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EN
The Author of the article analyses the judgment of the Court of Justice in case Astra Zeneca versus Commission from 2010. It is the first judgment of the Court dealing with abuse of dominant position in pharmaceutical industry, and the first where both competition and intellectual property law have been interpreted. The reasoning of the Court is analysed from the perspective of competition law, particularly Art. 102 TFUE.
Prawo
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2015
|
issue 317
69 - 87
EN
It stands to reason that air transport brings positive catalytic impact for the whole economy. It helps to attract inward investment, allows location-specific resources to reach other parts of the country and fosters social cohesion. It is especially relevant in case of remote, secluded locations where travel by air may be the only viable transport option. At the same time these relatively small communities could hardly generate enough demand to justify air operations economically. Public Service Obligation (PSO) is the regulatory tool provided in European law that allows sustaining air operations that are deemed to be vital for a society but that are not commercially viable. This article provides an overview of this legal regime. The analysis hovers around the following issue: The extent of discretionary powers that the State retains in regard to the shape of network that could be supported from the public purse. This immediately brings up another issue, whether State’s involvement in sustaining air operations should be limited to clear market failures or could go beyond that and provide transport of convenience. These policy issues are analyzed from the standpoint of division of powers between the State and the UE.
The Lawyer Quarterly
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2016
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vol. 6
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issue 1
18-27
EN
Since 1990s when liberalization and deregulation processes first opened the social security field to market forces, the EU competition law has had to cope with the situations of clash between values of social welfare and free competition. In the post-crisis period the European Union wants and needs to be more socially responsive, as the strengthening of social justice and social rights, the fight against poverty and social exclusion has become the key to political legitimacy of the European integration as well as of its Member States. A question hence arises how the call for a more social EU would cohabit with the free and undistorted competition. The paper tries to remedy on the fact that the EU so far has no accepted methodology of how to integrate public policy considerations in competition decisions. After sketching out such a methodology based on the CJEU’s pre-Lisbon case law, the present analysis deals with the post-Lisbon developments inquiring whether the CJEU is paying now more consideration to social security measures.
FR
L’Autorité de la concurrence serbe a été particulièrement dynamique durant ces trois dernières années. Le Conseil et le président nouvellement élus de la Commission pour la protection de la concurrence (ANC serbe) ont apporté un changement indispensable à l’application du droit de la concurrence en Serbie en mettant l’accent non plus sur les seuls cas individuels mais sur une vision plus globale et en promouvant le respect du droit de la concurrence en tant que modèle d’entreprise à privilégier. Au cours de cette période, l’autorité nationale de concurrence serbe a publié plusieurs instruments juridiques non contraignants, notamment ses premières lignes directrices pour l’élaboration de programmes de conformité, accompagnées d’un modèle de programme de conformité et de deux listes de contrôle de la conformité, visant à identifier les risques liés au droit de la concurrence. Ces activités, destinées à sensibiliser au droit de la concurrence, ont été accompagnées de plaidoyers vigoureux promouvant son respect. L’objectif global était de favoriser le respect volontaire du droit de la concurrence, de promouvoir la concurrence en tant que valeur positive dans la conduite des affaires et d’assurer le respect ascendant (bottom-up) du droit de la concurrence.
EN
The last three years have been very dynamic for the competition authority in Serbia. The newly elected Council and President of the Commission for Protection of Competition (Serbian NCA) have brought a much-needed change to competition enforcement in Serbia, shifting the focus of enforcement from solely individual cases, to looking at the bigger picture and promoting competition law compliance as the preferred business model. During this period, the Serbian NCA has published several soft-law instruments, issuing its first Guidelines for Drafting compliance programmes, accompanied by a Template compliance programme and two compliance Checklists, aimed at identifying competition law related risks. These materials, meant to raise competition law awareness, were accompanied by vigorous advocacy activities in promoting competition law compliance. The overall aim was to foster voluntary compliance with competition law, promoting competition as a positive value in doing business, and ensuring compliance from the bottom up.
