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1

Big data a problem reprezentacji poznawczej

100%

Iwasiński Ł.

Człowiek i Społeczeństwo

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2022

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vol. 53

241-261

PL

In this article, the author reflects on Big Data analytics in the context of the problem of cognitive representation. There are many voices declaring that the era of Big Data has brought a radical breakthrough in human cognitive abilities. Some – especially in the world of business and marketing, and to a lesser extent in the field of science – argue that for the first time we can reach a clean, objective picture of reality and keep track of its changes. The article is a critical commentary to this thesis. In Big Bata analytics, cognitive activities are assessed not from the point of view of their compliance with reality, but the possibility of achieving set goals. Big Data mining can be, and often is, an important tool for reality control and forecasting – which does not mean it can discover objective truth and create accurate representations of reality.

2

Benedict de Spinoza’s Virtue: Springboard for Modern Valorization of Ethical Relativism

88%

Ogbujah C. N.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2021

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issue 2

107-122

EN

Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677) was about the most radical of the early modern philosophers who developed a unique metaphysics that inspired an intriguing moral philosophy, fusing insights from ancient Stoicism, Cartesian metaphysics, Hobbes and medieval Jewish rationalism. While helping to ground the Enlightenment, Spinoza’s thoughts, against the intellectual mood of the time, divorced transcendence from divinity, equating God with nature. His extremely naturalistic views of reality constructed an ethical structure that links the control of human passion to virtue and happiness. By denying objective significance to things aside from human desires and beliefs, he is considered an anti-realist; and by endorsing a vision of reality according to which everyone ought to seek their own advantage, he is branded ethical egoist. This essay identified the varying influences of Spinoza’s moral anti-realism and ethical egoism on post-modernist thinkers who decried the “naïve faith” in objective and absolute truth, but rather propagated perspective relativity of reality. It recognized that modern valorization of ethical relativism, which in certain respects, detracts from the core values of the Enlightenment, has its seminal roots in his works.

3

Constructive realism: In defense of the objective reality of perspectives

88%

Madzia R.

Human Affairs

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2013

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vol. 23

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issue 4

645-657

EN

The paper proposes an outline of a reconciliatory approach to the perennial controversy between epistemological realism and anti-realism (constructionism). My main conceptual source in explaining this view is the philosophy of pragmatism, more specifically, the epistemological theories of George H. Mead, John Dewey, and also William James’ radical empiricism. First, the paper analyzes the pragmatic treatment of the goal-directedness of action, especially with regard to Mead’s notion of attitudes, and relates it to certain contemporary epistemological theories provided by the cognitive sciences (Maturana, Rizzolatti, Clark). Against this background, the paper presents a philosophical as well as empirical justification of why we should interpret the environment and its objects in terms of possibilities for action. In Mead’s view, the objects and events of our world emerge within stable patterns of organism-environment interactions, which he called “perspectives”. According to pragmatism as well as the aforementioned cognitive scientists, perception and other cognitive processes include not only neural processes in our heads but also the world itself. Elaborating on Mead’s concept of perspectives, the paper argues in favor of the epistemological position called “constructive realism.”

4

Realism: Philosophical and Scientific

75%

Marsonet M.

Academicus. International Scientific Journal

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2020

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issue 21

53-58

EN

What kind of realism - if any - are we allowed to endorse? It is often stated that, in order to provide realism with a solid foundation, we need having recourse to a reality that is totally independent of thought (and let alone of language). This is taken to be the key thesis of realism. But many philosophers reply that, even when we imagine a world totally devoid of human presence, we must use human concepts. From this point of view, conceptualization does not seem to be an optional we can get rid of, but rather a built-in component of the nature of human beings.

5

O (vedeckých) inštrumentoch na pozadí Kvaszovho inštrumentálneho realizmu

63%

Labuda P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2015

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vol. 63

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issue 3, Special No: Sedmkrát z logiky a metodologie vědy

143-152

EN

According to instrumental realism (Don Ihde, Instrumental Realism, 1991) science comes about by virtue of instruments and within experimental situ¬ations. This is the idea of the technological embodiment of science in experi¬mentation. In its broader sense, instrumental realism: (a) emphasizes dyna¬mically-developing scientiﬁc praxis, giving a central role to instruments; (b) oﬀers a critique of a purely propositional view of the character of analysis used in the philosophy of science; and (c) gives some degree of “reality-sta¬tus” to entities often taken (by the preceding philosophy of science) to be merely theoretical (Ihde, 98-114). However, one can ask what the nature of the instruments is? Do they constitute any speciﬁc kind of experience? In this paper I examine the problematic status of the instruments within the IR position developed by Ladislav Kvasz, and I go on to suggest how to defend the position that instruments are not only a part of scientiﬁc praxis, but also a key part of our everyday life and our ordinary language.

6

No Miracles: What does it mean that science seeks the truth?

63%

Frápolli M. J.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2014

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vol. 50

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issue 4(202)

263-280

EN

The purpose of the following pages is to show that the rejection of Metaphysical Correspondentism doesn’t force us to reject Default Correspondentism and that the rejection of Metaphysical Realism doesn’t force us to reject Default Realism. As a consequence, we aim to disentangle the analysis of the (standard, robust, ordinary but also scientific) notion of truth from the debate between realism and anti-realism. The independence of the analysis of notions such as knowledge and assertion from the metaphysical debate follows too.

