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EN
In order to describe the environment surrounding us, so complex in terms of relations resulting from using violence, we easily employ terms such as ‘partisan’ or ‘militant’, just in order to define the very same ones as terrorists a while later. Probably the benchmark of contemporary description, especially of political action is the lack of clear-cut attitudes. Terrorism is nothing new, and this statement in itself is not very revealing. However, for many contemporary researchers of this issue, there is never too much information. Terrorism has always accompanied the history of oppressive regimes as well as resistance movements and uprisings. All the same, within the anti- colonial insurrectionary movements of the mid-20th century which led to the fall of European colonial empires over a short period of time, terrorism achieved new quality. It should also be emphasized that it achieved considerable political successes compared to the social-revolutionary terrorism of the late 19th century. The attribute ‘terrorist’ serves as an excluding one in different relations. By employing such term, one that their cause is an unconventional one – leastways as long as specific ways of using violence are applied. On the other hand, groups classified as terrorist ones often describe themselves as partisans who are fighting for the liberation of certain social or ethnic groups and who have to employ “unconventional” methods of using force because of the military superiority of the oppressive regime. By describing certain actions as ‘terrorist’ one usually intends on bereaving it of every sort of political legitimation. Is there any aspect that terrorism and guerrilla actions have in common? In certain socio-revolutionary or ethno-separatist strategies of violence, the concept of terrorism consists in the idea of a ‘starter’ which is to create the conditions to commence the guerrilla war. There could also be groups acting as partisans on one front line, and as terrorists on the other. The example is Al-Qaeda: in Central Asia its network operated only temporarily, as a kind of guerrilla, while in the global scale it employed terrorist strategy.
EN
Throughout history, changes in the character of war have always been difficult for contemporaries to identify and assess. The context of future conflicts and wars can help the nations to make sound decisions on designing the tasks and missions of future forces. This paper offers a view on the character of future conflicts, seeks to describe what Armed Forces are likely to experience in future conflicts in light of dynamic changes in current security environment, and provides recommendations on the areas with the shortfalls, which could be essential to their success. It assesses how we think about future war, drawing attention to its associated caveats, obstacles, and intellectual problems. The author focuses attention on the issues related the activities referred to as “hybrid”, and the possibility of using the Armed Forces’ potential in terms of identification and elimination of threats. The conclusion of the paper presents a clear picture of future generations of the soldiers based on the requirements predicted throughout the article.
EN
Objectives The aim of this paper is to analyse the use of weaponised incendiary kites and helium balloons in the Israeli-Palestinian hostilities between March and December 2018. The paper argues that arson started with incendiary kites and balloons can easily be exploited for terrorist purposes and poses a serious challenge for regular armed forces and for civilian emergency services. Methods The paper examines the Palestinian ‘Great March of Return’ as a background for the development of a new Hamas’ tactic and briefly describes the chronology of arson terrorism in the context of other hostilities at the Gaza-Israeli border. The study focuses on the two following questions: why are the kites and balloons useful for the current goals of Hamas and how do the Israelis respond to this new threat? The study uses comparative scientific literature and document analysis, the analysis of statements released by the Israeli authorities and the Israeli media reports related to the arson attacks. Results The main findings include the role of simple, non-lethal weapons in spreading fear for terrorist purposes and the advantages of turning everyday-use materials into weapons in a situation where there is limited access to regular arms. The second part of the study deals with the effects of arson attacks on the Israeli side of the conflict and the countermeasures undertaken in the Gaza Periphery. The author concludes that airborne arson attacks pose a serious threat to advanced Israeli defence systems, solely because of their primitive and unpredictable character. Conclusions The overall findings of this paper present the threat of arson terrorism in the context of an asymmetric conflict.