FR
Les services postaux de l’Union européenne ont été libéralisés par trois directives postales, notamment les directives 97/67/CE, 2002/39/CE et 2008/6/CE, conformément au Livre vert, qui souligne la nécessité de la libéralisation des services postaux pour le développement du marché unique et la promotion du développement socio-économique. Toutefois, la réalisation de cette transition est incertaine. Bien que ces directives, visant à supprimer toutes les barrières pour les nouveaux entrants, aient établi le cadre juridique nécessaire, les opérateurs postaux nationaux anciennement monopolisés ont conservé dans une large mesure leur position dominante et ont tenté d’en abuser. Par conséquent, la mise en oeuvre des dispositions du droit de la concurrence joue un rôle important dans le processus de libéralisation. Cet article vise à examiner dans quelle mesure les services postaux ont progressé en termes de libéralisation dans le cadre des récents jugements en matière de droit de la concurrence rendus à l’encontre d’opérateurs postaux nationaux tels que La Poste et Deutsche Post, en examinant les rapports de développement postal de l’Union postale universelle ainsi qu’en argumentant le contre-exemple de la position américaine.
EN
Postal services in the European Union have been liberalized through three postal directives, namely, 97/67/EC, 2002/39/EC and 2008/6/EC as per the Green paper, which emphasises the necessity of the liberalization of postal services for the development of the single market and the promotion of socio-economic development. Nevertheless, the realisation of this transition is questionable. Although these directives, to remove all barriers for new entrants, have established the necessary legal framework, formerly monopolised national postal operators have retained their dominant positions to a large extent and attempted to abuse it. Therefore, the implementation of competition law provisions plays an important role in the liberalization process. This article seeks to discuss how far postal services have advanced in terms of their liberalization under recent competition law judgments issued against national postal operators such as La Poste and Deutsche Post, by considering the Universal Postal Union (UPU)’s postal development reports as well as arguing the counter example of the US position.
EN
This paper provides a study of the impact of EU competition rules on Lithuanian legislation and legal practice. It was found therein that the Lithuanian law on competition, its competition authority and courts do not adhere to all objectives of EU competition law consistently. In Lithuania, the most followed objectives of EU competition law are primarily that of the internal market and consumer welfare. The European Commission looks at both: competition and the creation and preservation of the internal market, as promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of resources; it proclaims that the role of competition law is to prevent harm to consumers. The Lithuanian law on competition fully corresponds to the provisions of the Treaty. Full compliance is endorsed by the National Competition Authority while Lithuanian courts strive to maintain such policy by referring to the internal market and consumer welfare standards. Both the Lithuanian competition authority and its courts defend consumer welfare from higher prices, reduced output, less choice or lower quality of goods or services, or diminished innovation. Existing legislation and other procedural rules entitle the competition authority and courts of Lithuania to enforce competition law without significant obstacles. Applicable procedures ensure transparent, independent, and professional decision-making by the competition authority, confidentiality, as well as an effective process of investigation and information collection. The Commission's move towards the realignment of competition law with modern economic thinking on efficiency and welfare has begun. It entails not just the adoption of the consumer welfare standard, but also the application of the 'effects' approach. However, EU Courts have not been unambiguously following the consumer welfare standard, as endorsed by the Commission. They protect competitors themselves, rather than competition, ruling in favour of small or medium-sized firms in order to keep markets open and achieve fairness. They tend to protect the structure of the market from indirect possible long-term effects on consumers, rather than just from immediate direct effect on them. Some evidence was found of a 'more economic' approach being applied over the last decade as it started to find its way into the enforcement of Lithuanian competition law. Although this trend is likely to increase in the future, it is, nevertheless, still not the prevailing approach in Lithuania. At the same time, the national competition authority and courts strictly follow the guidelines and communications of the Commission on this issue.
