W niniejszym tekście przedstawione zostały wstępne wyniki analiz dotyczących sposobów defi niowania przez uczniów znaczenia terminów „argument” i „kontrargument”. Poddany analizie materiał obejmował 211 defi nicji słowa „argument” i 164 defi nicje słowa „kontrargument”. Defi nicje te uzyskano w badaniu, w którym uczestniczyło 240 uczniów (120 dziewcząt i 120 chłopców) w wieku od 9. do 18. roku życia. Byli to uczniowie: trzecich i szóstych klas szkół podstawowych oraz uczniowie ostatnich klas gimnazjum i ostatnich klas liceum. Wyniki badań wskazują, że do przekonywania jako funkcji argumentu uczniowie wraz z wiekem odwołują się rzadziej. Od momentu zakończenia edukacji na poziomie podstawowym coraz częściej wskazują oni na relacje łączące przesłanki z konkluzją. Znajomość znaczenia terminu „kontrargument” deklarowało mniej uczniów i najczęściej wskazywało na kontrargument jako przeciwieństwo argumentu.
EN
In the paper, I present the preliminary results on how students defi ne the meanings of the terms “argument” and “counterargument”. The analysed material consists of 211 defi nitions of the word “argument” and 164 defi nitions of the word “counterargument”. The defi nitions were obtained from 240 students (120 girls and 120 boys) aged 9 to 18. The study covered the students of the third and sixth years of the primary school, as well as those in their fi nal year of the secondary school. In their defi nitions, the older students referred to a function of an argument less frequently than their younger counterparts: they relatively rarely conveyed that a role of an argument is to convince. Instead, the older students were increasingly inclined to refer to relations between a premise and a conclusion as they defi ned the term. The knowledge of the meaning of the term “counterargument” was less common among the students. They usually provided a fuzzy defi nition of a counter-argument, contrasting it with an argument.
Some features within the physical universe appear to be so well-ordered that they have been regarded as evidence of the existence of a supernatural being who has designed them. This history of the so-called design argument is millennia-long, and various formulations of the argument have been presented. In this paper, I explore one contemporary version of the design argument proposed by the Intelligent Design movement, and analyze its advantages and disadvantages in comparison to one of the most famous classical versions of the argument.
In this text, I have focused on the second of three parts of Charles S. Peirce’s argument for the reality of God. The analysis of Peirce’s inquiry by which he justifies his belief will be based on his work entitled Neglected Argument. The content has been organized as follows: first, the thought process described by Peirce, called: „the play of muse” which humbly leads many people to „God hypothesis”, has been justified as natural for a man. Secondly, „God hypothesis” itself has been validated as a natural result of „the play of muse”. Thirdly, the author of the argument listed three properties of this idea, thanks to which it becomes credible, and thus it comes much closer to the truth. I consider these issues interesting and worthy of further research and scientific work.
PL
Niniejszy tekst skupia się na drugiej z trzech części argumentu Charlesa S. Peirce’a za rzeczywistością Boga. Analiza rozumowania Peirce’a, na mocy którego uzasadnia on swoje przekonanie, opiera się na jego artykule zatytułowanym Neglected Argument (Zaniedbany argument). Uporządkowano ją następująco: Po pierwsze, opisany przez Peirce’a proces myślowy nazwany „zabawą dumania”, który wielu ludzi w pokorny sposób prowadzi do hipotezy Boga, został usprawiedliwiony jako naturalny dla człowieka. Po drugie, sama hipoteza Boga została uprawomocniona jako naturalny efekt „zabawy dumania”. Po trzecie, autor argumentu wymienił trzy własności tej idei, dzięki którym staje się ona wiarygodna, a więc w znaczny sposób przybliża się do prawdy. To interesujące zagadnienie wymaga dalszych badań i prac naukowych.
In the Article I attempted to discuss and describe petitio principii in the sphere of formulating and proposing arguments in the actual practice of law. First, I discussed a basic – from a historical perspective and also its frequency of usage – conception of petitio principii. Then, received in such way data (i. e. ratio propria of the name 'petitio principii'; in other words the name by means of we describe some fallacy in demonstration) were brought face to face with a conception of an argument, namely with the information on its function and structure. This operation provided a form of petitio principii that – in regards to general and abstractive character – can be used in any discussion. The final stage of the considerations concentrated on specification of such general and abstractive conception of petitio principii by introducing essential aspects of a persuasion existing in legal practice.
