Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  agathology
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
This article intends to characterize the constructive function that the Indeterminate Duality may have played in Plato’s oral teaching. Far from being in itself – as some testimonia seem to suggest – the primary origin of evil, as origin of multiplicity the Indeterminate Duality can be perceived as intrinsically presupposed by Plato’s identification of the source of being with the supreme Good. The notion of good implicates for Plato namely an unconditioned impulse to relationality, which indicates that the supreme Good is to be considered as supreme origin not only of unity, but also of multiplicity (scil. non-unity) and alterity. In the absence of multiplicity and alterity, no real relation, and, therefore, no real manifestation of the Good could in fact take place. As a consequence (and in accord with the suggestions given by Simplicius), the Indeterminate Duality may be considered as source of that original differentiation as well as of that generativity without which the supreme Good would be discordant with its goodness.
IT
This article intends to characterize the constructive function that the Indeterminate Duality may have played in Plato’s oral teaching. Far from being in itself – as some testimonia seem to suggest – the primary origin of evil, as origin of multiplicity the Indeterminate Duality can be perceived as intrinsically presupposed by Plato’s identification of the source of being with the supreme Good. The notion of good implicates for Plato namely an unconditioned impulse to relationality, which indicates that the supreme Good is to be considered as supreme origin not only of unity, but also of multiplicity (scil. non-unity) and alterity. In the absence of multiplicity and alterity, no real relation, and, therefore, no real manifestation of the Good could in fact take place. As a consequence (and in accord with the suggestions given by Simplicius), the Indeterminate Duality may be considered as source of that original differentiation as well as of that generativity without which the supreme Good would be discordant with its goodness.
EN
In this article, we consider the problem of the equivalence of transcendentals: beauty, truth and good, in the perspective of two great thinkers of the twentieth century: H. U. von Balthasar and J. Tischner. Based on the confrontation of their reflections, we introduce the concept of the paradox of the “strugle of transcendentals” and we analyze the philosophical positions they occupy in this matter. The obtained research results, concerning all transcendentals, are then concretized on the agathological ground, where the similarities and differences in views of both authors are apparent. A common ground for Balthasar and Tischner consists in the recognition of good as a fundamental transcendentale in the development of (theo)dramatic reflection. The basic difference is revealed in their perception of the relation of good to other transcendentals. Tischner is in favor of the absolute primacy of good among all transcendentals, while Balthasar admits only a relative primacy in this case. In the final section of the work we indicate some shortcomings of both approaches and we propose a soteriological-anthropological example illustrating the validity of tischnerian approach.
PL
W niniejszym artykule rozpatrujemy problem równoważności transcendentaliów: piękna, prawdy i dobra, w ujęciu dwóch znakomitych myślicieli XX wieku: H. U. von Balthasara i J. Tischnera. Opierając się na konfrontacji ich refleksji, wprowadzamy pojęcie paradoksu „walki transcendentaliów” i analizujemy stanowiska filozoficzne, jakie zajmują oni wobec tego zagadnienia. Uzyskane wyniki badań, dotyczące ogółu transcendentaliów, konkretyzujemy następnie na gruncie agatologicznym, na którym najwyraźniej zarysowują się podobieństwa i różnice w poglądach obu autorów. Wspólną płaszczyzną dla Balthasara i Tischnera okazuje się być uznanie dobra jako transcendentale fundamentalnego dla rozwijania refleksji (teo)dramatycznej. Podstawowa różnica ujawnia się w ich postrzeganiu relacji dobra do pozostałych transcendentaliów. Tischner opowiada się za absolutnym prymatem dobra wśród transcendentaliów, Balthasar dopuszcza w tym przypadku jedynie prymat relatywny. W końcowej sekcji pracy zwracamy uwagę na pewne mankamenty obu podejść i proponujemy soteriologiczno-antropologiczny przykład ilustrujący zasadność podejścia Tischnerowskiego.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.