PL
The present analysis of military operations carried out by Tatar Hordes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has shown that these operations were basically shaped by asymmetric actions. Their main characteristics were secrecy of action up to the moment of attack, use of information-and-intelligence warfare struggle instruments, a total character of operations taken against civilians, their material resources and economic infrastructure, with use of terrorist tactics and means of psychological impact that aimed at intimidating the community under attack. The actions of Tatar Hordes were primarily focused on non-military aspects and took advantage not only of classic military tools but also a combination of political measures and instruments as well as those typical of economy, these including a variety of economic and demographic pressures. Pursuing asymmetric action was in the hands of the Giray (Gerey) dynasty one of the most important tools enabling them to efficiently achieve their political goals in the international arena and to support the economic development of the Crimean Khanate through permanent transfers of slaves and tangible property of various sorts.
EN
“Operation Cast Lead” undertaken by the Israeli armed forces against Hamas forces in the Gaza strip in 2008/2009 raises a significant number of international legal issues. These issues relate to the nature of the military conflict, the legal status of the Gaza strip under international humanitarian law, but also, more generally, to the applicability and suitability of international humanitarian law in such kinds of asymmetric warfare taking place in densely populated areas. Besides, the article also questions at least some of the findings made by the “Goldstone Report” tasked by the United Nations Human Rights Council to investigate alleged violations of international humanitarian law during the armed conflict.
PL
Artykuł przedstawia wyniki badań dotyczących dywersyjnego udziału rosyjskich ochotników w wojnie domowej na terenie byłej Jugosławii w latach 90. XX w. Obejmuje zarys szlaku bojowego ochotników, prawdopodobne motywy, jakie nimi kierowały oraz sposób zaciągu i przerzutu. Ponadto autor próbuje udzielić odpowiedzi na ważne w tym kontekście pytanie: czy Rosjanie biorący udział w walkach byli najemnikami czy – jak sami twierdzą – ochotnikami?
EN
The article presents the results of research on the participation of Russian volunteers in sabotage activities during the civil war on the territory of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. It describes the volunteers’ combat trail, probable motives, as well as the methods of recruitment and redeployment. Moreover, the author attempts to answer the significant question: whether Russians involved in combat activities were mercenaries or – as they claim themselves – volunteers.
EN
The aim of this article is to make a diagnosis of problems which Polish officers struggle with during their performance of command functions in asymmetrical combat operations. For the Western political culture, strategy and army, threatened of asymmetry, are very ,,inconvenient’’ because their instruments (methods) cannot be found in the Western established way of conducting war thus it is difficult to face them. The advantage of strength of military and technology are not a guarantee of quick win over weaker, but determined enemy who applies strategy of asymmetry. The aspects above insist on deep transformation of the conventional military not only from the tactical level but also structural, preliminary and mental. The empirical basis of this article are field researches among soldiers of The 12th Szczecin Mechanised Division, experienced in the asymmetrical campaigns. The author has conducted a qualitative analysis of the material collected, based on the interviews. Suggestions were formulated about the need to train Polish officers who perform command roles in assymetrical wars.
PL
Głównym celem artykułu jest diagnoza problemów, z jakimi borykają się polscy oficerowie pełniący funkcje dowódcze w asymetrycznych operacjach bojowych. Dla zachodniej kultury politycznej, strategicznej i wojskowej zagrożenia asymetryczne są bardzo „niewygodne”, gdyż ich instrumenty (metody) nie znajdują odpowiednika w ugruntowanym przez Zachód sposobie prowadzenia wojny. Z tego powodu trudno jest stawić im czoła. Przewaga siły militarnej i technologii nie gwarantuje szybkiego zwycięstwa nad znacznie słabszym, ale bardzo zdeterminowanym przeciwnikiem stosującym strategię asymetrii. Powyższe czynniki wymuszają głęboką transformację konwencjonalnych sił zbrojnych nie tylko na poziomie taktycznym, ale również strukturalnym, przygotowawczym i mentalnym. Podstawę empiryczną artykułu stanowią badania terenowe przeprowadzone wśród żołnierzy 12. Szczecińskiej Dywizji Zmechanizowanej, posiadających doświadczenie w asymetrycznych działaniach wojennych. Autorka dokonuje analizy zebranego materiału o charakterze jakościowym (wywiadów) i formułuje sugestie odnośnie do potrzeb szkolenia polskich oficerów pełniących funkcje dowódcze w warunkach wojny asymetrycznej.
