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Responsible Capitalism and the Culture of Investment

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EN
This paper outlines the background to, and describes the main conclusions of, the government-initiated Kay Review into UK equity markets and long-term decision making published in July 2012. The review, whose conclusions were accepted by the UK government, vividly describes flaws in the relationships between investors and businesses and concludes that short-termism is a key problem. It suggests that the principal causes of the short-term approach to investment are a decline of trust and the misalignment of incentives at the various stages of the equity investment chain. Among its recommendations is that the UK Stewardship Code, which advocates greater engagement by shareholders with the companies in which they invest, should include a more expansive form of stewardship, focussing on strategic as well as corporate governance issues.
EN
The article deals with the unequal treatment of company shareholders. The analysis is conducted from the perspective of minority shareholders and their interests. The author uses a research method that presents the position of minority shareholders in companies on the basis of the agency theory. Szewc-Rogalska shows the influence of dominant shareholders and top managers on the market value of companies (in light of both Polish and foreign empirical studies), along with a review of ways to limit inequality among shareholders. The analysis reveals that the position of minority shareholders can be threatened by agency conflicts that occur in companies. In companies with concentrated ownership, these conflicts are different than in companies with scattered ownership. After a dominant shareholder exceeds a certain level of ownership, the company is likely to face problems resulting from the shareholder’s desire to pursue their own interests at the expense of other shareholders. Inequalities among shareholders cannot be eradicated completely, and there is no single fully efficient mechanism to protect minority shareholder rights. A diverse range of activities is needed, including improved information transparency of companies and better corporate supervision, in addition to increased activity of minority shareholders and the creation of legal mechanisms to protect their interests.
EN
The aim of this paper is to present regulations related to professional liability of a real estate agent, and an indication of the effectiveness of information issues. First of all, economic theory of agency will be used as a tool to characterize the relationship between the parties of a transaction. Next liability will be discussed, i.e. the agency contracts and agent’s professional liability − distinguished from civil and criminal liability. The theory of agency exists as a research tool in the new institutional economics. Its assumptions can be summarized as follows: The agent as a subject is acting on behalf of the principal who, in terms of the indicated target, according to his own preferences and possibilities performs actions leading in his opinion to the desired result by the principal. The relationship may form problems of information asymmetry, because the agent does not have to reveal his knowledge and capabilities, so the principal is not able to affect the method of implementation of an order. The identification of professional liability of a real estate agent comes directly from the set of his contract. Basic regulations defining agency agreements and identifications of professional liability arose during the political changes in Poland. Patterns come from different countries and different legal systems. Polish business practice used them in accordance with its capabilities. The observed patterns of work of agents’ representatives lead to the conclusion that they may lead to strengthening the presence of information asymmetry problems in the form of adverse selection or moral hazard. As a result, they can lower the information efficiency. A real estate agent can provide mediation activity by acting on the basis of multiple sources of contractual provisions. These include a contract of employment, contract work, self-employment or running a company. Regardless of the basis for their relationship with an employing person an additional (and primary) source of responsibility are agency agreements. Two types of contracts (open and with an exclusivity clause) impose different qualitative responsibilities on a agent. Regardless of the form of the activity they are associated with high risks connected with the provision of services on asset markets with high specificity and uniqueness of the transaction. Therefore, from an economic point of view attempts trying to reduce the occupational risk and market risk should be regarded as reasonable.
EN
An IT project consisting in implementing a management support information system is characterised by information asymmetry between the supplier and the client. The presented research results are part of the author’s broader research pointing to imperfections in the access to information amongst the providers and buyers of IT projects. The scope of this article is to present the methods of avoiding information asymmetry as part of an IT project implementation. The research results may be interesting for researchers specialising in the subject matter of IT project implementation and for practitioners completing IT projects.
