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EN
The article focuses on the problem of truth in posterior works of Wittgenstein, especially in his essay 'On Certainty'. The main problem concerns the range of changes that presumably were introduced in the grammatical interpretation of the classical concept of truth, as it was developed by Wittgenstein in the thirties, and repeated in 'Philosophical Investigations'. The author argues that that these changes constitute an integral development of the conception of truth that Wittgenstein adopted previously. Accordingly, they cannot be construed as a new position of Wittgenstein who purportedly abandoned the classical conception of truth and espoused cognitive relativism.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2008
|
vol. 63
|
issue 9
830-838
EN
The author will undertake the attempt to outline Wittgenstein's account of subjectivity by focusing on the central notion of expression, emerging from the rejection of the false alternative between Cartesianism and Behaviourism. Although allowing us to rethink the relationships between inner and outer and self and other, the notion of expression does not seem to provide a plausible explanation of first-person authority. His main point will be that by differentiating the term knowledge (utilizing Polanyi's and Shoemaker's accounts), we can expand Wittgenstein's model in a way helps us understand self-knowledge and first person
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2008
|
vol. 63
|
issue 4
301-304
EN
The paper deals with Wittgenstein's conception of the status of scientific laws (in particular the laws of natural sciences), as presented in his 'Tractatus logico-philosophicus'. The author finds Kantian motifs in the conception, namely conceiving scientific laws as an a priori contribution of reason. According to Wittgenstein, however, there could be many of such a priori 'grids', some of them simple, the other more complete, but none of them can be declared to be the definitive and the only accurate one. This is how Wittgenstein argues against another Kant's contribution, in particular against conceiving scientific laws as something universal and apodictically valid.
EN
This article deals with the social introspection approach of the Czech sociologist I. A. Bláha. Its aim is not only to introduce the method but also to explore the potentials and the limits of this approach in understanding social reality. The author looks at Wittgenstein's argument against a private language as a critique of the introspective method and briefly analyses the phenomenological approach in sociology to asses the boundaries of the introspective approach. Theoretical conclusions on the application of the introspection method in sociology are drawn at the end of the article, allowing the author to assess the applicability of Blaha's method.
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