PL
Artykuł jest próbą ukazania, dlaczego i w jaki sposób zabójstwo ważnych osobistości jest jednym z narzędzi rozwiązywania konfliktów o charakterze asymetrycznym. Postępujący wzrost liczby aktorów stosunków międzynarodowych oraz rosnący poziom interakcji miedzy nimi prowadzi do coraz większej liczby konfliktów, które też, z tych samych powodów, mają coraz częściej charakter asymetryczny. Postrzeganie czynnika ludzkiego jako najistotniejszego prowadzi do przekonania, iż eliminacja kluczowych postaci jawi się jako skuteczne narządzie rozwiązywania pozimnowojennych konfliktów. Niemniej, godnym uwagi jest fakt, że nie tylko aktorzy niepaństwowi, co jest oczywiste, ale również państwa, decydują się sięgać po tę metodę, czego dowodzą coraz częstsze „targeted killings”, dokonywane przede wszystkim przez amerykańskie i izraelskie organizacje wywiadowcze i siły zbrojne.
EN
This article is an attempt to show why and how the VIP assassination is a tool of asymmetric warfare. The constantly increasing number of the actors of international security along with a growing level of interdependence between them lead to more and more conflicts, which for the same reason, are more and more often of an asymmetric nature. As the human factor is perceived as the most important one, elimination of key figures comes into focus as a really effective tool of waging the post-Cold War conflicts. What is even more interesting is the fact that not only non-state actors, which appears obvious, but also states decide to take advantage of this method. More and more frequently committed “targeted killings”, especially by the US and Israeli military and intelligence, constitute the evidence.
PL
W artykule dokonano oceny możliwych form oddziaływania rosyjskich służb specjalnych na państwa wschodniej flanki NATO. Zadaniem rosyjskich operacji specjalnych jest rozbudowa tzw. zewnętrznego pierścienia obrony, mają one także uzupełniać przedsięwzięcia A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial). Natomiast w sytuacji narastającego kryzysu lub realnego konfliktu zbrojnego (o niskiej intensywności) mają one stanowić jedną z form działalności operacyjnej sił zbrojnych. Przyjęta formuła działań zakłada prowadzenie wzajemnie skoordynowanych przedsięwzięć mających na celu oddziaływanie na establishment polityczny państw członkowskich NATO i UE oraz na opinie społeczne w tych krajach, a także uzyskanie wpływu na procesy gospodarcze. Natomiast w wymiarze militarnym stanowią element działań operacyjnych skierowanych selektywnie przeciwko najważniejszym celom i obiektom przeciwnika. Rozpoznane cele i efekty rosyjskich operacji specjalnych pozwalają stwierdzić, że wykorzystują one zarówno wpływy militarne, jak i działania agencji rządowych oraz podmiotów prywatnych. Dominującą formułą pozostają tzw. operacje niekonwencjonalne i działania pośrednie, dostosowane do sytuacji wewnętrznej w państwach wschodniej flanki NATO, nacelowane na zdobycie wpływu na sposób prowadzenia ich polityki. Przyjęta formuła wpływu oznacza, że system obronny państw członkowskich NATO powinien uwzględniać nie tylko przygotowanie do operacji obronnej, której integralną częścią jest ochrona przed działalnością wywrotową i sabotażową, ale także prowadzenie pełnego zakresu działań kontrwywiadowczych oraz eliminowanie dezinformacji społecznej i infiltracji struktur państwowych.
