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EN
With the intention of the German, French and Polish foreign ministers to bring their countries closer together after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Weimar Triangle was founded in 1991. This setting has enabled an institutionalised regional cooperation on the governmental level as well as between the respective civil societies. However today, in a Europe of permanent crises and protracted uncertainty, a risky divergence between Germany, France and Poland seems to emerge. Since the Polish national elections in October 2015 has brought the right‑wing, nationalist Law‑ and‑Justice‑party (PiS) into power, we are also witnessing a rising relevance of domestic political determinants for mutual contacts. Facing this new period of tension, where more closeness and trust would be required, discursive attitudes and strategies of ‘othering’ might gain ground and lead to increasing alienation. Based on the assumption that the portrayal of a country could be both the first step towards creating and obtaining a more inclusive or exclusive identity, this paper aims to find out the following: in how far are German and French media about to pre‑ cook patterns of asymmetry and alienation? Or follow they rather an inclusive and comprehensible approach towards Poland? These questions are exemplified by the biggest centre‑left and centre‑right German and French daily newspapers Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Le Monde and Le Figaro, whereas the corpus of data is limited to the period of the year 2016. By making use of the critical discourse analysis, this paper provides information about to what extent Poland is considered to be a close and indispensable partner as well as to where we can identify mechanisms of putting the country aside as a significant other.
EN
The significance of the Weimar Triangle as a platform for cooperation and solving the most important problems of continental Europe has been changing since the day it was established. Despite a number of significant and spectacular achievements and answers given to the most crucial questions, there are still a lot of controversial issues in which the agreement cold not be achieved.
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2016
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vol. 18
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issue 2
133-151
EN
Polish-German relations in the first half of 2014 were dominated by the Ukraine crisis. This study is an attempt to answer the question of how Polish and German press assessed the cooperation of both countries in resolving the conflict in Ukraine; to what extent the most widely read magazines associated themselves with the decisions of their politicians and the feelings of their own societies and how much understanding they showed for the arguments of their EU partner. The analysis focuses on the unprecedented mission of the Weimar Triangle foreign ministers to Ukraine in February 2014, which led to an agreement between the Ukrainian opposition and President Viktor Yanukovych. A turning point was the visit paid by Radoslaw Sikorski and Frank-Walter Steinmeier to St. Petersburg in June 2014. The next meetings agreed on by EU partners were held without inviting the Polish partner. In view of the speed of events in the selected time interval, the articles subjected to analysis were taken from the most widely read online editions of national daily newspapers in Poland and Germany.
EN
The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) enables European Union to take a leading role in peace – keeping operations, conflict prevention and the strengthening of the international security. It is an integral part of EU’s comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets. EU Battle Groups remain important for CSDP as the only military capabilities on standby for possible EU operations and as they are helping to reinforce the effectiveness Member States’ of military forces. EU Battle Groups are multinational, military units and form an integral part of the EU’s military rapid reaction capacity to respond to emerging crises and conflicts around the world. Therefore, Polish diplomacy actively acts in various forums (the Visegrad Group, the Weimar Triangle) to bolster the CSDP. Poland actively involved in the implementation of the CSDP through participation in EU Battle Groups.
PL
Celem naukowym artykułu jest zbadanie stosunków państw Trójkąta Weimarskiego ze Zjednoczonymi Emiratami Arabskimi. Dlatego też, autor stawia pytanie badawcze. Czy rola i znaczenie państw Trójkąta Weimarskiego wzrasta w zewnętrznym wymiarze Unii Europejskiej? Na przykładzie Zjednoczonych Emiratów Arabskich w badaniu przyjęto hipotezę. Jest to stwierdzenie, że po Brexicie, państwa Trójkąta Weimarskiego mają szansę zwiększyć swoje znaczenie w działaniach zewnętrznych UE. Oprócz studiów przypadków, w celu zrewidowania hipotezy, autor przeprowadził skrupulatną analizę porównawczą. Ponadto, jako odpowiednie narzędzie do zbadania przedstawionego zagadnienia, przyjęto Teorię Praktyki Międzynarodowej (International Practice Theory). Niniejsze badania empiryczne i jego wyniki są rezultatem ponad dziesięciu lat autora bezpośredniej obserwacji, analiz i uczestniczenia w wielu inicjatywach, zarówno Unii Europejskiej, jak i Zjednoczonych Emiratów Arabskich. Bliski Wschód dla krajów Trójkąta Weimarskiego jest ważniejszy niż tylko z perspektywy potencjału handlowego. Sytuacja w tym regionie ma również wpływ na Europę i globalną architekturę bezpieczeństwa. Dlatego też, należy rozwijać spójną i kompleksową politykę zagraniczną i bezpieczeństwa UE, wobec tego regionu, a jednym z jej filarów powinna być formuła Trójkąta Weimarskiego.