PL
W rozważaniach zawartych w artykule podjąłem próbę określenia pojęcia petitio principii jako błędu swoistego dla sfery argumentacji prawniczej. Wpierw scharakteryzowałem jak – z perspekty-wy historycznej i zarazem w kontekście częstotliwości używania wyrażenia 'petitio principii' – przede wszystkim jest rozumiane petitio principii. Następnie dane te (czyli ratio propria nazwy 'petitio principii', za pomocą którego rzeczony termin służy do oznaczania pewnego rodzaju błędu w dowodzeniu) skonfrontowałem z pojęciem argumentu (tj. wypowiedzi argumentacyjnej), miano-wicie z informacjami o strukturze argumentu i jego funkcji. Otrzymaną w ten sposób koncepcję petitio principii, którą – ze względu na jej ogólny i abstrakcyjny charakter – odnieść równie dobrze można do każdej odmiany argumentacji, dookreśliłem poprzez zestawienie jej z istotowymi i zarazem swoistymi właściwościami przekonywania, jakie istnieją w praktyce prawniczej.
The topic of “reason and faith in God” has challenged philosophers and theologians since the beginning of their disciplines, and it has left many inquirers confused. The key notions of faith and reason are often left unclear, and this complicates inquiry about faith in God. Many inquirers end up puzzled about the significance of the distinction between reason and faith. This paper outlines an approach to reason and faith in God that explains how faith in God can be well-grounded in reason as evidence, even if reason as an argument does not apply in a case. It identifies distinctive roles for experience and defense in an account of faith in God.
PL
Problem „rozum a wiara w Boga” stanowił wyzwanie dla filozofów i teologów od samego początku istnienia ich dyscyplin, lecz wiele dociekań na ten temat wciąż pozostaje niewyjaśnionych. Nawet kluczowe pojęcia „wiary” i „rozumu” często pozostają niejasne, co komplikuje badanie na temat wiary w Boga. Dla wielu badaczy znaczenie rozróżnienia między rozumem i wiarą ostatecznie okazuje się zagadką. Niniejszy artykuł zarysowuje podejście do zagadnienia rozumu i wiary w Boga, które wyjaśnia, w jaki sposób wiara w Boga może być mocno oparta na rozumie oraz ewidencji przedstawianej przez rozum, nawet jeśli argumentacja rozumowa nie ma zastosowania w danym przypadku dotyczącym wiary w Boga. Artykuł określa również różne role, jakie spełniają doświadczenie oraz argumentacja apologetyczna w wyjaśnianiu wiary w Boga.
The author analyses the case paradigm of Polish and Macedonian languages and states that this paradigm, continuing the old tradition of classical languages, is composed of three different segments: adverbal cases, adnominal case (Genitive) and “deontic” case (Vocative); the core of the adverbal set is the trio N-D-A – a confirmation of the anthropocentric character of the language
PL
Autorka analizuje paradygmat przypadków w językach polskim oraz macedońskim i stwierdza, że paradygmat ten, kontynuując starą tradycję języków klasycznych, składa się z trzech różnych segmentów: przypadków adwerbalnych, przypadka adnominalnego (Genetiw) i przypadka „deontycznego” (Wokatiw); rdzeniem zbioru adwerbalnego jest trio N-D-A – potwierdzenie antropocentrycznego charakteru języka.
Despite the long-standing tradition in research on conceptual metaphor, little attention has been paid to the use of conceptual metaphor in academic writing. The present study aims to investigate how the concept of ARGUMENT is realized in two academic contexts: (i) L2 speakers writing in English, and (ii) L1 speakers writing in Swedish. Following Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003), four related conceptual metaphors (AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY; AN ARGUMENT IS A BATTLE; AN ARGUMENT IS A BUILDING; AN ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER) were identified and examined in a sample of Bachelor and Master theses written in English or Swedish by native speakers of Swedish. The main questions here are (i) to what extent the students employed these metaphors in their conceptualization of an argument and (ii) whether there are any differences in the patterns of conceptual metaphor depending on the language in which the texts were produced. The results suggest that while for the most part, academic texts written in English and Swedish both employed metaphorical conceptualizations of ARGUMENT as a JOURNEY and as a BUILDING, precisely which linguistic expressions predominated differed between the two languages. The findings have implications for (second-language) teaching, such as the development of academic writing courses, in particular in the context of English for non-native writers and for the training of instructors for such courses.