PL
W artykule podjęto problem przedstawicielstwa w otwartych funduszach emerytalnych. Całość rozważań osadzono w założeniach pozytywistycznej teorii agencji. W tekście poddano analizie stosunki, w jakie wchodzą otwarte fundusze emerytalne (OFE) i powszechne towarzystwa emerytalne (PTE) – organ zarządzający OFE. Zwrócono uwagę na relacje zachodzące pomiędzy członkiem OFE a akcjonariuszem PTE. W opracowaniu jako cel przyjęto ocenę mechanizmów ukierunkowanych na łagodzenie konfliktu interesów pomiędzy członkami OFE a PTE. Analizie poddano dwa rodzaje mechanizmów, a mianowicie: bodźce i monitoring. Zdaniem autora w zakresie bodźców przyjęte przez ustawodawcę rozwiązania nie do końca odpowiadają potrzebom członków OFE. Autor proponuje powiązanie większej części wynagrodzenia PTE z wynikami inwestycyjnymi OFE. Towarzyszyć temu jednak powinno zniesienie ustawowych ograniczeń inwestycyjnych dla środków zgromadzonych w OFE i stworzenie możliwości wyodrębnienia z OFE kilku subfunduszy o różnym poziomie ryzyka inwestycyjnego. Autor zaznacza przy tym, iż o profilu ryzyka planu emerytalnego decydować powinien członek OFE. Przyjęte natomiast przez ustawodawcę rozwiązania z punktu widzenia mechanizmu monitoringu nie budzą większych zastrzeżeń. Pewnej poprawy wymagałyby jednak relacje wewnątrz PTE, a dokładniej kwestie dotyczące rad nadzorczych.
EN
The article discusses the agency problem in open pension funds. All these considerations embedded in the assumptions of the positivist agency theory. The text analyzed the relationship between the open pension funds (OFE) and general pension societies (PTE) – OFE governing body. Attention was paid to the relationship between members of the open pension funds and PTE shareholders. The study adopted as a goal: to assess the mechanisms that solve the conflicts of interest between members of OFE and PTE. Author analyzed two types of mechanisms, namely: incentives and monitoring. According to the author, adopted solutions by the legislator in the area of incentives do not fully meet the needs of OFE members. The author proposes to link the greater part of the PTE remuneration with the results of OFE investment. The author also proposes the abolition of statutory investment limits on OFE and separation within the OFE several sub-funds with different levels of investment risk. OFE member should decide about the risk profile of a pension plan. Adopted solutions by the legislature in the field of monitoring do not raise major objections. One improvement would require, however, relations within the PTE, and more specifically issues concerning supervisory boards.
EN
Investment Fund Company sets up and manages investment funds that collect funds from many investors. Decisions taken by Investment Fund Company are supported by the experienced managers (investment advisors or Asset Management Company). It seems that those decisions are optimal. It turns out, however, that between Investment Fund Company, participants in the Investment Fund and the managers (investment advisors or Asset Management Company) can be identified the agency problem. The purpose of this article is to present, on the basis of literature studies, the sources of agency theory in Investment Fund Company. In the empirical part of the paper is presented the potential sources of the Agency Theory on the example of AXA Investment Fund Company.
Oeconomia Copernicana
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2016
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vol. 7
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issue 4
613-634
EN
The issue of corporate governance is being taken up by different branches of science. Particular views on the nature and goals of a firm, as well as on corporate law, determine various approaches to the issue. The ongoing debate on corporate governance is being stimulated by notorious scandals and economic crises. The agency theory (prevailing today), which assumes egoism and pursuit of one’s own interests, forms the basis for shareholder primacy model, while team production theory forms the basis for director primacy model. Stewardship theory, which assumes convergence of management’s and stakeholders’ interests, may be competing or complementary towards the agency theory, depending on situation. According to management theory, efficient management requires law regulation of managers’ status. This paper is aimed at presenting controversies about traditional agency theory as theoretical basis for corporate governance, as well as at discussing other perspectives on the issue, which are extensions of the traditional theory or are based on substantially different premises. The analysis shows that going beyond agency theory allows for better understanding of the whole range of models of corporate governance as well as of the changes that are being proposed in the area. The method utilized in this paper is descriptive and comparative in character.
EN
The aim of this paper is to bring together some of the foundational and recent literature interlinking corporate governance and the leadership role of the board of directors. Strategic leadership is widely assumed to be a responsibility that defaults to the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). However, in practice, what most CEOs do is strategic management rather than strategic leadership. While strategic management does share key aspects of strategic leadership CEOs are expected to prioritize the managerial side over the leadership side. This is just one of the situations in which the boardroom assumes the leadership role. This paper discusses how boards of directors conduct the process of strategic leadership in their organizations. In recent years there has been an increasing interest among scholars to understand how boards strategize from a behavioral point of view. This growing interest has resulted in the development of various typologies regarding boards’ involvement in the strategic leadership processes.
