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1

Propositional logic extended with a pedagogically useful relevant implication

100%
Batens D.
Logic and Logical Philosophy
|
2014
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vol. 23
|
issue 3
245–276
EN
First and foremost, this paper concerns the combination of classical propositional logic with a relevant implication. The proposed combination is simple and transparent from a proof theoretic point of view and at the same time extremely useful for relating formal logic to natural language sentences. A specific system will be presented and studied, also from a semantic point of view. The last sections of the paper contain more general considerations on combining classical propositional logic with a relevant logic that has all classical theorems as theorems.
2

Introduction

80%
Weber E., Wouters D., Meheus J.
Logic and Logical Philosophy
|
2012
|
vol. 21
|
issue 4
319-322
EN
This introduction clarifies the ideas behind the Logic, Reasoning and Rationality congress from which the papers in this issue are selected. These ideas are situated in the history of 20th century philosophy (Vienna Circle, Kuhn, . . . ). We also give an overview of the papers in this issue.
3
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Kryteria „logiczności” logiki w ujęciu Susan Haack

70%
Czernecka-Rej B.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2012
|
issue 50
140-151
PL
In the philosophy of logic the following questions are discussed: What is logic? Which formal systems are systems of logic? What does make them systems of logic? The paper presents and analyses the answers to these questions given by Susan Haack. She adopted the strategy, called the “hospitable policy”, giving the criterion in which formalism is a logical one. In the article I discuss whether the validity of her solutions is correct.
4
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Jak uniesprzecznić sprzeczność umysłu?

61%
Grygiel W.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
|
2010
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issue 47
70-88
PL
The common sense conviction that rationality is based on the classical logic requires major revision since the essential assumption of many standpoints in the cognitive science, concerning the non-contradictory character of mind, seems to be no longer tenable. Firstly, the non-algorithmic models of mind proposed by John Lucas and Roger Penrose are presented. In the context of these models, the importance of the Gödel incompleteness theorems for the philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence is debated. Secondly, several specific difficulties in applying the ‘Gödelian arguments’ in the modeling of mind are pointed out. As the main thesis of the article, it is stipulated that mind operates according to a wrong algorithm that is functionally equivalent to a contradictory formal system. The examples of the contradictory contents of mental states, evidenced in the phenomenon of self-deception and the mediaeval double truth theory in science, are discussed. Some consequences of the model of an inconsistent mind, based on the revision of the classical logic, are surveyed.
5
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Logika kondicionálov

61%
Gahér F.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2022
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vol. 70
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issue 2
381-401
EN
In his monograph The Paradoxes of Classical Logic (Paradoxy klasickéj logiky. Filosofie a logika hypotetických vět), Vít Punčochář, in addition to an overview of classical logic, presents the paradoxes of material implication and an explanation of the primary alternative ways to solve them, especially in the form of an exposition of his own version of the theory of strict assertibility. The theory is presented in a sufficiently comprehensive form on a base of detailed argumentation. In the critical part of this article, the author lays out the ideas that form the basis of his own solution to the main paradoxes of material implication, which is still based on the concept of truth. At the same time, it uses the distinction between the actual and the potentially unreal, or if you like the absolutely unrealistic conditions of implicit sentences and the corresponding classification of conditional sentences into factuals, agnostic conditionals and counterfactuals. The author additionally suggests differentiating between situations in which the analysis of conditional sentences as material implications has precedence over those in which it is an expression of inference. In the latter case, it is an expression of the abbreviations of judgments, where tacit assumptions and the principle of ceteris paribus can come into play.
6

A Fregean conception of singular existence

51%
Sayward C.
Logic and Logical Philosophy
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2015
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vol. 24
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issue 1
3–18
EN
A perplexity about singular existence statements (for example, ‘Socrates exists’) is that for their negations to be true their subject terms do not name anything. For example, in ‘Pegasus does not exist’ ‘does not exist’ is not said in respect to the referent of ‘Pegasus’ since there is none. But, then, in respect to what is that said? The paper answers the question by proposing a metalinguistic interpretation of singular existence statements, according to which singular existence statements are about names. It is argued that this interpretation fits in well with Frege’s views on existence, presupposition, and his idea that names have senses.
7
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Postprawda w dyskursie publicznym w kontekście logiki klasycznej i logiki rozmytej

51%
Lakomy M.
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia de Cultura
|
2019
|
issue 11(1) "Postprawda. Nowe narracje i praktyki społeczne w epoce sfingowanych informacji i gatunków hybrydycznych"
5-14
PL
W pracy zaprezentowano dwa nurty dyskusji na temat postprawdy. Pierwszy konserwatywno-krytyczny, zasadzający się na konieczności odrzucenia tego pojęcia jako nienaukowego i szkodliwego. W tym kontekście uznano bowiem, iż termin ten jest sprzeczny z dorobkiem filozofii, logiki klasycznej i nauki społecznej Kościoła katolickiego. Drugi z kolei nurt–liberalno-kontraktualistyczny – poszukuje uzasadnienia dla zjawiska postprawdy w logice nieklasycznej, trójwartościowej i rozmytej.
EN
The work presents two trends of discussion on post-truth. The first is conservatively critical, based on the necessity of rejecting this concept as unscientific and harmful. In this context, it was recognized that this term contradicts the achievements of philosophy, classical logic and the social teaching of the Catholic Church. The second in the current – liberal – countercurrent – seeks to justify the phenomenon of post-truth in non-classical, trivalent and fuzzy logic.
8
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CZYM JEST PLURALIZM LOGICZNY? (STANOWISKO J.C. BEALLA I GREGA RESTALLA)

41%
Czernecka-Rej B.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
|
2013
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vol. 61
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issue 1
5-22
EN
C. Beall and Greg Restall are advocates of a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism (LP). According to LP, there is not one correct logic, but many equally acceptable logical systems. The authors share Tarski’s conviction and follow the mainstream in thinking about logic as the discipline that investigates the notion of logical consequence. LP is the pluralism about logical consequence – a pluralist maintains that there is more than one relation of logical consequence. According to LP, classical, intuitionistic and relevant logics are not rivals, but they all are equally correct, they all count as genuine logics. The purpose of this paper is to present some remarks concerning J.C. Beall’s and Greg Restall’s exposition of LP. At the beginning, the definition of the relation of logical consequence, which is central to their proposal, is shown. According to Beall and Restall, argument is valid if, and only if, in every case when the premisses are true, then the conclusion is, too. They argue that by considering different types of cases the logical pluralist obtains different logics. The paper — apart from presenting LP — also gives a critical discussion of this approach. It seems, that the thesis of LP is far from being clear. It is even unclear what exactly LP is and where is stops. It is unclear what “equally good”, “equally correct”, “equally true” mean. It is not clear, how to explain, in scope of logic, that the system of logic, is a model of real logical connections.
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