Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  abstract entities
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

Platonismus Pavla Tichého

100%
EN
This article addresses the Platonism of the Czech philosopher and logician Pavel Tichý. This is not an easy task as Tichý’s texts are first and foremost detailed analyses of concrete logical problems. The article therefore draws in part on the texts of Tichý’s followers, especially those of P. Materna, M. Duží and J. Raclavský. The author compares Tichý’s version of Platonism with the ancient version of Platonism and then with Aristotle’s critique of Platonism. Reference is made to Aristotle’s (probable) work Peri Ideōn, in which arguments defending Platonism are invariably presented prior to Aris­totle’s critique of them. At the beginning of every chapter there is thus always to be found an argument from Peri Ideōn defending Platonism and then the Aristotelian critique of that argument. The arguments in question are the Argument of Scientific Knowledge, the Argument of the One in Multiplicity, and the Argument of the Object of Thinking. Analogies between ancient arguments and Tichý’s defence of Platonism allow the author to apply Aristotle’s critique to Tichý’s view. The kernel of Aristotle’s critique which, in the author’s opinion, is also relevant to Tichý’s conception, consists in the fact that the arguments presented, though they correctly point to there being something common to a plurality of things, do not justify one to postulate a concrete conception (in this case a Platonic one) of universals.
EN
The paper explores the functions of names of fictional characters, like Emma Bovary, at various levels of fictional discourse: the author suggests an analysis of their textual, paratextual, intertextual and metatextual use, as well as of the negative existential claims which include fictional names. In polemics with widely shared views he argues that proper interpretation of neither of these uses requires introducing fictional characters as abstract entities into our ontology and that neither of them is (typically) made in the mode of pretense.
EN
The scope of Platonism is extended by introducing the concept of a “Platonic computer” which is incorporated in metacomputics. The theoretical framework of metacomputics postulates that a Platonic computer exists in the realm of Forms and is made by, of, with, and from metaconsciousness. Metaconsciousness is defined as the “power to conceive, to perceive, and to be self-aware” and is the formless, contentless infinite potentiality. Metacomputics models how metaconsciousness generates the perceived actualities including abstract entities and physical and nonphysical realities. It is postulated that this is achieved via digital computation using the Platonic computer. The introduction of a Platonic computer into the realm of Forms thus bridges the “inverse explanatory gap” and therefore solves the “inverse hard problem of consciousness” in the philosophy of mind.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.