FR
Dans cet article, les auteurs présentent une étude de l'impact des règles de concurrence de l'UE sur la loi et la pratique juridique lituaniennes. Les auteurs ont constaté que le droit de la concurrence, l'autorité administrative et les tribunaux de la Lituanie ne respectent pas tous les objectifs du droit communautaire de la concurrence d’une manière uniforme. En Lituanie, les objectifs les plus suivis du droit de la concurrence de l'UE sont principalement ceux du marché unique et du bien-être des consommateurs. La Commission européenne examine à la fois la concurrence, la création et la préservation du marché unique autant que la promotion du bien-être des consommateurs et une allocation efficace des ressources. Elle proclame le rôle du droit de la concurrence dans la prévention des dommages faites aux consommateurs. En Lituanie, la loi sur la concurrence correspond pleinement aux traités de l'UE. Cette conformité est approuvée par l'autorité administrative. Les tribunaux de la Lituanie s'efforcent de maintenir cette politique en faisant appel aux normes du marché et de la protection des consommateurs individuels. En Lituanie, l'autorité administrative et les tribunaux défendent le bien-être des consommateurs contre la hausse des prix, la baisse de la production, la limitation du choix ou la détérioration de la qualité des biens ou des services, ou la diminution de l'innovation. Tous les actes juridiques et autres règles de procédure permettent à l'autorité administrative et aux tribunaux de la Lituanie d’appliquer l'appareil de droit de la concurrence sans obstacles importants. Les procédures prévues assurent que les décisions sont prises d’une façon transparente, indépendante et professionnelle par l'autorité administrative, autant que la confidentialité et l’efficacité du processus d’enquête et de collecte de l'information requise sont maintenues. La démarche de la Commission vers la réorganisation du droit de la concurrence en conformité avec la pensée économique moderne sur l'efficacité et le bien-être a commencé. Elle implique non seulement l'adoption de la norme de protection des consommateurs, mais aussi l'approche «effets» à l'application de celle-ci. Toutefois, les juridictions de l'UE n'ont pas été sans ambiguïté en suivant le concept de la norme de protection des consommateurs adopté par la Commission; ils protègent les concurrents eux-mêmes plutôt que la concurrence, en faveur des petites et moyennes entreprises, afin de maintenir l'ouverture des marchés et d’atteindre l'équité; ils ont tendance à protéger la structure du marché avec des effets sur les consommateurs qui serions indirects et possibles à long terme, et pas seulement à l'effet direct et immédiat. Les auteurs ont trouvé des preuves de l'approche «plus économique» au cours de la dernière décennie. Il a commencé à trouver sa place dans l'application du droit de la concurrence de la Lituanie. Cette tendance semble à augmenter. Cependant, il ne reste encore pas en vigueur dans l'approche de l'autorité administrative et les tribunaux. En Lituanie, l'autorité administrative et les tribunaux suivent les directives et les communiqués de la Commission sur cette question strictement.
EN
The Damages Directive has a rather limited scope, focusing only on damages claims stemming from anticompetitive agreements or abuse of a dominant position, provided such conduct was able to affect trade between EU Member States. However, Member States are not limited by this scope and so they may decide, when implementing the Directive, to enhance not only claims for damages, but the overall private enforcement of competition law. In this article, we shall explore the scope of the implementing legislation of selected Central and Eastern European Countries, namely in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
EN
The EU Antitrust Damages Actions Directive does not include provisions for collective redress. Each EU member state is free to provide national regulation on this matter. The Portuguese legal system provided regulation on actio popularis since 1995. The ‘rational apathy’ of individual consumers may lead to non-reparation of damage and be of significant benefit for the company that is in breach of the law. The opt-out models solve the crucial economic problem caused by a large number of consumers or clients who have suffered a small loss because of competition law infringements. Under those circumstances, it is rational to be apathetic, because it can be foreseen that the cost of filing for compensatory damages will exceed the recovery obtained from the defendant. Such rational apathy of the parties injured by competition law infringements favours the wrongfully acting companies by not extracting their illegal gains from them. By not requiring the active consent of each of the claimants, the opt-out model is able to override rational apathy of consumers.
FR
La Directive 2014/104/UE du Parlement Européen et du Conseil du 26 Novembre 2014 relative à certaines règles régissant les actions en dommages et intérêts en droit national pour les infractions aux dispositions du droit de la concurrence des États membres et de l’Union européenne n’offre pas des normes sur l’action collective. Chaque État-membre est libre d’adopter ses normes sur ce sujet. L’ordre juridique portugais prévoit des normes sur l’actio popularis, depuis 1995. L’apathie rationnelle de chaque consommateur peut déclencher la non réparation des dommages causés par l’infraction des normes de concurrence. Cet effet signifie un bénéfice pour les entreprises qui violent le droit de la concurrence.Le system opt-out donne la solution pour le problème causé pour des nombreux consommateurs qui souffrent des modestes dommages causés par des violations du droit de la concurrence. En ces situations, il est rationnel ne pas réagir, parce que les couts sont supérieurs aux bénéfices. Cette apathie rationnelle favorise les entreprises qui violent le droit de la concurrence. Le system opt-out est capable de surmonter les effets de l’apathie rationnel .