EN
The executive compensation issue continues to cause protest due to the increasing number of cases of an unjustifiably high level of pay. The main conflict arises from the misalignment of interests between the short-term expectations of the manager and long-term needs of the shareholders. Since there are no universal rules on how to price the executive performance companies reach for different means of establishing the CEO’s compensation and ascertaining manager’s commitment towards maintaining a company’s value. The issue becomes more complex once the compensation rules are not a direct effect of the market power game but are additionally restricted by government. The aim of the paper is to discuss corporate government policies introduced in Israel and their impact on executive compensation level and structure. Israel is amongst those countries that partially regulate CEO compensation and thus the Israeli experience can add to the understanding of the effectiveness of modern corporate governance.
EN
The aim of the article was to assess the importance of barriers to cooperation between regulatory authority and companies in the field of regulation from the perspective of behavioural economics. To achieve this goal the results of survey research conducted in Poland in the Office of Electronic Communications (OEC, n = 107) and the Energy Regulatory Office (ERO, n = 157) were used. The results of the research showed relatively greater importance of barriers in the form of risk propensity, market assessment, and choice of regulation tool, as well as the lack of partner relations and trust. It was indicated that the lack of need for cooperation, discouragement from cooperation and dishonesty are relatively less significant barriers. In several cases statistically significant differences in the assessment of these barriers between UKE and URE officials were also found. From the perspective of behavioural economics the importance of prospect theory, anchoring heuristic, framing effect, overconfidence effect, status quo effect and noise phenomenon was indicated.
PL
Celem artykułu była ocena znaczenia barier we współpracy pomiędzy regulatorem a przedsiębiorstwami w zakresie regulacji z perspektywy ekonomii behawioralnej. Do osiągnięcia celu badawczego wykorzystano wyniki badań ankietowych przeprowadzonych w urzędach regulacyjnych w Polsce: w Urzędzie Komunikacji Elektronicznej (UKE, n = 107) oraz w Urzędzie Regulacji Energetyki (URE, n = 157). Wyniki badania wykazały relatywnie większe znaczenie barier dotyczących skłonności do ryzyka, oceny rynku i wyboru narzędzia regulacji, a także braku partnerskich stosunków współpracy i zaufania. Jednocześnie badani wskazali na relatywnie mniejsze znaczenie braku potrzeby współpracy, zniechęcania do współpracy i nieuczciwości działań. W kilku przypadkach stwierdzono istotne statystycznie różnice w ocenie tych barier pomiędzy urzędnikami UKE i URE. W analizie barier z perspektywy ekonomii behawioralnej wskazano na znaczenie teorii perspektywy, heurystyki zakotwiczenia, efektu ramowania, efektu nadmiernej pewności, efektu status quo oraz na zjawiska szumu.
EN
We outline the management performance measures (MPMs)' boundaries based on the upcoming introduction of MPM's definition to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The literature investigates business performance measures concentrating on managers' needs, while IFRS aims to provide financial information to external users who provide resources to the entity. This indicates a gap between how performance metrics have been investigated so far and how IFRS will adopt them. We used analysis of the exposure draft of the planned standard together with working materials developed in the consultation process. Further, a case study is presented. Results show that the scope of MPM to be introduced to IFRS is limited compared to the broad spectrum of performance measures presented in the literature. We contribute by showing the avenues for future performance measures research using signalling and agency theory and by indicating the limited scope of MPMs and thus bound prospects for using them for a full assessment of the entity‘s performance.
PL
Celem badania jest ocena wpływu frekwencji wyborczej i wykształcenia radnych — które można rozpatrywać jako elementy oddziałujące na zależność agencyjną — na efektywność dostarczania przez gminy dóbr publicznych. Efektywność mierzono za pomocą indeksu efektywności działalności sektora publicznego (Public Sector Efficiency — PSE). Na podstawie próby przekrojowej oszacowano parametry modelu ekonometrycznego dla wszystkich gmin oraz w podziale na: miejskie łącznie z miastami na prawach powiatu, miejsko-wiejskie i wiejskie. W badaniu wykorzystano dane statystyczne GUS oraz Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej (PKW) za 2014 r. Uzyskane wyniki nie potwierdziły zależności agencyjnej rozumianej jako większe zaangażowanie obywateli w politykę i lepszą kontrolę władzy, wskazały jednak na możliwość występowania dodatniej zależności pomiędzy kompetencjami radnych a efektywnością dostarczania dóbr publicznych mieszkańcom gmin.
