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EN
This paper draws upon the cardinal assumption that most relations between compound components may be regarded as specific manifestations of iconicity. It manifests itself in compound formation as a phenomenon named “apperception” (apercepcja). The concept of apperception – proposed in Polish linguistics by Jan Rozwadowski, strongly influenced by Wundt – is a powerful tool in the description and functional explanation of word and sentence structure. In a nutshell, apperception may be defined as a cognitive process comprising two functional strategies speakers undertake during meaningful utterance construction: a) they establish similarity links between the already existent utterances (and their meanings); b) they establish distinction points between the already existent utterances and the new one. A proposal to view apperception as a manifestation of iconicity follows an observation that apperception helps discern how formal organization of compounds mirrors the cognitive (functional) strategies of encoding their meaning. The text also includes solutions which, are indispensable if Rozwadowski’s theory is to handle a wider spectrum of lexical data.
PL
Artykuł stanowi zmodyfikowaną wersję pracy licencjackiej napisanej przeze mnie w roku 2015, której promotorem był dr hab. Bogusław Paź.
EN
The main aim of this paper is to reconstruct G. W. Leibniz’s view on nature and structure of human identity. For this purpose selected writings of the author and of several other philosophers whose impact on his conclusion was the most noticeable are exploited. Analysis of these sources in relation to Leibniz’s whole monadological system provides us with the explication of human identity in his anthropology. In the first part the author concentrates on the historical background of a reflection on the notion of nature, which in Leibniz’s philosophy constitutes the basis of human identity. The Hanoverian philosopher, as the author claims, continues Aristotle’s thought on this issue. Afterwards a basic individual being – monad – is presented. Through the monad the German philosopher managed to unite two – seemingly opposing – perspectives: substancial (aristotelism) with “consciously-reflective”, which is synonymous with Descartes’ cogito. In the second part the author introduces the concept of the human person, which indicates such features as rationality, substantiality and individuality. From the latter flows such characteristics of personhood as uniqueness, distinctiveness and incommunicability. Even though this classical interpretation of the person was deconstructed by Descartes, the author shows that the monadic subject did not lose the attributes Leibniz’s processors wrote about. In the third part the author presents John Locke’s interpretation of the human identity described in his opus magnum – An essay concerning human understanding, in opposition to which Leibniz developed his own theory. In the fourth part the structure of human identity in the interpretation of the German is presented. The author of this paper particularly focuses on the characteristics of its two dimensions: real identity and moral identity. At the end, in the fifth part, the epistemological foundation of Leibniz’s anthropology: perception, apperception and reflection, its specifics and the relation to two levels of human identity presented in Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain are explored.
EN
In this essay there are led ways to man’s heart of hearts, to ego resembling an inaccessible monad, which evades our control, but attracts always attention. The unattainable destination inside our inside is reflected in thinking and action in outer world; here the man can recover himself. Kant’s I think shows the way to ego and to looking for myself outside. The essay presents the dual exposition of the essence of human being. Though ego belongs to man’s inside, it can be hardly dabbed by philosophical thought, but on other hand the landscape of our thinking and action is idealizing or blurred. My essay only describes problems roughly. The rest waits for description.
EN
Theories of discursive integration form a group of theories that see the principles responsible for the integration of experience data (apperception) in the practices and schemes of discourse. These theories indicate that the use of language unites and organizes experience data. Their main assumption can be expressed as follows: this integration does not inhere in objects and cannot be derived from them; hence this integration cannot be secondarily expressed in language, but results exclusively from the use of language (or discourse). In this article, Witold Marzęda gives an overview of narrativist theories, script theories, Gazzaniga and Dennett’s models, which refer to evolutionary psychology, and the theories of Lakoff and Johnson – all these being theories of discursive integration. Marzęda’s main objective is to formulate a paradox, which consists in a trap of self-referentiality into which these theories fall: they postulate some general properties of discourse, which, firstly, do not have to become at once the properties of individual models and which, secondly, do not admit of falsification.
PL
Koncepcje integracji dyskursywnej to grupa teorii, które upatrują zasad łączenia danych doświadczenia (apercepcji) w praktykach i schematach dyskursu. Koncepcje te wskazują, że użycie języka jednoczy i porządkuje dane doświadczenia. Główną tezę tych koncepcji można wyrazić tak: powiązanie nie leży w przedmiotach i nie można go z nich zaczerpnąć, powiązania nie można więc wtórnie wyrazić w języku, lecz jest ono wyłącznie dziełem używania języka (dyskursu). W artykule omówiono koncepcje narratywistyczne, teorie skryptów, nawiązujące do psychologii ewolucyjnej modele Gazzanigi i Dennetta oraz koncepcje Lakoffa i Johnsona. Stanowią one reprezentacyjne teorie integracji dyskursywnej. Głównym zadaniem artykułu jest prezentacja paradoksu opartego na samoodniesieniu, w jaki popadają koncepcje integracji dyskursywnej. Ich paradoks polega na tym, że postulują pewne generalne własności dyskursu, które po pierwsze, nie muszą stać się również własnościami poszczególnych modeli, a po drugie, nie dają się falsyfikować.
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