Starting with the assumption that the proposition (i.e. predicate > argument(s) structure) is the basic unit of the semantic structure of the text, the author argues that the relation > predicate > argument in its turn is the basic link in the process of the construction of the text. She distinguishes three types of predicates: (a) those which inform about the relations between the parts of the world around us and about the characteristics of these parts (cf. ‘stand’, ‘sleep’, ‘build’, ‘destroy’, ‘white’, ‘old’, ‘tall’, ‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘river’, sea’) and which accept arguments whose referents are parts of that world; (b) those which inform about our mental, emotional, volitional reactions to that world (cf. ‘think’, ‘know’, ‘like’, ‘wish’, ‘want’, ‘ask’, ‘command’) and which accept also arguments whose referents are events, states of affairs, processes, i.e. propositional arguments; (c) those which inform about the ways of our thinking and concluding about the events, states, processes happening around us (cf. ‘coexist’, ‘exclude’, ‘succeed’, ‘precede’, ‘overlap’, ‘cause’, ‘let’, ‘stipulate’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘before’, after’, because’, ‘if’) and which only accept propositional arguments. She concludes that however complex and/or context dependent a sentence is, it should be understood and interpreted as a hierarchically organized proposition.
In the frame of the grammatical description “from meaning to form” the author promotes the thesis that arguments implied by verbal predicates stand in the syntactic position primarily designed for noun phrases.
How do students acquire argumentation skills through debating? Although attempts have long been made to answer this question, a common limitation of previous studies is the tendency to ignore the potential of college students who learn how to argue in a community of practice. Cultural difference is also an important theme in argumentation studies, as individuals and a community co-construct the quality of their arguments. In Japanese education, argument is rarely taught in classes. Nakano (2007) pointed out that Japanese students tend to hesitate when arguing with friends, and are low in approach argumentativeness and high in avoidance argumentativeness, compared to other Asian countries. Parliamentary Debate (PD) is most popular and is effective for novice learners of argument (Inoue & Nakano, 2006). Every stage of debating, such as preparation, debate rounds, reflection and so on, forms a cyclic learning system, and this functions as an ideal community of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991). The present study aims at exploring how members of a community acquire argumentation skills through debating. First, we identify patterns of argument produced in the community during a session. Second, we analyse transitional patterns, focusing on individual differences. In order to teach reasoning and persuasion to those who are especially unwilling to oppose someone, we need to have them realize their improvement with confidence by reducing their mental blocks.
Built in argument positions and the propositions intensional completenessThe paper discusses issues concerning the potential influence of built in argument positions on the propositions intensional completeness. According to the chosen scientific approach the distribution of determiners is a reflex of the propositions completeness, there seem to exist however such structures in which one of the argument positions is blocked due to being built into the predicate. The intensional value of such positions may vary and theoretically reflect the propositions definiteness / indefiniteness (intensional completeness). Predicates such as: търся implicate a locative argument position, which is inherently indefinite, but does not seem to reflect the distribution of determiners.
Semantic motivation for the denotational identity of arguments in predication structuresThis text is an attempt at a preliminary outline of the factors that motivate the denotational identity of argument content in the predication structure as well as the consequences of this identity for the shape of the sentence expression which is a realization of such a structure.The first question this analysis attempts to answer concerns the structure of predicative concepts that constitute the predication structure with arguments of the identical content?The second question the cursory analysis done attempts to answer concerns the manner, in which the identity existing on the semantic structure level is signaled on the surface, in the formal structure.