EN
The Serbian Competition Act , which has been in force since November 2009, was amended in 2013 in order to improve the effective enforcement of competition rules by the Commission for Protection of Competition (hereinafter, the Commission or Competition Commission), and to further harmonise national regulations with the EU acquis in the area of protection of competition. The 2009 Competition Act (hereianfter, the Act), which introduced some modern competition protection concepts into the Serbian legal system, had certain deficiencies which hindered the practical application of the statute and, consequently, effective enforcement by the Commission. In addition to the existing provisions of the Act, the legislator introduced a novelty that will, beyond any doubt, produce considerable effects on the Commission's actions in deciding on competition infringement cases. The novelty concerns the introduction of the so-called commitment procedure, which allows the Commission to close a competition infringement case by accepting commitments offered by the undertakings concerned, without establishing whether there has been an infringement. The instrument has turned out to be exceptionally effective in closing proceedings before the competition authorities of the EU and the Member States.
10
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Putting Dawn Raids under Control

100%
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2020
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vol. 13
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issue 22
145-168
FR
« Dawn raids » sont devenus un moyen efficace de faire respecter le droit européen et national de la concurrence. Le contrôle judiciaire est un mécanisme essential de contrôle du pouvoir exécutif contre d’éventuels abus de ce pouvoir. Toutefois, ce contrôle judiciaire a montré ses limites ; il ne garantit pas toujours une reparation adéquate pour les parties concernées. Comment résoudre le problème du contrôle judiciaire limité pour assurer le contrôle des « dawn raids »? Cet article avance que les limites du contrôle juridictionnel pourraient être résolues en étendant les types de contrôle sur cette action, c’est-à-dire les orientations législatives ex ante et la responsabilité interne des administrateurs. Ainsi, la thèse plus conceptuelle de l’article est qu’il est essentiel de chercher des liens entre les différents concepts et types de contrôles pour garantir un système complet et efficace de contrôle des actions du pouvoir exécutif.
EN
Dawn raids have become an effective tool to enforce EU and national competition laws. Judicial review is an essential mechanism of control over the executive branch against possible misuse of this power. However, this judicial review has shown to have limits; it cannot always guarantee an adequate redress for the affected parties. How to address the limited judicial review to ensure control over dawn raids? This article argues that the limits of judicial review could be addressed by extending the types of controls over this action, i.e. ex ante legislative guidance and internal managerial accountability. The more conceptual argument that this paper puts forward is thus that it is essential to seek connections between different concepts and types of controls to ensure a comprehensive/water-tight system of controls over the actions of the executive branch.
|
2020
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vol. 13
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issue 21
99-128
FR
Cet article donne un aperçu historique de la jurisprudence et des méthodes appliquées par l’Autorité hongroise de la concurrence (HCA) dans les affaires d’abus de position dominante. Le document est co-rédigé par des praticiens des domaines complémentaires de l’antitrust, ce qui garantit que les aspects tant juridiques qu’économiques sont explorés. Le document identifie les caractéristiques uniques de la législation et de la jurisprudence hongroises et évalue de manière critique à la lumière des principes du droit de la concurrence et de l’économie de l’UE. Les auteurs analysent (i) les raisons du nombre élevé d’affaires d’exploitation avant 2010, (ii) les principes généraux appliqués par la HCA dans les affaires d’exclusion, (iii) les évaluations de la répartition des coûts dans les affaires de position dominante et (iv) la question du pouvoir de marché significatif des distributeurs. Le point de départ général est que l’application des règles antitrust par la HCA a été plus limitée ces dernières années, à en juger par le nombre d’enquêtes sur les positions dominantes. Toutefois, l’article conclut qu’une application réduite n’est pas synonyme d’une application plus faible. En fait, la qualité des affaires de position dominante, tant du point de vue juridique qu’économique, a augmenté au fil du temps. Cette tendance a également conduit à une plus grande clarté juridique en Hongrie, ce qui est bénéfique pour les acteurs du marché. L’article formule des critiques plus sévères à l’encontre du concept de pouvoir de marché significatif des distributeurs.
