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1
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The ne bis in idem Principle in Proceedings Related to Anti-Competitive Agreements in EU Competition Law

100%
Rosiak P. K.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2012
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vol. 5(6)
11-135
EN
The source of the ne bis in idem principle in European Union law is found in both the Protocol no. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention) and in the legal systems of many Member States. It is enshrined in the jurisprudence of the EU courts as a general principle of EU law. Furthermore, it has also been introduced into some international agreements concluded by the Member States, i.e. the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests and the Convention on the fight against corruption, which remain an integral part of EU legislation, as well as in the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, which has been progressively integrated into EU legislation. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter) into EU primary law, the provision on the application of the ne bis in idem principle is now applied in the European Union in areas broader than just the scope of the three above-mentioned Conventions. The significance of this principle may also be strengthened following the accession of the EU to the Convention, as has been set forth in the new Article 6(2) TEU. The ne bis in idem principle has found its own, lasting place among the rights and guarantees of undertakings in proceedings conducted by the Commission and the national competition authorities (NCAs) of the Member States aimed at prosecuting and/or sanctioning parties for agreements non-compliant with EU competition law. However, it is still not applied in proceedings against agreements having a scope which transcends EU borders, conducted by the Commission or the NCAs of Member States on the one hand, and by the competition authorities of non-member States on the other. This approach is grounded both in the provisions of the Convention and in the provisions of the Charter.
FR
Le principe ne bis in idem trouve sa source aussi bien dans le Protocole no 7 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (Convention) que dans les systèmes juridiques des États membres. Dans le droit de l’Union européenne, il est présent dans la jurisprudence des juges communautaires en tant que règle générale du droit communautaire. Avec l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, qui inclut la Charte des droits fondamentaux (Charte) dans le droit primaire de l’UE, l’Union européenne s’est dotée aussi d’un texte relatif à l’application du principe ne bis in idem dans un champ beaucoup plus large que pour les affaires relevant des trois conventions susmentionnées. L’importance de ce principe peut aussi être corroborée par l’adhésion de l’UE à la Convention, ce que prévoit l’art. 6 nouveau, al. 2 du TUE. Le principe ne bis in idem a sa place assurée parmi les droits et garanties reconnus à l’entrepreneur dans le cadre des procédures menées par la Commission et les autorités nationales de concurrence, soit la poursuite et sanction des accords non conformes au droit communautaire de la concurrence. Cependant, il n’est pas appliqué en cas de procédures relatives à des accords dont la portée dépasse le territoire de l’UE, menées par la Commission ou une autorité nationale de concurrence d’une part et les autorités de concurrence de pays tiers d’autre part. Ceci est motivé aussi bien par les clauses de la Convention que celles de la Charte.
2
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Economic Approach to Counteracting Cartels

88%
Fornalczyk A.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2009
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vol. 2(2)
34-48
EN
Horizontal agreements between competitors concerning price fixing, quotas, distribution and/or supply market share – cartels – represent the most severe form of competition law infringement. Why are these agreements subject to the highest fines and, in some countries (USA, Canada, Mexico, UK), subject to both fines as well as imprisonment? What are the economic grounds for such severe punishment? How important is an economic analysis for the results of anti-cartel proceedings considering that they are prohibited per se, that is, absolutely and unconditionally? Does growing market concentration and resulting transparency increase the significance of the economic approach to the evaluation of market effects of the behaviour of business? Which methods make it possible to differentiate cartels from competition in oligopolistic markets including economic and econometric analyses? This paper will present an answer to the aforementioned questions on the basis of literature studies, an analysis of Polish case law between 2000–2009 as well as the author’s extensive experience in the field of antitrust consultancy.
3
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Anti-Competitive Agreements according to Kosovo’s Law on the Protection of Competition – Case Study of the Insurance Market

