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1
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Czy Bóg zna zło? Antyczne rozwiązanie problemu na przykładzie filozofii Temistiusza

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Komsta M.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2019
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vol. 67
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issue 1
19-33
PL
Filozofia grecka, a w szczególności arystotelizm, ze względu na zawartą w niej koncepcję Boga nie podejmowała tematu Bożej wszechwiedzy, która wydawała się sprzeczna z boską doskonałością, a co za tym idzie — również zagadnienie Boskiej wiedzy na temat zła nie było rozważane. W czasach Temistiusza, którego myśli tutaj przedstawiam, pojawiają się jednak nowe możliwości ukazania tego problemu pod wpływem nowej koncepcji Boga w neoplatonizmie i neoplatonizmie chrześcijańskim. Temistiusz, będąc świadom tych nowych zagadnień i włączając je do swoich rozważań, nie zmienił jednak schematu, w jakim powstaje jego stanowisko (arystotelizm). Zadał więc pytanie o to, czy Bóg zna zło, ale jego odpowiedź ograniczyła się w zasadzie do powtórzenia nauki Arystotelesa: Bóg poznaje samego siebie, tj. najdoskonalszy przedmiot poznania, a nie poznaje tego, co niedoskonałe, w tym braku, jakim jest zło.
EN
Greek philosophy, especially Aristotelianism, because of the concept of God present in this thought, did not raise the issue of divine omniscience and divine knowledge of evil. The divine omnisciene seemed to be contrary to God’s perfect being. In the time of Themistius, whose thought I present in this paper, Neoplatonism and Christian Neoplatonism showed new possibilities of solving this problem. Themistius being aware of these new topics and including them in his own philosophy, still however represents ancient Aristotelianism with all its limitations. He asked about divine knowlegde of evil, but in his answer he repeated only the Aristotelian doctrine: God knows only Himself, because He Himself is the most perfect object of knowledge and cannot know less perfect beings.
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Wprowadzenie do arysto-tomizmu

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Piotrowski R.
Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy
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2013
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vol. 10
267-269
PL
Recenzja książki: Piotr LENARTOWICZ i Jolanta KOSZTEYN, Wprowadzenie do filozofii, wyd. 4., Petrus, Kraków 2012, s. 184.
EN
Review of: Piotr LENARTOWICZ i Jolanta KOSZTEYN, Wprowadzenie do filozofii, wyd. 4., Petrus, Kraków 2012, s. 184.
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O NIEKTÓRYCH UWARUNKOWANIACH WSPÓŁCZESNEJ RECEPCJI ARYSTOTELIZMU W PERSPEKTYWIE WYCHOWANIA MORALNEGO

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Rutkowski J.
Forum Pedagogiczne
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2014
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issue 2
15-24
PL
Współczesne interpretacje, podzielonej na fragmenty, nauki Arystotelesa o etyce i polityce nie uwzględniają kontekstu całości myśli Stagiryty. Trudności pojawiające się w nowoczesnej percepcji arystotelizmu są związane z – kontynuowanym również obecnie – fundamentalnym sporem toczonym przez sofistów z filozofami. Istota tego sporu dotyczy istnienia niezależnych od ludzkiej woli, uniwersalnych norm moralnych.
EN
Contemporary interpretations of the fragmented Aristotelian ethical and political theory do not employ the context of the whole Stagirite's thought. The difficulties in the modern perception of Aristotelianism are reflected in the fundamental dispute between the sophists and philosophers, which has not ceased nowadays. In essence, this dispute concerns the existence of universal moral standards, independent of human will.
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Klasyczne ujęcia problemu prawdy w „post-świecie”

