Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  bin Laden
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

Krwawe widowisko. Wojna z terrorem w ujęciu ekonomii politycznej komunikowania

100%
Czapnik S.
Nowa Krytyka
|
2013
|
issue 30/31
319-342
EN
The aim of this article is to analyze so-called war on terror from the perspective of the political economy of communication. The author starts with a story about Osama bin Laden's death in Abbottabad (Pakistan), including sometimes shameful reaction on it (a specially in the United States). Then this paper addresses major trends in the TV shows about war on terror – in the American „24” and Polish „Misja Afganistan” („The Afghanistan Mission”). The next part of the article is devoted to a discussion of the phenomenon called WikiLeaks (a non-profit organization that publishes submissions from anonymous whistleblowers) in the context of the „Collateral Murder” video of U.S. Helicopter and „Cablegate” scandal – the U.S. Diplomatic cables leak, scandal began in 2010, when WikiLeaks began releasing classified cables that had been sent to the U.S. State Department by hundreds of its embassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions around the globe. In the conclusion, the significance of the war on terror is highlighted, but the author is convinced, that this is a part of a broader process – United States is losing its superpower status and American establishment is influenced by military-industrial complex, so global war on terror could be eternal. The process of globalizing war on terror is proceeding rapidly – from the author's point of view this is highly dangerous.
2
Content available remote

Znovu k 11. 9. 2001: Jak se „dělá historie“ v politickém diskurzu

72%
Nekvapil J., Leudar I.
Sociologický časopis. Czech Sociological Review
|
2010
|
vol. 46
|
issue 4
619–642
EN
Drawing on ethnomethodology, this article addresses what participants do as ‘practical historians’ – how they use and produce history in and through their activities. Specifi cally, it studies how historical contingencies are built into antagonistic political talk and to what effect. To that end, the authors revisit three of their own papers, all of which analysed how the 9/11 attacks in the United States were represented. The authors reanalyse the texts focusing on how the protagonists in the confl ict (Bush, Blair and bin Laden) ‘did history’. The analysis reveals two related methods of ‘practicing history’: one is to situate contemporary events relative to historical antecedents and so provide them with history-contingent meanings; the other is to constrain the historical understanding of the events in future.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

BIN LADEN, AL-ZARKAWI, AL-BAGHDADI – KRYZYSY, DO KTÓRYCH MOGŁOBY NIE DOJŚĆ…

51%
Huczko M.
Kwartalnik Naukowy Uczelni Vistula
|
2017
|
issue 3(53)
17-32
PL
Istotnym wyzwaniem polityki zagranicznej USA w początkach tego wieku jest islamski terroryzm. Wraz z atakami z dnia 11 września 2001 roku terroryzm islamski, głównie oparty na Al-Kaidzie, stał się zagrożeniem międzynarodowym. Założycielem oraz najbardziej rozpoznawalną twarzą tej organizacji terrorystycznej był bin Laden, który już kilkanaście lat przed 2001 obrał sobie za cel Stany Zjednoczone i Amerykanów. Wiedza wywiadowcza o bin Ladenie, choć niekompletna, była dostępna już pod koniec lat 90. poprzedniego stulecia. Decydenci postanowili jednak nie eliminować tego terrorysty. W wyniku amerykańskiej interwencji najpierw w Afganistanie, a później w Iraku Al-Kaida ewoluowała i rozprzestrzeniła się na region Bliskiego Wschodu. Kluczowymi postaciami w tym procesie byli (i są) al‑Zarkawi oraz al-Baghdadi. Terroryści ci są odpowiedzialni za stworzenie i kierunek działania samozwańczego Państwa Islamskiego, podmiotu destabilizującego Bliski Wschód i stanowiącego zagrożenie również poza nim. Zarówno al-Zarkawi jak i al-Baghdadi powinni byli zostać wyeliminowani we wcześniejszym okresie, co mogłoby mieć znaczący wpływ na sytuację polityczną na Bliskim Wschodzie i konsekwencje związane z brakiem stabilności w tym regionie. Powstrzymanie tych terrorystów na wcześniejszym etapie ich działalności było możliwe, a to z kolei mogło mieć znaczący wpływ na rozwój wydarzeń na Bliskim Wschodzie. Analiza porównawcza drogi, jaką przebyli wspomniani terroryści oraz niewykorzystanych okazji powstrzymania ich obrazuje pewne błędy i zaniechania które Stany Zjednoczone popełniły we wszystkich omawianych przypadkach.
EN
A crucial challenge to the US foreign policy at the beginning of this century is Islamic terrorism. With the attacks of 11 September 2001, Islamic terrorism, mainly based on Al-Qaeda, has become an international threat. The founder and the best recognised face of this terrorist organisation was Bin Laden who already a dozen or so years before 2001 had made the United States and Americans his target. Intelligence knowledge about Bin Laden, though incomplete, was already accessible in the late 1990s. However, the decisionmakers decided not to eliminate this terrorist. In result of the American intervention, first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq, Al-Qaeda evolved and spread over the Middle East region. The key figures in that process were (and are) al-Zarqawi and al-Baghdadi. These terrorists are responsible for setting up and the direction of activities of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, the subject destabilising the Middle East and posing a threat also beyond it. Both al- Zarqawi and al-Baghdadi should have been eliminated at an earlier stage, what might have exerted a significant impact on the political situation in the Middle East and consequences related to the lack of stability in this region. Holding back these terrorists at an earlier stage was possible and this, in turn, might have had a considerable impact on the development of events in the Middle East. The comparative analysis of the way covered by the said terrorists as well as the unexploited opportunities to hold them back illustrates some mistakes and omissions the United States made in all the cases in question.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.