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EN
Reasoning is one of the most important activities of intellect. Reasoning itself can be also a justification of human beliefs. It is connected one to another with process of acteptation of propositions as true ones. Thus it plays a role both in sciences and common thinking as well. That is why a justification is also needed as a support in domain of faith and of religious knowledge. The logical analysis of single act of faith is the content of this paper which main purpose is to point at the premisses which reasonelbe human intellect can accept revealed propositions as true ones with. To attain our delibarate purposes we present in turn two propositions from Holy Gospel according to Mark 2, 5. 10. Next, we are to reconstruct the logical arguments which brings to us demanded propositions as their conclusions, appearing as results of process based on implication. Next we are to examine the truth value of obtained premisses to show the rights which allow us to accept the revealed propositions which we are thinking about. In the same time we touch another topic. It is all about free human will and its decision which helps us to justify the propositions coming from Divine Revelation. In first part of this paper we find out something about reasoning in act of faith and we look closer on three concepts of reasonable faith. In second part we are going to lead an argument founded on two phrases from st. Mark's Gospel. By examining the argument step by step we will precise a way which revealed proposition is accepted on. In third part we figure out a few general conclusions about human free will which decision takes finally place in act of faith. An act of free will doesn't belong to human's intellectual activity so that it can be brought about by some influence from „outside”. Durring logical analysis of reasoning present in act of faith, we came up against moment for act of will. The act of will can be caused by the testimony of community of faith which The Revelation is bequeathed in. However obviously is that non every act of faith can be adequately translated into logical language but reconstruction and analysis put into practice wherever it could be applied, help us to understand complexity of act of faith and plurality of factors which it is built of. Even that reasonning is to be only one of them we need it as reasonable beeings and even more, we must angage our reason in our faith as far and deeply as it is possible.
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Umiarkowanie i jego modele

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EN
Temperance is one of the four cardinal virtues which were first formulated by Plato. Today the notion of temperance has a central position in many ethical systems, especially in ecophilosophy (environmental philosophy). Temperance, involwing balance and moderation, may give resolution to many contemporary human problems. The attempt of analysis of this concept with simple formal means can make clear some hidden assumptions and the structure of the concept of temperance. The analised concept includes both – a decision (a choice) and an action/behaviour as an effect of the decision. First model is based on Aristotle’s theory of golden mean presented in his Nicomachean Ethics. The attempt of reconstruction Aristotle’s idea using mathematical notion of weighted mean shows that the concept of temperance is strongly restricted to the cultural background. Therefore in extremal cases the universal concept of temperance may not exist.Second model given by Epicurus is based on the notion of consequence. It concerns pleasure and pain only, but temperance is just recommended in using pleasures. The set of temperant decisions is built recurently. A – the set of pleasure – is modified step by step by consequence CR(A) where R – set of rules – includes modus ponens, law of identity and some simple laws of everyday provenience. U is the set of temperant choices in Epicurean sense iff  ∀p ∈ P, ~(p ∈ CR (U)) where P – set of pain.
PL
Umiarkowanie jest jedną z czterech cnót kardynalnych, pierwotnie podanych przez Platona. Obecnie pojęcie umiarkowania zajmuje kluczową pozycję w wielu systemach etycznych, w tym w ekofilozofii. Umiarkowanie zakłada zachowanie właściwej równowagi, potrzebnej przy dokonywaniu wyborów życiowych. Próba analizy tego pojęcia przy pomocy prostych środków formalnych pozwala ujawnić ukryte założenia, a także jego strukturę. W pojęciu umiarkowania mieści się zarówno decyzja (wybór), jak i działanie bądź zachowanie jako efekt podjętej decyzji. Pierwszy model oparty jest na koncepcji Arystotelesa i jego „złotego środka” zawartej w Etyce nikomachejskiej. Próba rekonstrukcji koncepcji Arystotelesa pokazuje, że pojęcie umiarkowania w tym ujęciu jest silnie zrelatywizowane do kręgu kulturowego i, co wydaje się zaskakujące, w skrajnych przypadkach jego określenie może okazać się niemożliwe.Drugi model, podany przez Epikura, jest oparty na pojęciu konsekwencji logicznej. Wprawdzie dotyczy jedynie przyjemności i przykrości, ale umiarkowanie najczęściej zalecane jest właśnie w odniesieniu do rzeczy przyjemnych. Zbiór decyzji umiarkowanych jest budowany rekurencyjnie. A – zbiór przyjemności – jest modyfikowany krok po kroku poprzez konsekwencje CR(A), gdzie R jest zbiorem reguł zawierającym prócz reguły modus ponens oraz reguły tożsamości proste, najczęściej nieformalne, reguły działania/wyboru pochodzące z codziennego doświadczenia. Zbiór U jest zbiorem wyborów umiarkowanych w sensie Epikura wtedy i tylko wtedy, gdy dla dowolnego p należącego do zbioru przykrości, p nie należy do zbioru konsekwencji ∀p ∈ P, ~(p ∈ CR(U)).
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