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This paper combines perspectives from evolutionary biology and linguistics to discuss the early evolution of laughter and the possible role of laughter-like vocalisation as a bonding mechanism in hominins and early human species. From the perspective of evolutionary biology, we here emphasise several things: the role of exaptation, the typically very slow pace of evolutionary change, and the danger of projecting backwards from the current utilities of laughter to infer its earlier function, hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of years ago. From the perspective of linguistics, we examine both the semantics of the word ‘laugh’ and the vocal mechanics of human laughter production, arguing that greater terminological care is needed in talking about the precursors of laughter in the ancient evolutionary past. Finally, we turn to hypotheses about how laughter-like vocalisations may have arisen, long before articulate language as we know it today. We focus in particular on Robin Dunbar’s hypothesis that laughter-like vocalisation, which stimulated endorphin production, might have functioned as a bonding mechanism (a kind of “vocal grooming”) among hominins and early human species. The paper contributes to the special issue theme (Humour and Belonging) by casting a long look backwards in time to laughter-like vocalisation as a distant evolutionary precursor of humour, and to bonding as an evolutionary precursor to cognitively and socially modern forms of “belonging”. At the same time, it cautions against casual theorising about the evolutionary origins of laughter.
Human Affairs
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2013
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vol. 23
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issue 4
556-575
EN
J. Šmajs’ concept of evolutionary ontology has attracted much attention in recent years especially in Czech and Slovak academic circles, yet it remains, as some of its proponents claim, undervalued in Britain and the US. Even in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there are, in addition to its strong supporters, several authors who almost a priori reject the concept, pointing to several questionable, contradictory or even mutually exclusive or self-refuting arguments. In this paper, mainly based on a comprehensive analysis of the first part of Šmajs’ book, Evoluční ontologie kultury a problém podnikání (2012) [Evolutionary Ontology of Culture and The Issues Of Business], we attempt to demonstrate that the opponents of Šmajs’ concept are closer to the truth, since the concept, we believe, is just another variation on the extreme escalation of philosophical naturalism.
PL
Where should we seek the roots of natural language? Common sense suggests that human language should have somehow evolved from primitive vocal communication, which is also, to some extent, present among other animals, especially since primary humans mean of communication is speech. Some biological and psychological evidences, however, both from observation and experiments, indicate that for the missing evolutionary link between human language and animal (apes) communication one should take chimpanzee gestural communication, the only undoubtedly intentional non-human mean of communication. In this paper, I present the evidences for the aforementioned theory and draw some conclusions regarding the issue of two “sources” of language – biological and cultural evolution.
PL
Artykuł dotyczy relacji między nauką św. Tomasza z Akwinu a koncepcją ewolucji biologicznej. Stanowi odpowiedź na tezy przedstawione przez dwóch autorów (Piotra Lichacza i Williama E. Carrolla), według których nauczanie św. Tomasza w żadnym punkcie nie wyklucza ewolucji rozumianej jako makroewolucja biologiczna. Na początku zostaje doprecyzowana definicja ewolucji, która jest brana pod uwagę we współczesnej debacie. Takie rozumienie ewolucji (jako procesu opartego na całkowicie przypadkowej zmienności i naturalnej selekcji) jest nie do pogodzenia z nauką św. Tomasza przynajmniej z czterech powodów. Następnie zostaje wskazane, że wymienieni autorzy posługują się nieco innym rozumieniem ewolucji niż to przyjmowane we współczesnej debacie - jest to ewolucja teistyczna. Jednak, jak zostaje wykazane w głównej części artykułu, również ten model ewolucji nie jest do pogodzenia z wizją Akwinaty. Ten ostatni opowiadał się bowiem za stałością gatunków, za niemożliwością wytworzenia nowego gatunku (rozumianego jako pełna natura) przez kogoś innego niż sam Bóg. Ponadto tomistyczna wizja przyczynowości wtórnej wcale nie odpowiada tezie krytykowanych autorów, jakoby Bóg miał użyć ewolucji jako narzędzia przy stwarzaniu świata. Tezy Lichacza i Carrolla znajdują odpowiedź w analizie oryginalnych wypowiedzi Doktora Anielskiego. Artykuł kończy się wnioskiem, że nauka św. Tomasza jest trudna do harmonizacji z teistycznym ewolucjonizmem, a w wielu aspektach wprost go wyklucza.
EN
This paper concerns the relationship between Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine and the concept of biological evolution. It is a response to theses presented by two catholic authors (Piotr Lichacz and William E. Carroll), according to whom Thomas’ teaching does not exclude, at any point, biological evolution widely accepted in contemporary science. Firstly, the article presents four basic difficulties to the idea presented by Lichacz and Carroll. If Thomas’ teaching could have been reconciled with the idea of evolution, it must have been evolution somehow directed by God. Otherwise, evolution is atheistic concept which Thomas would have never agreed on. Nevertheless, this first condition does not solve all nonconformities. The other problems to reconcile Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine and contemporary notion of biological evolution are different concept of causality, lack of species transformism in Aquinas’ doctrine and Christian belief that only God himself (in a direct act) can produce a totally new nature (natura perfecta) in matter. These three substantial ideas do not allow to say that Thomas’ teaching can be compatible with the modern concept of biological evolution. At some points, Aquinas’ doctrine is irrelevant to it, but at other, it directly excludes it.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2021
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vol. 10
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issue 1
71–102
EN
In this article the author discusses Dennis F. Polis’ defense of the compatibility of biological evolution and Thomistic metaphysics. Some of Polis’ methodological and metaphysical arguments are examined and it is explained why they are unfaithful to the Thomistic tradition of metaphysics. There is a discussion of why metaphysics can, within certain parameters, critique the science of evolutionary biology, as well as a discussion of the role of metaphysics in the hierarchy of the sciences. The relationship between biological species to the notion of species in philosophy, including related metaphysical topics, such as essences and Divine ideas in God, is discussed. It is determined that Polis’ view suffers from a kind of relativism and nominalism that is incompatible with the moderate realism of Aquinas. Some of Aquinas’ key existential insights in metaphysics are discussed in this context as well. In addition to being corrective, this essay helps point the way to a better defense of the compatibility of biological evolution and Thomistic metaphysics.
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