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Pawlikowski T.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2018
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vol. 7
313-344
EN
1. For many people, the contemporary culture seems to be something different from modernity, it is something resembling a special period of “post-”. At the same time, different trends are present in current culture. Some reach the genesis of nearly two and a half thousand years back, others have about half a century. Perhaps also breaks some modern belief that in every culture, “newer” means “better”. 2. Representatives of the philosophical and theological trend of “Radical Orthodoxy” noticed in this the approach of postmodernism to the pre-modern tradition. Therefore, we can say that we live and operate in a “post-world”, without leading currents of thought. On the other hand, is the current culture very different from the others when you look at it from the perspective of centuries? 3. For many philosophers, it is still important to reach to the great traditional approaches to the problem of truth. These are above all three concepts related to three great philosophical syntheses created by Plato, Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. This is also evident among the basic contemporary trends critical of the classics and philosophical tradition. 4. M. Heidegger created a certain idea of being reduced to the time determinant. For the supporters of his views, it became the overcoming of Aquinas’s theory. The German thinker also formulated a specific interpretation of Plato's views on truth. He contrasted it with Thomas's concept, especially with the definition of truth as the adequacy of thing to intellect. 5. T. Bartoś – Polish author of the new attempt to read the essence of the concept – believes, in turn, that the statements of the Angelic Doctor can be found close to the characteristics of post-modernity. He points to a certain incoherence and fragmentary nature of the problem, anthropocentrism and pragmatism of the approach, and a rejection of the unity of truth. It seems, however, that there is a lot of exaggeration in this interpretation. De facto, we are dealing here with radical criticism of Thomism as a trend that develops the views of Saint Thomas Aquinas, because none of the known Thomists do not even come close in their deliberations to the view that T. Bartoś formulated. 6. Finally, a group of philosophers using in the method of reflection the achievements of contemporary logic, representatives of analytic philosophy, generally seems to be aimed at getting rid of the term “truth” from his vocabulary. The idea of reaching their assumptions of logical positivism is difficult to discuss with his followers because of the difference in approach to the practice of philosophy itself between the “analysts” and “non-analysts”. The classic concept of philosophy, under which situates itself Platonism, Aristotelianism and Thomism, is different from the concept of linguistic or neo-positivist, which locates to analytic philosophy. 7. The classical approach to truth, especially the definition developed in the final shape in the Middle Ages, indicating the adequacy of things and the intellect as the essence of truth, therefore meets with criticism from various directions. This does not mean that they should go into oblivion, that they have been replaced by newer and better concepts, or simply refuted. The proclamation of the slogans such as “The End of the Era ...”, “The End of Truth ...” sounds propaganda. 8. The classical approach to the problem of truth has lost nothing in its argumentation. In fact, the current forms of criticism do not rely on any discussion, but on the rejection of the principles on which it is based. Heidegger proclaimed his vision of being and truth, supporting it with a hermeneutic analysis of ancient works. He claimed that this vision is contained in the properly read outlooks of ancient Greek thinkers. The current of philosophy practiced with the use of modern logic tools considers reality only in so far as it can be translated into a “language fact”. This is the analysis of language and not reality. The proposal to read the theory of truth contained in the works of Aquinas, submitted by T. Bartoś to be a projection of some interpretative grid on the expression Thomas's interpretation, wherein the radically differs from the recognized positions. 9. It seems that in the whirlwind of ideologies present in philosophy, science and culture in general, it remains to preserve the classical approach to the problem of truth and develop them according to their essential elements. Compilation with principles that are not appropriate to them will not result in the presentation of their authentic content. They are permanent achievements of culture, philosophically justified. Recourse to reality, confrontation with it, makes the classic approaches open in terms of development. None of them provides a closed system also adopted a priori or received by the conversion performed according to a specified number of regulations. The development of the classical approaches to the problem of truth is theoretically interesting for the whole field of philosophy and as such should be supported.
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Mieczysław Gogacz’s Account of Ethics of Protecting Persons

100%
Płotka M.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2021
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vol. 10
181-193
PL
Sama etyka to normy rozumiane jako kryteria doboru działań chroniących osoby. Gogacz przekonuje, że etyka realistyczna poszukuje tych kryteriów - za Arystotelesem i św. Tomaszem - w człowieku. Rezultatem tych poszukiwań jest wskazanie trzech najważniejszych kryteriów postępowania moralnego: mądrości, sumienia i kontemplacji. Po pierwsze, ludzka mądrość jako podstawowe kryterium dobrego postępowania. Mądrość pomaga rozpoznać najwyższe dobro i umożliwia ludziom wybór właściwego kierunku działania. Po drugie, prawidłowo ukształtowane sumienie jest kolejnym kryterium moralnego postępowania. Gogacz zwraca uwagę, że moralne postępowanie wymaga regularnej ludzkiej refleksji, przemyślenia tego, co należy zrobić. A zatem, po trzecie, kontemplacja jest ostatnim kryterium moralnego postępowania. Rozważania te otwierają najważniejszą książkę Mieczysława Gogacza, w której przedstawił on swoją oryginalną propozycję teorii etycznej, tj. Wprowadzenie do etyki chronienia osób. W niniejszym artykule spróbuję zrekonstruować tę propozycję i wskazać jej najważniejsze tezy, koncepcje i postulaty. Przebieg wywodu będzie zgodny z kolejnością omawiania problemów etycznych w tej książce. Część pierwsza tego artykułu rozpoczyna się krótkim omówieniem zagadnień metodologicznym: wyjaśnimy czym jest etyka, jakie racje stoją za uzależnieniem etyki od antropologii, by następnie przywołać tezę Gogacza, że badania etyczne muszą być poprzedzone badaniami z zakresu metafizyki człowieka. Następnie w części pierwszej przedstawimy najważniejsze tezy etyki chronienia osób. Skupimy się na relacjach osobowych. Zostaną również sformułowane trzy zasady etyki. Druga część (Anthropological problems) dotyczy uszczegółowienia zagadnień z filozofii człowieka, aby móc w kolejnej ostatniej części (Ethical problems) przyjrzeć się bliżej szczegółowym propozycjom problemów etycznych.
EN
The key postulate of Mieczysław Gogacz’s ethics of protecting persons is to develop an attitude that always stands on the side of persons and defends the persons. In order to be able to implement this postulate, Gogacz points out that it is necessary to recognize in advance who a person (i.e. the subject of ethics) is. In his account, ethics of protecting persons is an ethical proposition built on metaphysics, on certain metaphysical assumptions. The ethics itself is constituted by norms understood as criteria for selecting actions that protect persons. He indicated three the most important criteria for moral conduct: wisdom, conscience and contemplation. Firstly, human wisdom as the basic criterion of good conduct. Wisdom helps to recognize the ultimate good and enables people to choose the right courses of actions. Secondly, a righteous conscience is another criterion for moral conduct. Gogacz point out that moral conduct requires a regular human reflection, consideration of what is to be done. Thus, thirdly, a contemplation is the last criterion for moral conduct. In this paper, I will attempt to reconstruct this proposal and point its most important theses, concepts and postulates. The course of the argument will correspond to the order of discussing ethical problems in Gogacz's book. The first part of this article begins with a brief discussion on methodological issues: we will explain what ethics is, what are the reasons for the dependence of ethics on anthropology, and then we will recall Gogacz's thesis that ethical research must be preceded by research in metaphysics of a human being. Then, we will present the most important theses of the ethics of protecting persons. Precisely, we will focus on personal relationships. Three rules of ethics will also be formulated. The second part (Anthropological problems) deals with some detailed problems on metaphysics of a human being (i.e. body, soul, conception, birth, death, suffering, etc.) in order to be able to take a closer look at the detailed propositions of ethical problems in the next last part (Ethical problems).
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Istnienie pierwszym aktem bytu

