits et conferences. Ricoeur, noting a discord between Freud’s theoretical writings and his descriptions of the psychoanalytical technique and of concrete cases, proposes a new approach based on the second group of writings.
EN
Proposed paper explores the message of German voluntarist philosophy in the works of Russian modernist writer Leonid Nikolaievich Andreyev. Its subject matter deals with the philosophical system of two leading figures associated with the concept of ‘will’ – Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche – as well as the influence of their teaching on Andreyev’s literary writings. The author of the paper analyses the phenomenon of ‘will’ from the perspective of the aforementioned philosophers, examines its significance in terms of human existence and determines its dominant position in relation to reason. The author subsequently confronts the acquired information with selected prosaic and dramatic texts of the Russian writer and identifies parallels between them. The paper concludes with evidence justifying the interrelation between Andreyev’s work and the German system of thought.
EN
Proposed paper focuses on the aspect of German voluntarism and its implications in the prose of Russian modernist writer Leonid Andreyev. The author of the paper explores the main ideas behind the German system of thought in the works of Arthur Schopenhauer and confronts them with Andreyev’s literary writings. The author emphasizes the concept of metaphysical ‘will’ as an underlying principle of voluntaristic philosophy and uses it as a reference point in the analysis of the writer’s prose. The paper attempts to define the purpose of ‘will’ in the life of Andreyev’s characters and to demonstrate its oppressive nature in relation to the notion of human freedom and self-fulfilment.
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88%
EN
According to St. Thomas Aquinas, the certitude of faith is caused by the First Truth which is an object of faith. The question of the certitude was overlooked and the signification of the First Truth was underestimated in the thomist treatises on faith. In his paper, the authoress concentrates on the First Truth as the last perfection of the intellect and the last end of the will. The relationship of the First Truth to the intellect and to the will is fundamental for understanding of the significance of faith's certitude.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2008
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vol. 63
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issue 3
240-251
EN
Duns Scotus argues that the will has a bent for the pleasant, by the help of which the humans want to reach some benefits for them, as well as a bent for justice, on the ground of which humans are able to love independently of their own benefits. It is the objective justice, which establishes the moral good of a practical act. The moral good is in full accordance with the true judgment of reason, which sets the necessary conditions for a morally good action. According to Duns Scotus there are two kinds of the moral norms, whose validity and obligation can be known naturally. The first kind is equal to natural law in the strict sense of the word. Its truth results from the formal contents of the concepts. The second kind is equal to natural law in the full sense of the word, i.e. to the norms of human relationships and the relationships of men to themselves. These norms can be syllogistically deduced from the first practical principles.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 9
928 – 934
EN
The paper deals with free will as discussed in the recent book of Michael Frede A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought. Besides a close view on the structure of Fredes’s main ideas and arguments, the paper aims to provide a critical discussion of Frede’s view of St. Augustine’s contribution to the development of the notion of free will. This would enable us to explore and re-think the historical and philosophical conditions of the rise of the notion of free will in ancient thought.
EN
The article is an analysis of an early Platonic dialogue, the Hippias Minor, regarding the use of the concepts boulesthai, dynamis, and episteme. I argue that Plato constructs the dialogue on a three-fold structure (as opposed to the majority of scholars, who divide it into two parts). The aim of the elenchus and the three aporias found in it is to challenge the reductionist moral psychology of the Sophists (represented by Hippias), which does not distinguish between the concepts of act and motivation. I argue further that Socrates’ apparently fallacious reasoning, purportedly relying on an equivocation, is in fact logically sound, since the distinction between act and motivation does not yet exist. It is precisely the introduction of this distinction that is the aim of the Platonic Socrates in the dialogue. This goal, however, is not reached in the dialogue, which is typical of an aporetic dialogue. Yet, strong affinities between the reasoning of Socrates in the Hippias Minor and the Gorgias indicate that the earlier dialogue is the initial point for the development of Plato’s complex theory of moral action, which was put forward in the Gorgias.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2023
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vol. 78
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issue 3
194 – 210
EN
The aim of the study is to explore the basic paradoxes of Nietzsche’s conception of freedom in Beyond Good and Evil from the perspective of Kant’s philosophy of freedom. The analysis of selected aphorisms shows that Nietzsche’s ambivalent statements regarding will and freedom are not expressions of inconsistency, but rather they outline a philosophy of freedom that takes the form of a liberating deconstruction of the idea of free will. At the same time, it turns out that in this philosophy one can read a radicalization of some Kantian motifs. These are scientist criticism, the autonomy of human being and the ethos of free self-determination stemming from it. On the other hand, Nietzsche transcends Kant by rejecting two strictly distinct spheres, as well as by emphasizing the legitimate plurality of speech acts regarding freedom. As a result, he succeeds in thinking freedom as an expression of human being in this world. Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will is often interpreted in a strictly naturalistic way. However, an interpretation of these Kantian features reveals the insufficiency of naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche.