EN
The aim of the research is to assess the influence of voter turnout and education level of councillors — which can be considered as the elements affecting the agency relationship — on the efficiency of public goods delivery by gminas. Public Sector Efficiency (PSE) index was used as a measure of efficiency. On the basis of the cross-sectional sample, the parameters of the econometric model were estimated for all gminas and their brakedown into: urban including cities with powiat rights, urban-rural and rural. Data published by the CSO and the National Electoral Commission for 2014 were used. The results did not confirm agency dependence understood as a greater involvement of citizens in politics and better control of power. They indicated, however, the possibility of a positive relationship between councillors’ competencies and the efficiency of public goods delivery to the residents of gminas.
EN
The primary purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the duality of the situation of private equity funds, which takes place in the process of investment. The first situation concerns the agency problem in private equity investments, while the latter refers to the information asymmetry. Furthermore this article points to the impact of principal – agent relationship and asymmetric information on the process of divestment. These two issues helps to better understand and comprehensively present the specifics of private equity investment processes. Possibility of resolving the agency dilemma and ability to minimize the degree of information asymmetry between the parties to the transaction affect the length of the fund's capital commitment in the portfolio company, the choice of method of divestment and the price at which the investment is completed. These factors are also key determinants of the efficiency of the private equity funds.
PL
W artykule zaprezentowano problematykę nadzoru właścicielskiego w kontekście wyzwań stawianych przed zarządami i radą nadzorczą. Celem autora jest przedstawienie ewolucji postaw rad nadzorczych spółek sektora komunalnego w kontekście konieczności zmiany modelu biznesu. Materiał empiryczny do analizy uzyskano na podstawie wywiadów przeprowadzonych z przewodniczącymi rad nadzorczych i prezesami zarządów spółek, które każdorazowo brały udział w badaniach w latach 2008, 2011 i 2014. Narzędziem badawczym był kwestionariusz wywiadu, a w metodyce badawczej wykorzystano elementy badań longitudinalnych, rzadko stosowanych w Polsce w naukach ekonomicznych, ale adekwatnych do uzyskania odpowiedzi na postawione problemy badawcze. Część końcowa zawiera wyniki badań ukazujące wzrost znaczenia mechanizmu nadzorczego dotyczącego sposobu pracy rady nadzorczej oraz czynniki mające największy wpływ na ten mechanizm. Konkluzją niniejszego artykułu jest imperatyw podjęcia badań nad zmianą sposobu pracy rady nadzorczej i jej współpracy z zarządem. Podkreślono znaczenie modelu biznesu w warunkach konkurencyjności tych przedsiębiorstw.
EN
The article presents the problems of the owner’s supervision in the context of challenges posed to management boards and the supervisory board. The aim of the article is to present the evolution of the attitudes of supervisory boards of the utilities sector companies, in the context of the need for a change of a business model. The empirical material for the analysis was obtained based on the interviews conducted with chairmen of supervisory boards and presidents of management boards of the companies which participated each time in the surveys in the years 2008, 2011, 2014. An interview questionnaire was a research tool, and some elements of longitudinal study were used in the research methodology. Longitudinal study is rarely applied in Poland in economic studies, but it is adequate to obtain answers to the posed research problems. The final part presents the research findings showing the growth of the importance of the supervisory mechanism concerning the method of work of the supervisory board and factors which have the greatest influence on this mechanism. A conclusion of the article is the imperative of undertaking research on the change in the manner of work of the supervisory board and its cooperation with the management board. The importance of business model in the conditions of the competitiveness of these enterprises is emphasised.