EN
The article’s scientific goal is to investigate the Weimar Triangle countries’ relations with the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, the author asks the research question. Are the Weimar Triangle states’ role and significance increasing in the external dimension of the European Union? Based on the example of the United Arab Emirates, the research adopted a hypothesis. It is the statement that after Brexit, the Weimar Triangle countries have a chance to improve their importance in the EU external activities. Apart from case studies, to revise the hypothesis, the author performed a meticulous comparative analysis. Moreover, the research implemented International Practice Theory as an appropriate tool to investigate the presented issue. This empirical research and its findings resulted from over ten years of the author’s direct observation, analysis, and participation in many initiatives, both in the European Union and in the United Arab Emirates. The Middle East for the Weimar Triangle countries is more significant than just from a trade potential perspective. The situation in this region is also affecting Europe, as well as global security architecture. For this reason, one should develop a coherent and comprehensive EU foreign and security policy towards the region, and the Weimar Triangle formula should be one of its pillars.
EN
The article refers to the Weimar Triangle. It reveals its genesis, goals, activities, successes and failures, and prospects for renaissance, as discussed, among other things, at the May 12, 2023 meeting of the Weimar Triangle countries’ European affairs ministers with the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine. The Weimar Triangle was formed at a difficult time for Poland and Europe (after the reunification of Germany on October 3, 1990), but before the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, which had a negative attitude toward Poland’s political transformation (begun in June 1989) and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin has a similar negative attitude toward Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The Weimar Triangle seems to be one of the greatest success of Poland’s post-1989 foreign policy, the main goal of which was accession to Euro-Atlantic structures, in order to thus ensure its sovereignty and strengthen its security. In this aspect, it should be said that the Weimar Triangle has fulfilled its function. It has had many successes, but also failures and missed opportunities. It also played a positive role in the process of Poland’s “return” to Europe after 1989. The main thesis of this article is the observation that without the Weimar Triangle, the integration of post-communist Europe, especially in 1991–2009, would not have been as dynamic and effective as it was then, and Poland’s path to Euro-Atlantic structures would have been much more difficult. I conclude that given the increasingly complicated international situation today, the Weimar Triangle should continue to play an important role in the foreign policy of Poland, Germany and France, and the European Union. It could also play an important role in ending the Russian-Ukrainian war and Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and NATO. Therefore it should resume its activities as soon as possible.
PL
Artykuł poświęcony jest Trójkątowi Weimarskiemu. Ukazuje jego genezę, cele, działalność, sukcesy i porażki oraz perspektywy renesansu, o czym mówiono m.in. 12 maja 2023 r. na spotkaniu ministrów ds. europejskich państw Trójkąta Weimarskiego z wicepremier Ukrainy. Trójkąt Weimarski powstał w trudnym momencie dla Polski i Europy (po zjednoczeniu Niemiec 3 października 1990 r.), ale jeszcze przed rozpadem Związku Radzieckiego w grudniu 1991 r., który miał negatywny stosunek do transformacji ustrojowej w Polsce (rozpoczętej w czerwcu 1989 r.) i jej euroatlantyckich aspiracji. Podobny negatywny stosunek do euroatlantyckich aspiracji Ukrainy ma Federacja Rosyjska pod rządami Władimira Putina. Trójkąt Weimarski zdaje się być jednym z największych sukcesów polityki zagranicznej Polski po 1989 r., której głównym celem była akcesja do struktur euroatlantyckich, aby w ten sposób zapewnić jej suwerenność i umocnić bezpieczeństwo. W tym aspekcie należy stwierdzić, że Trójkąt Weimarski spełnił swoją funkcję. Ma na swoim koncie wiele sukcesów, ale również porażek i niewykorzystanych szans. Odegrał też pozytywną rolę w procesie „powrotu” Polski do Europy po 1989 r. Tezą główną niniejszego artykułu jest konstatacja, że bez Trójkąta Weimarskiego integracja postkomunistycznej Europy, szczególnie w latach 1991–2009, nie byłaby tak dynamiczna i efektywna, jak to miało wówczas miejsce, a droga Polski do struktur euroatlantyckich byłaby znacznie trudniejsza. Ponadto stwierdzam, że biorąc pod uwagę coraz bardziej komplikującą się dziś sytuację międzynarodową, Trójkąt Weimarski powinien nadal odgrywać istotną rolę w polityce zagranicznej Polski, Niemiec i Francji oraz Unii Europejskiej. Mógłby odegrać też istotną rolę w zakończeniu wojny rosyjsko- -ukraińskiej oraz akcesji Ukrainy do Unii Europejskiej i NATO. Dlatego też powinien on jak najszybciej wznowić działalność.
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