EN
The article deals with the topic of donation in two substantial parts. In the first part, the author discusses on one hand the will and the motive of the donor of the gratuitous relationship and the gratitude of the donee on the other hand. The author argues that the expectations of the donor that the donee will be grateful may be just but they are not supported by law, because rules on donation do not contain gratitude as the donee´s obligation. If the grounds for revocation of donation by the donor were modified delege ferenda and the substantial breach of good morals was substituted by the new term “ingratitude” (similarly as in the new Czech Civil Code); in this case yes, donee´s obligation of gratitude towards the donor would probably become an implied obligation in donation relationship. The second part of article points out to the basic structural components of the donation contract in future Slovak Civil Code. Specific proposals of the author are based on three principles in donation: 1. pacta sunt servanda; 2. aequitas and gratitude; 3. legal certainty. At last, hesitation about introduction of revocation on the grounds of impoverishment was expressed and the author calls for broad public discussion on this point.
EN
The author analyses among others the approach to the limits of autonomy in regulation of corporations in the Czech legal environment. He refers to two major factors that influence the mental tendencies to limit the freedom of the will in this respect. The first factor is the application of legal paradigms by non-democratic establishments during 50 years, where in particular so-called socialist law regarded the corporation regulation as mandatory. The second factor is a fascination by German stock law and the Satzungsstrenge doctrine, which the domestic practice, among others due to the permanent influence of the first factor on legal thinking, extended to cooperatives and limited liability companies. The new legislation, i.e. the Civil Code and the Corporation Law adopted in 2012, may motivate to abandonment of this “path dependence” in the practice of the Czech Republic. Time will show whether it actually happens. In this context the author highlights the role of legal science in the cultivation of legal thinking.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 10
858 – 868
EN
In this paper, the author argues that despite various differences in his philosophical thinking from early to late, Nietzsche’s reflections on the relationship between art and science forms a thread of continuity in his thought, which sees him ultimately committed to the possibility of truth and knowledge. Moreover, the author argues that although he is not committed to it throughout his writings, consideration of the continuous character of Nietzsche’s thinking on the relation between art and science from an epistemic point of view helps us to make sense of the specific methodology that informs his proposal of the metaphysics of the will to power.
EN
The most significant problems of contemporary life have their origins in nihilism and its paradoxical logic, which is simultaneously destructive, and constitutive of society and individual. Yet, in philosophical theory, nihilism is surprisingly under-researched topic. Nietzsche’s relation to the problem of nihilism is a complex one. He approaches the problem of nihilism as deeply personal, stating that this predicament of the modern world is a problem that has become conscious in him. Sense of Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal recurrence assumes criticism existence as it is, without meaning or aim. The philosophy of will should displace metaphysics, overcome and revaluate all ancient values. The author tries to explain Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power as a simulative principle of the idea of the eternal recurrence. The paper examines the relationship of Nietzsche’s time perspective to nihilism, and how it relates to overcoming or closuring of open nihilism.