PL
Współczesna gospodarka światowa jest niestabilna. Świadczą o tym wybuchające cyklicznie kryzysy. Jednym z kluczowym czynników wpływających na niestabilność i kryzysy jest zmiana struktury własnościowej wielu przedsiębiorstw i towarzyszące temu oddzielenie własności od zarządzania. Procesy te doprowadziły m.in. do różnych konfliktów między akcjonariuszami i właścicielami opisywanymi m.in. przez teorie agencji. Nie ma miesiąca, w którym nie dowiadywalibyśmy się o kolejnym skandalu finansowym wywołanym przez wielkie korporacje. Celem artykułu jest wskazanie na korelacje między nadużyciami korporacyjnymi a teorią agencji. W artykule przeprowadzono analizę istoty teorii agencji, jej problemów, a także ewolucji. W celu zachowania obiektywności w tekście uwzględnione zostały stanowiska współczesnych zwolenników, jak i krytyków teorii agencji. Poruszono problem nadużyć korporacyjnych w Stanach Zjednoczonych w świetle teorii agencji począwszy od Enronu w 2001 roku, przez kryzys finansowy 2008 roku oraz dalsze jego konsekwencje. Przeprowadzona w artykule analiza wykazała, że pomimo wielkiego kryzysu finansowego nie wyciągnięto należytych wniosków w dziedzinie nadzoru korporacyjnego. Nowe regulacje, które narzucały odpowiedzialność menadżerów, nie przyniosły oczekiwanego efektu. Organy regulacyjne i kontrolne nie potrafiły postawić menadżerów odpowiedzialnych za kryzys w stan oskarżenia. Biorąc pod uwagę taki rozwój sytuacji i bezkarność menadżerów należy się spodziewać narastającego problemu agencji na rynkach finansowych.
EN
The contemporary global economy is unstable, as evidenced by cyclical crises. Almost every month we find out about the next financial scandal caused by large corporations. One of the key factors affecting volatility and crises is the change of the ownership structure of many enterprises and the accompanying separation of ownership and management. These processes led, among others, to various conflicts between shareholders and owners, described by agency theories. The purpose of this article is to show correlations between corporate/financial scandals and the agency theory. In the article, the author analysed the essence of the agency theory, its problems and evolution. To maintain objectivity this text includes the opinions of supporters as well as critics of the agency theory. In the article, there was discussed the problem of corporate frauds in the United States in the light of the agency theory, starting from Enron in 2001, through the financial crisis of 2008 and its further consequences. The analysis presented in the article shows that despite the great financial crisis no proper conclusions were drawn in the area of corporate governance. New regulations that imposed managers’ responsibility did not bring the predicted effect. Regulatory and control bodies were not able to make the managers responsible for the crisis indicted. Taking into account the development of the situation and lack of managers’ responsibility, we should expect a growing agency problem in financial markets.
PL
W piśmiennictwie polskim tematyka behawioralnego nurtu w rachunkowości jest stosunkowo nowa i jak dotąd niewiele jest pozycji, które w ukazywałyby prekursorów tego nurtu oraz jego podbudowę teoretyczną. W artykule zaprezentowano wybrane teorie z zakresu psychologii ekonomicznej oraz ekonomii, które znalazły zastosowanie w badaniach dotyczących rachunkowości behawioralnej, a także postaci najważniejszych uczonych działających we wczesnym okresie jej rozwoju. Oparto się na anglojęzycznych pozycjach książkowych oraz kilkunastu artykułach poświęconych ewolucji BAR (Behavioural Accounting Research), zarówno autorów rodzimych, jak i zagranicznych.
EN
Behavioural trend in accounting is relatively new in Polish literature and there are only a few references presenting the precursors of that mainstream and its theoretical background. The paper presents selected theories on economic psychology and economics which have been used in behavioural accounting research, as well as the most important scholarly figures in the early stages of its development. The source material includes English-language books and several articles (by Polish and foreign authors) devoted to BAR (Behavioural Accounting Research) evolution
EN
The inter-disciplinarity and multi-paradigmatism of corporate governance issues results in a lack of clear categorization of the theories. This paper attempts to systematize theories of corporate governance with special emphasis on the new institutional economics (NIE) framework and suggests new concepts for systematization. It allows us to understand better the limitations of each theory, and thus to choose the best one in particular circumstances, as well as provide them with the best available methodology. Bringing all the theories into the paradigm of NIE makes them closer to real market conditions and enables us to use methods attributed to neo-institutional research.