EN
This paper provides a historical overview of the case-law and practices applied by the Hungarian Competition Authority (HCA) in abuse of dominance cases. The paper is co-written by practitioners of complementing antitrust fields, which ensures that both legal and economic considerations are explored. The paper identifies the unique characteristics of Hungarian legislation and case-law and critically evaluates them in light of EU competition law and economics principles. We analyse (i) the reasons for the high number of exploitative cases before 2010, (ii) the general principles applied by the HCA in exclusionary cases, (iii) the cost allocation assessments in dominance cases, and (iv) the issue of significant market power of retailers. The general starting point is that, judging by the number of dominance investigations, there is less antitrust enforcement by the HCA in recent years. However, the article concludes that less enforcement does not mean weaker enforcement. In fact, the quality of dominance cases, considering both legal and economic aspects, has increased over time. This tendency has also led to higher legal certainty in Hungary, which is beneficial for market players. Stronger criticism is only formulated against the concept of significant market power of retailers.
FR
Cet article examine les lois sur la concurrence des États membres du Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG). Il examine leur contenu, les analyse d’un point de vue général depuis leur adoption jusqu’à aujourd’hui et, dans une certaine mesure, les compare aux autres juridictions (les plus développées notamment), telles que la législation européenne sur la concurrence et la législation antitrust américaine. L’article fait valoir l’importance du principe du plaidoyer dans la région, les initiatives que les organisations internationales (OI) ont prises jusqu’ici pour le développement du droit de la concurrence dans les pays du CCG, notamment le lien entre commerce et droit de la concurrence. Dans l’économie d’aujourd’hui – où les géants de l’Internet dominent et les comportements restrictifs entre entités commerciales indépendantes distinctes se multiplient et les fusions n’identifient pas les frontières officielles des États – la nécessité d’appliquer le droit mondial de la concurrence est indispensable. Par conséquent, une création du droit de la concurrence du CCG peut être considérée comme une solution progressive et avantageuse. L’article fait valoir les buts et les motivations pour lesquels une telle prise de conscience est souhaitable et fournit des recommandations législatives et normatives sur la manière dont cet effort doit être accompli.
EN
This article examines the Competition Laws of the Members States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It examines their content, puts all of them under general scrutiny from their enactment until today and compares their basic features to other (developed) competition law jurisdictions, such as EU Competition Law and US Antitrust Law. The article argues the importance of the Advocacy principle in the region and the incentives international organizations (IOs) have induced so far for the development of Competition Law in the GCC Countries, including the link between trade and Competition Law. In today’s economy where online giant companies dominate, where the restrictive conduct among separate independent commercial entities grows immensely, and where mergers do not identify formal state borders, the need for global Competition Law enforcement is indispensable. Therefore, in order to be part of the global competition world, a creation of GCC Competition Law may be considered progressive and advantageous. The article argues the purposes and motivations why such awareness is desirable and provides legislative and normative recommendations on how to accomplish this endeavor.
EN
This paper provides a study of the interaction between public and private enforcement of Lithuanian antitrust law. The study refers to the Damages Directive. It has been found that private enforcement depends greatly on public enforcement of competition law. Therefore, their compatibility and balance are of great importance to antitrust policy. The Lithuanian NCA prioritises cases where an economic effect on competition does not have to be proven. This creates uncertainty about the outcome of private enforcement cases. Private enforcement in Lithuania is also in need of detailed rules on the identification of harm and causality. The analysis reveals how challenging it can be to estimate and prove harm or a causal link in private enforcement cases. Support from the NCA is therefore exceedingly needed. Moreover, even though the use of the leniency programme helps, it remains insufficient to solve the problem of under-deterrence. However, measures introduced by the Damages Directive do not make the leniency programme safe.
PL
Artykuł jest opinią autora na temat proponowanych zmian w ustawie o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów oraz Kodeksie postępowania cywilnego, których wnioskodawcą jest Prezes UOKiK. Autor przedstawia założenia nowelizacji, jej ocenę, a także propozycje alternatywnych rozwiązań problemów zdefiniowanych przez wnioskodawcę nowelizacji.
EN
This article presents a subjective opinion of the author on some changes, currently championed by the Polish competition authority, to be introduced into Polish competition law as well as its civil procedure rules. Presented in the paper is the essence of these draft amendments, the views of the Author on this draft as well as shows alternative solutions to key problems defined by the NCA and addressed in the draft.