EN
In this study, the author is concerned with the position of widows in medieval society. He considers the development of basic ideas about their position on the basis of the decrees of Frankish synods and Early Medieval laws. The main part of the work is devoted to widows in the medieval Kingdom of Hungary during the earliest period from the 11th century to the issuing of the Golden Bull in 1222. The subject of this is the position of widows according to the individual points of the Hungarian law codes of St. Stephen, St. Ladislav and Koloman. The main question is the claim of widows to property and the gradual changes in this area up to the beginning of the 13th century. The main emphasis is placed on the search for the beginnings of the dower as property, which the woman kept after the death of her husband. The study includes a detailed analysis of the wills of important women, widows, but also widowers. Evidence of the property rights of widows and the first indications of the existence of the dower are sought in these documents.
EN
The author devotes attention to Early Modern practices in connection with wills in the royal borough of Trnava as a member of the group of treasury (tavernicalis) towns. She has narrowed her research base to the 16th and 17th centuries and the archives of the Trnava town authorities, in which the first surviving wills date from 1511. She traces the inheritance procedure of inheritance from a will in the summary of questions of the right to establish a will (and other actions of the mortis causa), determination of the group of legal heirs, freedom of bequest, formal signs of the establishment of a will and the basic material-legal principles of town inheritance law in the Kingdom of Hungary in Early Modern times. The result is only a legal historical sketch of inheritance practice at Trnava, but it opens the way to further research on the extensive documentary material from the following centuries, since the researched collection is remarkable for the preservation of the originals, rather than the usual preservation of the libris testamentorum.
EN
Man is a social being, he lives among the people and operates them throughout their lives. W. M. Kozlowski theory assumes the primacy of man over society. In Polish philosopher occupies the foremost place, feeling and will pushing for action. In this way — according to W. M. Kozlowski — the person will broaden the horizons of the general public and individuals through the interrelation with society becomes a liberated nation.
Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego
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2011
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vol. 20
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issue 4
1043-1091
EN
With the passing of a new law on 18 March, 2011 (taking effect on 23 October, 2011), regulations concerning the legatum per vindicationem were introduced into the Polish Civil Code (alongside existing regulations concerning the legacy, which only results in an obligation). The legatum per vindicationem can only be established in a notarial will. The object of such legacy may be a thing indicated as to its identity, a transferable property right, an enterprise or an arable farm, as well as establishing the right of use or easement to the benefit of the legatee. At the moment of opening the succession, the object of the legacy is acquired by the legatee. The object of the legatum per vindicationem does not become part of the succession. If at the moment of opening the succession the object of the legacy does not belong to the testator, or the testator was obliged to dispose of it, the legatum per vindicationem is void. Any term clause or condition clause made while establishing the legatum per vindicationem is considered as non-existent. Such legatee is liable jointly with the heirs for the payment of inherited debts. When calculating the compulsory portion, the value of the legata per vindicationem is added to that of the succession. The legatee is only liable for the compulsory portion when the eligible party is unable to obtain it from the heirs. The legatee may accept or reject the legatum per vindicationem under the same conditions as the heir. The procedure for documenting the acquisition of the legatum per vindicationem is identical to that concerning the acquisition of the succession by the heirs. Despite a number of reservations concerning particulars, this amendment to the Civil Code ought to be seen in a positive light since it broadens testamentary freedom and is in keeping with the legal sense of the average testator.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 9
890 – 905
EN
The present analysis of the evolution of the concept of freedom in Ernst Tugendhat’s philosophy aims to highlight several interesting facts. First, Tugendhat attempts to describe the meaning of Kant’s statement “I could have acted otherwise” from a non-transcendental perspective. Second, he makes an effort to avoid the classical Kantian dilemma of the relation of free will and determinism by posing the question differently. Third, he situates the issue of the relation of freedom and causality in the framework of the inner structure of freedom – examining it from the perspective of the human’s relation to him- or herself. Fourth, he attempts repeatedly to overcome the impossibility of considering freedom in the objective language of causality. The paper demonstrates why the issue of freedom remains a central problem of continental philosophy.
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