EN
The article assesses the possible forms of influence of Russian special services on the states of NATO's eastern flank. The task of Russian special operations is to expand the so-called outer ring of defense, they are also supposed to complement A2 / AD (Anti-Access / Area Denial) undertakings. On the other hand, in a situation of growing crisis or real armed conflict (of low intensity), they are to constitute one of the operational activities of the armed forces. The adopted formula of activities assumes the conduct of mutually coordinated undertakings aimed at influencing the political establishment and public opinion of NATO and EU member states, as well as obtaining influence on economic processes. On the other hand, in the military dimension, they are part of operational activities selectively directed against the most important targets and objects of the enemy. Recognized goals and effects of Russian special operations allow us to conclude that they use both military influence and actions of government agencies and private entities. The dominant formula remains the so-called unconventional operations and indirect actions, adapted to the internal situation in the countries of NATO's eastern flank, aimed at gaining influence over the way their policies are conducted. The adopted formula of influence means that the defense system of NATO member states should take into account not only preparation for a defense operation, an integral part of which is protection against subversion and sabotage, but also the conduct of a full range of counterintelligence activities and the elimination of social disinformation and infiltration of state structures.
EN
The study of warfare, throughout its history, as well as efforts to legally regulate the resort to war and the conduct of war, were concentrated exclusively on one form of warfare - interstate conflict. Only since the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York in 2001 and the following ‘Global War on Terrorism’ has a discussion on a potentially new kind of warfare - asymmetric warfare - moved into the spotlight. Despite all the scientific attention, the concept of asymmetric warfare remains undefined or ill-defined until today, resulting in a proliferation of its use and limiting its value. Hence, restraint in the use of the term is necessary, in order to reinforce its analytical value and applicability. Defining asymmetric warfare as a conflict among opponents who are so different in their basic features that comparison of their military power is rendered impossible, is such an attempt to limit the term to a substantially new form of warfare, witnessed in a conflict that is often commonly called the Global War on Terrorism. The past two years, since the upsurge of the so-called Islamic State to the forefront of the salafi jihadi movement, have witnessed a significant change in this war. Superficial analysis could lead to the conclusion that the proclamation of the Islamic Caliphate on the territories of Iraq and Syria (for now) seems to have recalibrated this conflict into traditional inter- state war again, making the concept of asymmetric warfare obsolete and diminishing it into just a short-term aberration in the history of warfare. Nothing could be further from the truth. The enemy in the Global War on Terrorism was and remains a global and territorially unrestricted ideological movement whose numbers cannot even be estimated, which fights its battles wherever it chooses to, and whose ultimate goal is the annihilation of the international system of sovereign states, not the creation of a new state within this system. The Islamic Caliphate in its current boundaries is nothing more than the “model Islamic state”, as envisioned by Osama bin Laden in his 1996 fatwa as part of Al Qaeda’s 200 year plan for the establishment of God’s Islamic World Order. This grand strategy is the guiding blueprint of the salafi jihad that is waged against the Westphalian state system in a war that is truly asymmetric. We have to adjust to this strategic asymmetry if we are to prevail in this struggle, fighting a long war against an indefinable enemy on battlefields that are still unknown.
EN
The phenomena related to natural disasters and acts of war, bringing significant destruction and material losses, usually left an indelible mark in collective memory and identity of early modern era societies. This class of phenomena included a particular type of military-business activity of Tatar hordes, specifically long-range pillage raids, which ravaged and weakened demographically the south-eastern territories of the Polish-Lithuanian state from the late 15th to the end of the 17th century. Since military operations conducted by Tatar hordes were asymmetrical in nature, focusing on civilian communities, mostly in rural areas, they constituted an existential threat to the communities living there. This stemmed from the impact of such unconventional military operations, which included catastrophic damages to buildings and economic infrastructure of attacked villages, as well as significant demographic losses, suffered by local populations. Thus, Tatar slave raids have left a permanent mark in the collective memory of victim communities. The author utilizes a broad base of source materials dating back to 17th and 18th century, including narrative sources, visitation files of Latin Przemyśl diocese, treasury and tax sources, to focus on the transformation process of communicative (generational) memory into cultural memory. The latter began to form around mid-18th century, when the last generation that directly witnessed Tatar pillage raids started dying out. Cultural memory is understood here – after German cultural studies scholar and Egyptologist Jan Assmann – as exteriorized and objectified memory of the given community about its own traumatic past. It is transmitted through textual sources and oral tradition, often supported by various “places of memory”, both material and intangible with great symbolic potential, such as legends, folk tales and songs. It seems that figures of key importance in transforming local communicative memories into cultural memory were the representatives of local intellectual elites, most often Catholic priests. Their activities, referring to the sacrum-profanum dichotomy and the providentialism idea, popular in the 17th–18th century Commonwealth, indicate a socially conditioned process of forming a cultural memory within the framework of symbolically objectified and highly structured narrative, relating directly to Christian religion, which on one hand transcended individual experience of the members of local community, and on the other, responded to current social and cultural needs.