Each public speech (including the homily) should be associated with showing the right which serves as the basis for accepting the presented statements. This is one of the fundamental features of the correct construction of a statement. The theological content of a homily can be presented on the basis of the classical form of argumentum ex auctoritate. As an inductive structure, this argument may promote specific ways of organising the whole speech. Firstly, in the rhetorical inventio structure, it allows the author to control the semantic coherence of the text. Secondly, in the structure of dispositio, the authority can make for an interesting use of rhetorical narrative in homily text. Thirdly, argumentum ex auctoritate can be used to build the ethos of the preacher. Thanks to the above proposals, it is possible to influence the processuality of the text, which may determine the recognition and assimilation of the different key elements, both of which are crucial for preaching.
This article attempts to describe the means of evaluation applied in French legal language. Analysing verdicts from the French court (Cour de cassation), this paper attempts to show ways to uncover the values system held by the judge. In order to achieve this aim, four groups of evaluative operators (modal truth-functional connectives, amplifying operators, emotive-evaluative modal operators and mental operators) are shown. The corpus under analysis is characterised by three aspects: intentional, conventional and institutional, as it makes references to the group of set convictions concerning the nature of a particular community. Thus one could see here a relation between the values behind the arguments in the verdict and the language used to express them.
The aim of this article is to determine the specific features of argument from the similarity (analogy) in legal discourse. This is undertaken in regard to the dispute over application of article 745 of the Polish Civil Code to deciding on costs of proceedings to secure claims when: a) the plaintiff initiated the proceedings to secure claims on the grounds of order for payment; b) the measures for claim safeguarding were enforced by the judicial enforcement officer; and c) the defendant did not raise objections against the order for payment.
PL
Celem artykułu jest ukazanie specyficznych cech prawniczego argumentowania w oparciu o analogię. Jest on realizowany w odniesieniu do zaistniałego w obrocie prawnym sporu dotyczącego stosowania art. 745 k.p.c. do rozstrzygania o kosztach postępowania zabezpieczającego w sytuacji, gdy: a. powód zainicjował postępowanie zabezpieczające w oparciu o nakaz zapłaty wydany w po- stępowaniu nakazowym; b. zabezpieczenie powództwa zostało wykonane przez komornika sądowego; c. pozwany nie wniósł skutecznie zarzutów od nakazu zapłaty.
This article describes the ways to support theses in television news programs. The research material is based on the three most popular programs on Polish television: Fakty, Wiadomości and Teleexpress. Information which was analyzed, was presented from March 1st–3rd, 2017. As a result of the analysis it was possible to identify the theses, which are: quotations, paraphrases of public statements or journalistic conclusions resulting from interpretation of socio-political phenomena. The subjects in the question are verbalized by journalists (who are running the program) or are included in the narratives accompanying the presented film material. Additionally, they also appear in graphically animated banner inscriptions. The support is mostly verbal – the media primarily use two techniques: ab auctoritate (expert statement, politics) and ab exemplo. The second group of theses are the graphical ways to support them – where evidence and examples are most often drawn from online sources: what dominates is the influence of the activities of public figures in social media. In addition, scans of various official documents, open letters are displayed, data visualizations in the form of tables, graphs and diagrams are less frequent. What is valid there were also theses without support – the role of the support is taken by the credible medium. It is interesting to encourage the inferential activity of program viewers – only the premises are presented, drawing the conclusion is the task of the recipient.
PL
W artykule opisane są sposoby wspierania tez w telewizyjnych programach informacyjnych. Jako materiał badawczy służą wydania trzech najpopularniejszych w Polsce programów: Faktów, Wiadomości oraz Teleexpressu. Analizie poddano informacje wyemitowane w dniach 1–3 marca 2017 r. W wyniku analizy udało się ustalić źródła pochodzenia tez – są cytatami, parafrazami wypowiedzi osób publicznych lub konkluzjami dziennikarskimi, które stanowią efekt interpretacji zjawisk społeczno-politycznych. Tezy, o których mowa, są werbalizowane przez dziennikarzy (prowadzących program lub terenowych) lub zawarte w narracjach towarzyszących prezentowanym materiałom filmowym. Dodatkowo pojawiają się także w graficznie animowanych napisach banerowych. Wsparcie tez najczęściej ma postać werbalną – media posługują się przede wszystkim dwiema technikami: ab auctoritate (wypowiedzi eksperta, polityka) oraz ab exemplo. Drugą grupę stanowią graficzne sposoby wspierania tez, gdzie przesłanki, dowody i przykłady najczęściej zaczerpnięte są ze źródeł internetowych: dominują tu owoce aktywności osób publicznych w mediach społecznościowych. Ponadto prezentowane są skany różnych dokumentów urzędowych, listów otwartych, rzadziej pojawiają się wizualizacje danych w postaci tabel, wykresów i diagramów. Wykryto także tezy bez wsparcia – jego rolę pełni wiarygodność medium. Ciekawy zabiegiem jest zachęcanie do aktywności inferencyjnej widzów programu – prezentowane są wyłącznie przesłanki, stworzenie konkluzji to już zadanie odbiorcy.