PL
Interdyscyplinarność i wieloparadygmatyzm zagadnień związanych z nadzorem korporacyjnym utrudnia wskazanie jednolitej klasyfikacji teorii corporate governance. W artykule podjęto próbę usystematyzowania teorii nadzoru oraz skonfrontowania ich założeń z paradygmatem nowej ekonomii instytucjonalnej. Przeprowadzony przez autorkę przegląd podejść teoretycznych podkreśla ograniczenia każdej z zaprezentowanych koncepcji, pozwalając tym samym wybrać optymalną w określonych warunkach teorię oraz metodologię badań. Analizowane teorie zinterpretowane zostały również w świetle założeń NEI, co, w opinii autorki, zbliża je do rzeczywistych warunków, w jakich funkcjonują współczesne podmioty gospodarcze, oraz umożliwia wykorzystanie instrumentarium metodologicznego używanego w analizie neoinstytucjonalnej.
EN
In the article selected aspects of property management are presented. Particular attention is paid to the role of real estate manager and the specificity of the relationship emerging between the manager and the owners of residential units. These problems are discussed in the context of agency theory.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono wybrane aspekty zarządzania nieruchomościami. Szczególną uwagę zwrócono na rolę zarządcy nieruchomościami oraz specyfikę relacji kształtujących się pomiędzy zarządcą nieruchomości a właścicielami lokali mieszkalnych. Problemy te omówiono w kontekście teorii agencji.
EN
The research analyses dividend initiations and the reasons why firms begin paying regular cash dividend to shareholders in the context of signaling theory, agency theory, and life cycle theory. The research was conducted on the population of non-financial companies initiating dividends payments in the years 2009–2013 and listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange at least 3 years before the event. Due to such assumptions, a small number of the population (27 firms) was obtained, which affects a limitation of the study. The study does not show statistically significant results of the analysis, therefore, we are not able to indicate the reasons why Polish nonfinancial firms did begin regular cash dividends in the years 2009–2013. We assume the necessity of further research in this area.
PL
Główny problem badawczy postawiony w opracowaniu dotyczył przyczyn inicjowania przez spółki wypłat dywidend. Analizy prowadzono w kontekście teorii sygnalizacji, teorii agencji i teorii cyklu życia. Badanie przeprowadzono na populacji niefinansowych spółek inicjujących wypłaty dywidend w latach 2009–2013 i notowanych na GPW w Warszawie co najmniej przez 3 lata przed zdarzeniem. W związku z tak przyjętymi założeniami uzyskano populację 27 spółek – niewielka liczebność stanowi o ograniczeniach badania. Z uwagi na brak potwierdzenia statystycznej istotności przeprowadzonych analiz uznano, że nie ma podstaw do wyciągnięcia jednoznacznych wniosków dotyczących przyczyn inicjowania wypłat dywidend, uznając, iż są konieczne dalsze badania w tym obszarze.
PL
W procesie gospodarowania istotną rolę odgrywają instytucje, które ze względu na swoją funkcjonalność przyczyniają się do sprawnego funkcjonowania rynku lub, gdy są dysfunkcjonalne, ograniczają mechanizmy rynkowe. Ponieważ nie istnieje uniwersalny, sprawdzony sposób kreowania instytucji formalnych o wysokiej jakości, każde państwo powinno na bieżąco kontrolować wpływ instytucji na funkcjonowanie podmiotów gospodarczych na rynku. Celem niniejszego opracowania jest podjęcie próby (za pomocą narzędzi oferowanych przez nową ekonomię instytucjonalną) identyfikacji źródeł dysfunkcjonalności instytucji formalnych wprowadzonych do polskiego systemu prawnego na mocy ustawy o wspieraniu nowych inwestycji. Koncepcja badawcza została przeprowadzona na podstawie metody studiów literatury oraz metody teoretyczno-prawnej.
EN
Institutions, that following own functionality contribute to the efficient market operation, or when dysfunctional limit market forces, play an important role in the economic process. Since there is no universal and proved method of establishing high-quality formal institutions, each country should control the influence of institutions on business units operating on the market, on current basis. The purpose of this study is identification of origins for dysfunctionality (with means of tools offered by new institutional economy) in formal institutions, that are implemented into the Polish legal system under the Act on supporting new investments. The research concept was carried out on the basis of literature research method, as well as theoretical and legal method.
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