88%
Ceku O., Shaqiri M. Q.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2016
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vol. 9(13)
191-208
EN
Competition law is an area which links the economy with the law and is very important for the functioning of a free market economy. Anti-competitive agreements, along with the abuse of dominance and concentrations of undertakings, are the subject matter of the Law on the Protection of Competition (LPC) of the Republic of Kosovo. Anti-competitive agreements can be horizontal or vertical in nature. The following paper deals with agreements and other multilateral practices prohibited under Kosovo’s Law on the Protection of Competition. The LPC explicitly states also specific circumstances where the prohibition does not apply – these are covered by the so called 'exceptions and allowances' section of the LPC. In this respect, the LPC has incorporated the entirety of the principles covered by Article 101 TFEU. The insurance market of the Republic of Kosovo was analyzed in the context of this case study, which has all the features of an oligopoly including: a limited number of participating firms, product standardization, interdependence in controlling prices and, difficulty of new market entry. From this perspective, the insurance market is highly problematic as far as violations of the provisions of the law dealing with anti-competitive agreements are concerned. The analysis is conducted based on the enforcement measures undertaken by the Kosovo Competition Authority and reviewed by the judiciary of the Republic of Kosovo. Taking into consideration that Kosovo is a young country facing special transitional challenges and aiming to become a member of the European Union, much needed reforms are to take place still. The aim of this analysis is thus to contribute to further development of competition law in Kosovo through the analysis of current market situation, domestic legislation and its compliance with EU rules.
FR
L’article suivant concerne des accords et des pratiques interdites par la loi sur la protection de la concurrence du Kosovo. La loi mentionnée ci-dessus prévoit également circonstances atténuantes exceptionnelles pour l'application des dispositions concernant les accords anticoncurrentiels. À cet égard, la loi sur la protection de la concurrence a incorporé les principes de l'article 101 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne. Dans ce contexte, l’article analyse le marché de l’assurance dans la République du Kosovo, qui possède toutes les caractéristiques d'oligopole, y compris le nombre limité d'entreprises, la normalisation des produits, l'interdépendance dans le contrôle des prix et les difficultés de nouvelles entreprises qui entrent le marché. Dans cette perspective, le marché de l'assurance est très problématique en termes de violation des dispositions concernant les accords anticoncurrentiels. L'analyse est effectuée à la base de sanctions introduits par l’Autorité de la concurrence de Kosovo, ainsi que par la Cour de la République du Kosovo. En prenant en compte que le Kosovo est un pays jeune, avec des défis pour la transition, qui a pour son objectif de devenir un membre de l’Union européenne, certains réformes doivent être mises en oeuvre. En effet, le but de l’article est de donner la contribution pour les développements de la loi de la concurrence au Kosovo, par l'analyse de la situation actuelle du marché, de la législation nationale et de sa cohérence avec des règles du droit de l’Union européenne.
4
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Jednostronne ujawnianie informacji handlowych a zakaz porozumień ograniczających konkurencję

63%
Korycińska P.
internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny
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2014
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vol. 3
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issue 3
21-33
PL
Wymiana informacji przez konkurentów od dawna znajdowała się w centrum zainteresowania organów antymonopolowych. Przekazywanie informacji może mieć bowiem co najmniej dwojaki antykonkurencyjny charakter: z jednej strony wymiana informacji może stanowić samoistną praktykę ograniczającą konkurencję, z drugiej zaś –jest ona jednak na ogół tylko pewnym elementem szerszego porozumienia ograniczającego konkurencję. Ostatnimi czasy zauważyć można, że organy antymonopolowe nie tylko analizują zjawisko wielostronnej wymiany informacji, ale i coraz częściej podejmują tematykę jednostronnego ujawniania informacji o antykonkurencyjnym skutku. Celem artykułu jest omówienie problematyki jednostronnego ujawniania informacji przez konkurentów i próba znalezienia odpowiedzi na pytanie, w jakich warunkach jednostronne ujawnianie informacji przez konkurenta może zostać uznane za praktykę ograniczającą konkurencję
EN
Information exchange between competitors has been the focus of antitrust authorities for a long time. Information disclosure may be anti-competitive in nature at least in two different ways. On the one hand, information exchange may constitute an autonomous competition restricting practice. Most of the cases, however, it is only a part of a broader anti-competitive agreement. It is noticeable that recently antitrust authorities not only analyze the phenomenon of multilateral information exchange, but also increasingly tackle the issue of unilateral information disclosure with anti-competitive effects. The purpose of this article is to discuss unilateral information disclosure by competitors and attempt to answer the question under what conditions may such behavior be considered an anti-competitive practice.
5
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Porozumienia ograniczające handel równoległy produktami leczniczymi w świetle zasad unijnego prawa konkurencji

63%
Nowakowski M.
internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny
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2014
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vol. 3
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issue 3
34-45
PL
Zagadnienie handlu równoległego produktami leczniczymi to szczególnie interesujące zagadnienie europejskiego prawa konkurencji. Jego rosnąca rola stanowi zarazem istotny problem dla producentów leków, którzy osiągają w związku z jego funkcjonowaniem znacznie niższe zyski. W związku z realizowaniem handlu równoległego w ramach Unii Europejskiej ogromnego znaczenia nabiera kontrola organów antymonopolowych oraz sądów, które sprawują pieczę nad należytym realizowaniem zasad prawa konkurencji. Niniejszy artykuł stanowi analizę porozumień ograniczających handel równoległy i próbę ich oceny pod kątem prawnym i społecznym. Autor omawia jedno z najistotniejszych orzeczeń Europejskiego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości, które dotyczyło przedmiotowego zagadnienia. Artykuł wieńczą wnioski oraz krytyczne spojrzenie na zagadnienie ograniczania handlu równoległego
EN
Parallel trade of pharmaceutical products is a particularly interesting aspect of European competition law. The increasing role of parallel trade is also of significance to the producers of pharmaceuticals, as it results in the lowering of their profits. Due to the existence of parallel trade within the EU, the supervisory role of antitrust authorities and courts over competition law compliance is of essence. This article analyses anti-competitive agreements concerning the limitation of parallel trade and attempts to assess their legal and social status. Described is also one of the most relevant judgments of the European Court of Justice concerning this issue. The article closes with final conclusions and a critical insight into the issue of parallel trade limitation.
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