At first sight, it is not easy to identify the structure and argument of Nativity sermon 191. Augustine does not make explicit the steps he takes in this sermon and, furthermore, the existing arrangement into sections (derived from the Maurists’ edition) does not correspond to these steps. It is, however, possible to identify the structure and argument on the basis of a relatively quick and easy twofold method, which examines the text for use of language (changes of sentence type, unusual particle order, and uncommon word and/or constituent order) and for use of Scripture (changes in Scriptural texts and/or quotations or clusters of Scriptural references). If the markers pointing to transitions uncovered by analysing the use of language are identical to the markers pointing to transitions uncovered by analysing the use of Scripture, these are markers pointing to transitions between parts of the text. In sermon 191, this method results in a division into three internally coherent parts, in which a central didactic moment is preceded by a preparation and followed by a confirmation. The central didactic moment expresses suggestions that must be adopted if a person is to be able to change his (or her) inner disposition from pride to humility. The information contained in the preparation for the didactic moment sets the hearer on the path towards this moment, while the information contained in the confirmation of the moment inspires the hearer to put its teachings into practice. This division into three parts clarifies the structure of the sermon. This structure cannot be discerned on the basis of the traditional rhetorical rules, which Augustine incidentally also repeats elsewhere (although not without qualifying them). The tripartite division also clarifies the argument. Understanding and recognising this trains a spotligh on the force of Augustine’s strategy as a preacher.
The thesis is devoted to the comparative study of the dialogical genre “argument” in the present-day British and Ukrainian language pictures of the world. This type of investigation has been the first so far in the field of comparative linguistics that deals with human communication. Argument is a widespread type of day-to-day communication, namely a kind of dialogue that finds its verbal conceptualization in English and Ukrainian. The general idea of argument can be formulated as an emotionally coloured verbal communication between partners who differ about something and try to convince each other in the righteousness of one’s position. Such a general scheme of argument interpretation is modified in the structures of ethnic languages. Thus, the terms argument and суперечка reflect the existing differences between two nations as for the type of interaction itself. The crucial difference is understanding of argument as a verbal exchange in British society and a verbal contest in Ukrainian one. One more allomorphic feature is that the British typically tend to get excited in argument, the fact reflected in the semantic components a heated or angry interaction. The next verbal specification argument gets in a number of its forms or subgenres. A closer comparative look at such kinds of argument as debates, polemics, dispute and discussion is suggested. The main differences and common features of the genres are established.
Christianity, and the Christian faith, seems to be losing when confronted with scientific reason and scientific certainty. Christianity needs new arguments for the epistemological seriousness of its faith. Those could be found in Joseph Ratzinger’s writings, providing new insights into fundamental theology. The subject of faith as an element that is crucial to him (and to Christianity) pervades all his works. This paper aims at proving that Ratzinger has worked out an original epistemological way of defending the Christian faith. It is an attempt to recreate his argument on the basis of his entire intellectual output. The present research leads to the conclusion that Ratzinger’s way of argumentation is quite unique. In classical fundamental theology, the Christian faith (comprehended mostly as an individual act of faith) is placed at its end point, while in Ratzinger’s fundamental theology, faith (understood mostly as a historical and communal act) is practically a point of departure. From the beginning of his reasoning Ratzinger (due to his meta-faith perspective) persuades that the Christian faith is epistemologically very serious. Faith may not only manifest its presence alongside other serious attitudes to reality, but also be capable of demonstrating its foundation, rationality, originality, uniqueness, and even absoluteness (definitiveness).
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