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Andrzejuk A.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2017
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vol. 6
13-25
EN
From the perspective of existential Thomism, and following Aristotle’s philosophy of being (metaphysics) as the nucleus and keystone of the whole philosophy, seeking there the most important claims of St. Thomas, the article asks the three following questions: 1) What is the novum of Thomistic metaphysics? 2) What was Thomas’ way of thinking that led him to formulate the thesis that existence is the act of being? 3) Would anyone else have discovered the uniqueness of existence if Thomas Aquinas had not done it? The answers to these questions were formulated in reference to Gilson’s views and his concept of the history of philosophy and to the study of the concept of being in the texts of Thomas Aquinas and the historical sources of that concept. 1) Thomas proposed a new understanding of the structure of being, in which existence is the act that makes essence real and constitutes being’s potency, together making a real individual being. Thus, Thomas formulated a new existential theory of being, overcoming the limitations of Aristotle’s theory, and consistently explaining the issue related to esse (a problem that Avicenna and his followers - Parisian theologians of the 13th century could not solve). 2) Thomas Aquinas - with the help of Avicenna’s metaphysics - outdistances Aristotle’s essentialism, perceiving being as composed of existence and essence. Then, examining thoroughly the proposition of the Arab philosopher, he sees there inconsistency of attributing the position of accident to existence. According to Avicenna the element of being considered as the cause of the reality of being became - at the same time, as the accident - an unimportant component of essence. That is why Thomas Aquinas recognized that existence is the act of everything that makes essence, which transcended Avicenna’s theory, and thus he formulated his own existential version of the metaphysics of being. 3) It seems that nobody else but Thomas Aquinas would have put up a thesis that existence is the first act of being. And what would have been if Thomas Aquinas had not done it? It is hard to say as we have no historical data to let us discuss it. Similarly, it is impossible to answer this question even assuming Gilson’s thesis that the detailed claims of a given philosophy are the conclusion of the set of principles adopted at the beginning because Thomas did not have such a set of principles as at the starting point he modified the principles of Aristotle and Avicenna. Would someone else have made the same modifications, thus creating a “Thomistic” set of principles? The history of philosophy analyzes the things that actually happened and left their mark; it has no interest in things that did not take place and leave any trace. This could be an area for historical and philosophical fantasy, if it ever exists, but we try to stay in the field of the history of philosophy.
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Simone Simoni: Stefan Batory’s ‘vita medica’

80%
Ryczek W., Ryczek W.
Ruch Literacki
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2020
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issue 4
8
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Konisskii and Peripatetic Orthodox

