The main aim of this paper is to propose an adequate interpretation of the concept esse apparens (apparent being) which was used by Franciscan philosopher and theologian Peter Auriol (c. 1280-1322), especially focusing on his account of sensory perception. Drawing on an analysis of the relevant passages of the commentary on the Sentences by Auriol, first, I introduce his famous account of sensory illusions, and then his own claims about the nature of esse appparens (Auriol refuses to treat it either as a separate entity serving as a mediator of perception, or as only an extrinsic denomination of the perceived object). In the next part, I reject the interpretation which identifies esse apparens with mental representation. In my opinion, it is more appropriate to place this concept into the context of scholastic doctrine of objectiver or intentional being (popularized mainly by Duns Scotus and his disciples). At the end of the paper, I return to Auriol's account of illusions and show that it is compatible with esse apparens being understood as mode of being.
An argument from illusion assumes that the illusion occurring in perception is a reason to redefine the ordinary account of perception as a direct and immediate access to reality, therefore it suffice to refute a direct realism. Many theories of perception where arisen to address the problem, the most popular ones are: the sense-datum theory, the adverbial theory, the intentionalist theory and the most recent the disjunctivist theory. Recent work in psychology and philosophy of mind on change blindness and related phenomena elicit a new skepticism about the nature of perception which is called a grand illusion hypothesis. It seems that doubts engendered by this hypothesis goes even further than those of the argument from illusion, because it suggests that subjects have a radically false beliefs about what their perceptual experience is like. I ’d like to consider the number of ways of understanding the hypothesis and evaluate them. It seems that we have tree ways of coping with the grand illusion problem: accepting the new skeptic account (Dennett, Blackmore i Rensink), rebuilt the theory of perception so it avoids the problem (Noe, O’Regan, A. Clark) or show the grand illusion isn’t really that grand, actually it’s modest and familiar one, but at the same time it teaches us a lot about the nature of visual perception (Cohen, Siewert, Mack).
An argument from illusion assumes that the illusion occurring in perception is a reason to redefine the ordinary account of perception as a direct and immediate access to reality, therefore it suffice to refute a direct realism. Many theories of perception where arisen to address the problem, the most popular ones are: the sense-datum theory, the adverbial theory, the intentionalist theory and the most recent the disjunctivist theory. Recent work in psychology and philosophy of mind on change blindness and related phenomena elicit a new skepticism about the nature of perception which is called a grand illusion hypothesis. It seems that doubts engendered by this hypothesis goes even further than those of the argument from illusion, because it suggests that subjects have a radically false beliefs about what their perceptual experience is like. I ’d like to consider the number of ways of understanding the hypothesis and evaluate them. It seems that we have tree ways of coping with the grand illusion problem: accepting the new skeptic account (Dennett, Blackmore i Rensink), rebuilt the theory of perception so it avoids the problem (Noe, O’Regan, A. Clark) or show the grand illusion isn’t really that grand, actually it’s modest and familiar one, but at the same time it teaches us a lot about the nature of visual perception (Cohen, Siewert, Mack).
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