PL
Zjawiska związane z klęskami elementarnymi i działaniami wojennymi, których konsekwencją były znaczne zniszczenia i straty materialne pozostawiały zazwyczaj trwały ślad w pamięci zbiorowej i tożsamości społeczeństw epoki wczesnej nowożytności. Do tej klasy fenomenów należała specyficzna działalność militarno-biznesowa ord tatarskich w postaci wypraw grabieżczych dalekiego zasięgu, które od schyłku XV do końca XVII w. pustoszyły i osłabiały demograficznie południowo-wschodnie ziemie państwa polsko-litewskiego. Ze względu na fakt, że operacje militarne prowadzone przez ordy tatarskie miały charakter asymetryczny, koncentrując się w środowisku ludności cywilnej, przeważnie na obszarach wiejskich, stanowiły dla zamieszkujących tam społeczności zagrożenie egzystencjalne. Wynikało to ze skutków tego typu niekonwencjonalnych działań militarnych, którymi były katastrofalne zniszczenia w zabudowie i infrastrukturze gospodarczej atakowanych wsi oraz znaczne straty demograficzne ponoszone przez miejscowe populacje. Jako takie właśnie, niewolnicze wyprawy tatarskie odciskały trwałe piętno w pamięci zbiorowej społeczności, które stawały się ich ofiarą. W oparciu o szeroką bazę materiałów źródłowych pochodzących z XVII i XVIII w., wśród których są m.in. źródła narracyjne, akta wizytacji łacińskiej diecezji przemyskiej i źródła skarbowo-podatkowe, autor skupia swoją uwagę na procesie transformacji pamięci komunikatywnej (pokoleniowej) w pamięć kulturową. Ta ostatnia zaczęła się tworzyć około połowy XVIII w., kiedy w sposób naturalny zaczęło wymierać ostatnie pokolenie będące naocznym świadkiem grabieżczych rajdów tatarskich. Pamięć kulturowa rozumiana jest tutaj – za niemieckim kulturoznawcą i egiptologiem Janem Assmannem – jako ponadindywidualna i zobiektywizowana pamięć danej społeczności na temat własnej traumatycznej przeszłości. Jest ona transmitowana poprzez teksty i tradycję mówioną, często przy wsparciu różnych „miejsc pamięci”, zarówno materialnych, jak i tych niematerialnych o dużym potencjale symbolicznym w postaci legend, podań i pieśni ludowych. Jak się wydaje, kluczowe znaczenie w przetwarzaniu lokalnych pamięci komunikatywnych w pamięć kulturową mieli reprezentanci miejscowych elit intelektualnych, którymi byli najczęściej księża katoliccy. Ich działania, odwołujące się do opozycji sacrum-profanum i popularnej w Rzeczypospolitej XVII–XVIII w. idei prowidencjonalizmu, wskazują na społecznie uwarunkowany proces konstruowania pamięci kulturowej w ramach zobiektywizowanej symbolicznie i wysoce ustrukturyzowanej narracji odnoszącej się wprost do religii chrześcijańskiej, która z jednej strony wykraczała poza indywidualne doświadczenie członków lokalnej wspólnoty, a z drugiej odpowiadała aktualnym potrzebom społeczno-kulturowym.
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