80%
Drozdek A.
Studia Warmińskie
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2014
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issue 51
9-25
PL
Jerzy Konisski – prawosławny biskup białoruski, kanonizowany przez Synod białoruskiego Kościoła prawosławnego – był wykładowcą w Akademii Kijowskiej, jego wykłady zachowały się do dziś. Jako filozof był perypatetykiem akceptującym zasadnicze elementy systemu Arystotelesa: istnienie materii i form; cztery rodzaje przyczynowości; odrzucenie atomizmu; dusza jako forma ciała; trzy typy duszy: wegetatywna (nutrytywna), zmysłowa (zwierzęca) i myśląca; odrzucenie aktualnej nieskończoności; odrzucenie próżni w przyrodzie. Konisski wprowadził modyfikacje do tego systemu, sięgając do zasad teologii chrześcijańskiej: świat został stworzony i nie będzie trwał bez końca; Bóg jest zasadniczą przyczyną sprawczą. Teologia Konisskiego miała wymiar tradycyjny – nie podejmował się on wyjaśnienia tematów nie dość wyraźnie zarysowanych w teologii prawosławnej. Konisski mocno podkreślał duchowy aspekt teologii i konieczność manifestowania go przez własne życie duchowe. Teologia prawosławna była dla niego nienaruszalną podstawą i jego rola jako osoby duchownej polegała na przekonaniu ludzi do żywej akceptacji tej teologii.
EN
Georgii Konisskii, an Orthodox bishop of Belarus canonized by the Synod of the Belorussian Orthodox church, was at first a lecturer in the Kiev Academy and his philosophy lectures have been preserved. As a philosopher, he was a peripatetic through and through accepting all the major tenets of the Aristotelian system: he accepted matter and form; the four types of causes; rejection of atomism; the idea of the soul being a form; three types of the soul: vegetative (nutritive), sensory (animal), and rational; rejection of actual infinity; rejection of the void in nature. He made modifications only when forced by the Christian theology: the world was created and will have its end; God is the major efficient cause, not only the final cause. His theology remained traditional with no attempts to modify anything or to explain if there were areas not clearly delineated by Orthodoxy. Konisskii stressed very strongly the spiritual aspect of theology and the necessity of manifesting this theology through one’s spiritual life. Orthodox theology was for him an inviolable foundation that should be accepted without questioning and his role as a pastor was to imbue people with reverence of this theology and urge them to make it the way of their temporary spiritual journey through this world heading to the eternity in the afterlife.
DE
Georg Konisski, ein orthodoxer Erzbischof von Weißrussland, von der Synode der weißrussischen orthodoxen Kirche heiliggesprochen, war zuerst Dozent an der Kiew-Mohyla-Akademie und seine philosophischen Vorträge sind erhalten geblieben. Als Philosoph war er durch und durch Peripatetiker und akzeptierte alle wichtigen Grundsätze des aristotelischen System: die Existenz von Materie und Form; die vier Arten von Ursachen; die Ablehnung des Atomismus; Seele als Form des Körpers, die drei Arten von Seele: vegetative (nutritive), sensitive (tierische), und intellektuelle; Ablehnung der aktuellen Unendlichkeit, Ablehnung der Leere in der Natur. Er machte Änderungen nur dann, wenn er von der christlichen Theologie gezwungen war: die Welt wurde geschaffen und wird sein Ende haben; Gott ist die erste wirkende Ursache, nicht nur die Zweckursache. Seine Theologie blieb traditionell ohne Versuche etwas zu ändern oder die Bereiche zu erklären, die nicht ganz klar durch die Orthodoxie beschrieben worden sind. Konisskii betonte sehr stark den spirituellen Aspekt der Theologie und die Notwendigkeit, diese Theologie durch ein spirituelles Leben zu manifestieren. Orthodoxe Theologie war für ihn ein unantastbares Fundament, die ohne zu fragen angenommen werden sollte und Konisskis Rolle als Pastor war es, Menschen Ehrfurcht vor dieser Theologie zu verleihen, so dass diese Theologie sie in ihrer zeitlichen spirituelle Reise durch diese Welt in die Ewigkeit führen könnte.
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Saint Thomas d’Aquin en tant que philosophe: le problème des sources

61%
Golonka W.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2013
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vol. 2
183-194
EN
The title issue of the article is the problem of the philosophical sources Thomas in his works. The author believes that the source of Thomas’ philosophy is Aristotle. He argues his position as follows: a) Thomas wrote 11 comments on philosophical works of Aristotle, b) he called him Philosopher, c) he regularly refers to Aristotle, even in his theological writings, d) teaching aristotelism dominates in the Thomistic philosophy.
PL
Tytułowym zagadnieniem artykułu jest problem filozoficznych źrodeł Tomasza. Autor uważa, że źródłem filozofii Tomasza jest Arystoteles. Argumentuje swoje stanowisko w następujący sposób: a) Tomasz napisał 11 komentarzy do filozoficznych dzieł Arystotelesa, b) nazywał go Filozofem, c) systematycznie odwołuje się do Arystotelesa, nawet w swych pismach teologicznych, d) nauczanie perypatetyzmu dominuje w filozofii tomistycznej.
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