PL

Celem artykułu jest pokazanie, że odrzucenie metafizycznego korespondentyzmu nie pociąga za sobą odrzucenia domyślnego korespondentyzmu i że odrzucenie realizmu metafizycznego nie pociąga za sobą odrzucenia domyślnego realizmu. W związku z tym, staramy się oddzielić analizę (standardowego, odpornego, potocznego, ale także naukowego) pojęcia prawdy od debaty między realizmem a anty-realizmem. Wynika z tego niezależność analizy pojęć, takich jak wiedza i asercja, od debat metafizycznych.

7

Is Transparent Intensional Logic a non-classical logic?

51%

Materna P.

Logic and Logical Philosophy

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2014

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vol. 23

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issue 1

47–55

EN

It is shown that: (a) classicality is connected with various criteria some of which are fulfilled by TIL while some other are not; (b) some more general characteristic of classicality connects it with philosophical realism whereas (radical) anti-realism is connected with non-classical logics; (c) TIL is highly expressive due to its hyperintensionality, which makes it possible to handle procedures as objects sui generis. Thus TIL is classical in obeying principles of realism and non-classical in transcending some principles taught by textbooks of classical logic.

8

Realism, Anti-Realism and Truth

51%

Nowakowski A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2014

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vol. 50

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issue 4(202)

291-299

EN

In the article, I argue that semantic considerations cannot provide arguments to solve metaphysical debates. Any potential conclusions would only be possible at the expense of modifying the concept of truth. The results of such attempts, however, prove to be brazenly artificial and inconsistent.

PL

W artykule uzasadniam twierdzenie, że rozważania semantyczne nie mogą dostarczyć argumentów służących do rozstrzygania sporów metafizycznych. Ewentualne rozstrzygnięcia byłyby osiągalne jedynie za cenę modyfikacji pojęcia prawdy. Rezultaty takich prób są jednak rażąco sztuczne i niespójne.

9

Podmiot jako wewnętrzny biegun symbolizmu. Antymentalistyczna wykładnia "Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego"

51%

Gomułka J.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2016

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vol. 35

69-86

EN

The purpose of this paper is to offer a radical anti-mentalistic interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs Tractatus. Contrary to mentalistic approaches postulating that thetask of projection must be performed by a subject (transcendental or psychological), the author claims – after Rhees, Diamond and McGinn – that the projection itselfis an intrinsic relation within the symbol. The main point of the paper is the thesis that the transcendenal subjectivity – or, as Wittgenstein calls it, the metaphysical subject – is the inner pole of the symbol, and since the meaning of the symbol isitʼs other inner pole (as anti-realist interpretations point out), the whole intentionalrelation of symbolizing is intrinsic to the symbolism.

10

Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox

38%

Jarmużek T., Krawczyk K., Palczewski R.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2020

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vol. 68

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issue 4

291-313

EN

In the paper, we try to find a new, intuitive solution to the Fitch paradox. We claim that traditional expression of Knowability Principle (p → ◊Kp) is based on erroneous understanding of knowability as de dicto modality. Instead, we propose to understand knowability as de re modality. In the paper we present the minimal logic of knowability in which Knowability Principle is valid, but Fitch Paradox does not hold anymore. We characterize the logic semantically as well as by an axiomatic and tableaux procedure approach.

PL

Poznawalność jako modalność de re: pewne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha W artykule staramy się znaleźć nowe, intuicyjne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha. Twierdzimy, że tradycyjne wyrażenie zasady poznawalności (p → ◊Kp) opiera się na błędnym rozumieniu poznawalności jako modalności de dicto. Zamiast tego proponujemy rozumieć poznawalność jako modalność de re. W artykule przedstawiamy minimalną logikę poznawalności, w której zasada poznawalności jest ważna, ale paradoks Fitcha już nie obowiązuje. Logikę charakteryzujemy semantycznie, a także poprzez podejście aksjomatyczne i tabelaryczne.

11

Udawane filozofowanie

38%

Jodkowski K.

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy

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2014

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vol. 11

279-302

PL

Recenzja książki: Wojciech Grygiel, Stephena Hawkinga i Rogera Penrose’a spór o rzeczywistość, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2014, s. 412.

EN

Review of: Wojciech Grygiel, Stephena Hawkinga i Rogera Penrose’a spór o rzeczywistość, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2014, s. 412.

Refine search results

Big data a problem reprezentacji poznawczej

Benedict de Spinoza’s Virtue: Springboard for Modern Valorization of Ethical Relativism

Constructive realism: In defense of the objective reality of perspectives

Realism: Philosophical and Scientific

O (vedeckých) inštrumentoch na pozadí Kvaszovho inštrumentálneho realizmu

No Miracles: What does it mean that science seeks the truth?

Is Transparent Intensional Logic a non-classical logic?

Realism, Anti-Realism and Truth

Podmiot jako wewnętrzny biegun symbolizmu. Antymentalistyczna wykładnia "Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego"

Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox

Udawane filozofowanie