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PL
On the 3rd April 2018, a new Act of the 8th December 2017 regarding the Supreme Court (Journal of Laws 2018 item 5 as amended), hereinafter the “Law regarding the Supreme Court”, entered into force, which introduced to the polish legal system a new institution, namely the extraordinary complaint. It is a new remedy, the purpose of which is the extraordinary review of final court decisions (judgements) in order to ensure their compliance with the principle of a democratic state of law that implements the principles of social justice. It may be brought before the Supreme Court only by certain public authorities strictly specified in the Law regarding the Supreme Court, namely by the Attorney General and the Ombudsman but also, within the scope of their jurisdiction, inter alia by the Financial Ombudsman, the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Ombudsman and the President of the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection. Thus, these entities were given the right to challenge final judgments of common courts, which otherwise could not be revoked or changed by any other means or remedies. Currently, all legitimized authorities may file extraordinary complaints – with the reservation that authorities other than the Attorney General and the Ombudsman may do so only within their jurisdiction – regarding judgments that became final after the 3rd April 2018 (inclusive). However, the Attorney General and the Ombudsman may also, until the 3rd April 2021, file extraordinary complaints regarding judgments that became final after the 17th October 1997 and before the 3rd April 2018 (the date the Law regarding the Supreme Court entered into force). Aim of the article is to analyze the main legal issues regarding the extraordinary complaint, especially the grounds for its admissibility, the practical aspects in the subject matter, as well as possible disputable issues and interpretation doubts. The study is limited to the analysis of selected legal issues regarding the extraordinary complaint in the civil procedure.
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2018
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vol. 16
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issue 4 (2)
87-95
EN
This article deals with the changes that were made and with possible expectations in the field of administrative justice which can be observed on the example of (not only) the Czech Republic. To this end, the contribution focuses, first, on the purpose of the administrative justice as such and on its history and development. Then it gives consideration to the current stat and form of the legal framework of the administrative justice in the Czech Republic. On this basis, the last part of the contribution deals with the changes which have been made in the administrative justice as well as with possible expectations that may be placed on the administrative justice, going hand in hand with its possible changes in the future.
EN
The purpose of this article is to present the most significant legal problems related to judicial control of actions of administration within the scope of development policy. The following issues have been discussed: admissibility of judicial control, object of control exercised by administrative courts and judicial proceedings in these matters. Distribution of funds from the European Union has been regulated by the Act on the Principles of Implementing the Development Policy (APIDP). APIDP also regulates judicial control of actions of administration within the scope of development policy. The proceedings before administrative courts was regulated differently in APIDP than in the Law on Proceedings before Administrative Courts (LPAC), significantly modifying general procedural rules. This causes numerous controversies and interpretative difficulties. In the course of argument I establish that the subject of the control exercised by administrative courts are, so-called, otheracts and activities of the administration. The so-called information on the outcome of the appeal procedure shall be considered as other act and activity of the administration. The views recognizing information as an administrative decision or factual action are erroneous. The article further discusses the problems of complaint to administrative court, i.e. filing the complaint, terms, payment of court fees, the issue of so-called ‘completeness’ of the complaint. Then the activities of the administrative court have been analyzed, i.e. acceptance of complaint, dismissal of complaint, or leaving the complaint without consideration. It was found that the court may also reject the complaint or leave it without recognition, which is controversial due to unclear wording of the APIDP. Provisions of APIDP has been assessed negatively as causing confusion, chaotic, full of legislative errors. Some provisions have to remain dead (eg. terms of considering complaints), others are clearly unconstitutional.
EN
The text offers an overview of the evolution of cassation in Poland and its historical background from the 19th century until the present time. The author argues that consistently conducted transformation of the Polish cassation system has changed the perception of cassation which was widely spread after the political transformation of 1989. She points out that such elements as: the procedure of preliminary selection of cases, absolute compulsory representation by an attorney or legal advisor, and the exclusive use of cassation grounds indicated in the Code of Civil Procedure exert an impact on the accessibility of a cassation complaint. She demonstrates a far-fetching evolution of this appellate measure over the years, considering the fact the beginning of its function was quite the opposite.
Zeszyty Prawnicze
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2017
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vol. 17
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issue 3
135-164
EN
Summary The aim of this article was to determine whether in certain cassation cases heard by the Polish Supreme Administrative Count (SAC) there may be an obligation resting on this court to take EU law into consideration of its own motion, on the grounds of the EU principle of effectiveness. The article is divided into three parts. The first part describes the grounds for cassation and the bounds to the SAC’s adjudication. The second part presents the principle of effectiveness and the way in which it is applied with respect to Poland’s domestic procedural regulations. Te last part examines three conditions for the construction of grounds for complaint from the point of view of the principle of effectiveness. The following conclusions may be drawn from my study. On the one hand, there is no obligation for the SAC to apply EU law of its own motion if no grounds for cassation have been drawn up on the basis of EU law at all, or if they have been formulated incorrectly, without a specification which provision of EU law has been breached. But on the other hand the SAC is obliged to take EU law into consideration in the event of a renewed complaint should it turn out that its original verdict was incompatible with the preliminary ruling issued by the EU Court of Justice.
PL
Streszczenie Celem artykułu było ustalenie, czy dla NSA rozpoznającego sprawę w granicach skargi kasacyjnej, może w określonych przypadkach powstać obowiązek uwzględnienia z urzędu prawa UE, na podstawie zasady skuteczności, która wynika z prawa UE. Artykuł obejmuje trzy części. W pierwszej scharakteryzowano podstawy kasacyjne i zasadę związania NSA granicami skargi kasacyjnej. Druga dotyczy treści zasady skuteczności i sposobu korzystania z niej w odniesieniu do krajowych reguł procesowych. W ostatniej części zbadano trzy warunki konstrukcji podstawy kasacyjnej pod kątem zasady skuteczności. Wnioski są następujące. Z jednej strony, obowiązek uwzględnienia przez NSA z urzędu prawa UE nie powstaje wtedy, gdy w skardze kasacyjnej w ogóle nie sformułowano podstawy kasacyjnej dotyczącej naruszenia prawa UE, jak również gdy sformułowano ją nieprawidłowo, bez wskazania konkretnego przepisu prawa UE. Z drugiej strony, obowiązek ten wchodzi w grę przy ponownej skardze kasacyjnej wniesionej w tej samej sprawie gdy okaże się, że wykładnia prawa UE ustalona we wcześniejszym orzeczeniu NSA, jest niezgodna z wyrokiem prejudycjalnym TSUE.
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