PL
Artykuł jest opinią autora na temat proponowanych zmian w ustawie o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów oraz Kodeksie postępowania cywilnego, których wnioskodawcą jest Prezes UOKiK. Autor przedstawia założenia nowelizacji, jej ocenę, a także propozycje alternatywnych rozwiązań problemów zdefiniowanych przez wnioskodawcę nowelizacji.
EN
This article presents a subjective opinion of the author on some changes, currently championed by the Polish competition authority, to be introduced into Polish competition law as well as its civil procedure rules. Presented in the paper is the essence of these draft amendments, the views of the Author on this draft as well as shows alternative solutions to key problems defined by the NCA and addressed in the draft.
EN
This paper provides a detailed review of evaluation standards for the legal assessment of tying. This practice, which constitutes an abuse of a dominant position, is a significant breach of competition law. The mechanism of this type of abuse is based on taking advantage of market power in the supply of one product to create packed offerings capable of precluding competition from superior rival solutions. Tying occurs when one product, the “tying product”, is sold only with another product, the “tied product”. In the prevailing number of cases, tying serves to consolidate the company’s dominant position on the tied product market, which usually aims to share the tying product’s large customer group with the less-desired product. However, tying is not illegal per se. In many cases, it does not lead to any anti-competitive concerns, and might be beneficial for consumers. This is why each assessment of this conduct must be carefully evaluated with special attention given to the effects, in accordance with the generally applied effect-based approach, and also potential efficiencies. An analysis of the case-law and literature reveals the basic mechanisms for conducting a legal assessment of tying. However, the use of these mechanisms will not be possible without their adaptation to the ongoing changes caused by technological development. Digital markets not only generate incremental revenues, but are also the sources of new or unusual legal arrangements. It will more frequently be the case that existing provisions will not be able to address every new practice accurately without new acts. The Digital Markets Act aims to adapt the existing legal framework to contemporary market realities and to become a modern tool for enforcing competition law rules on digital markets. The European Commission is seeking to broaden its powers to intervene at the earliest possible stage, before an undertaking affects the competition on a market.
EN
Providing incentives for technological innovation (spurring the generation and utilisation of productive information), entrepreneurship and co-operation, and deterring opportunism are of the utmost importance for economic growth and maximisation of social welfare. This paper offers a legal evaluation of the optimal entrepreneurial incentive mechanisms under current anti-competitive enforcement practices and provides a legal and economic analysis of its economic and business impacts.
EN
The article discusses the issue of soft law and its role in the functioning of supranational competition networks. It draws from the assumption that international cooperation is crucial for competition authorities around the world and that the most efficient and comprehensive form of such cooperation takes the form of supranational competition networks. For networks, establishing common standards in the form of soft law is essential for development of the network and the deepening of cooperation between network members. The article concludes that supranational soft law has its eminent advantages like informality, flexibility, and accessibility which allow it easily to respond to the changing needs of authorities and stakeholders, and to adapt to evolution of the economic and regulatory environment. However, the problems of legitimacy and transparency in the process of establishing soft law rules are yet to be resolved.
19
88%
EN
This paper deals with the newly adopted Digital Markets Act and its relationship and impact on competition law. The legal framework of competition law and standard instruments of competition law have so far served in several cases as a tool for punishing the practices of online platforms whose actions showed certain digital specifics in connection with their market power. As the subject of the regulation is to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by establishing harmonized rules that will ensure competitive and fair markets in the digital sector throughout the Union for all businesses, it is obvious that it will intersect with the issue of competition. The main goal of the paper is to examine and to approximate the fundamental features of relationship between the Act on Digital Markets and competition law regulation and clarify the impact on the pillars of competition law.
EN
Directive 2014/104/EU on private antitrust enforcement opted for the exclusion of punitive damages from the category of recoverable damages following a violation of antitrust law. This article will outline the concept of punitive damages and analyse the relevant case-law of the courts of the Member States, of the ECtHR and of the ECJ. Then, it will examine the regime laid down in the Directive and consider the possible reasons why the European legislator opted for this exclusion. Thus, the opportunity to introduce such a provision into the European legal system will be evaluated, taking into consideration the problem of overdeterrence, the problem of the division of functions between public and private enforcement, and making a comparison with the relevant provisions of Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Finally, a possible modification of Article 3(3) of the Directive will be suggested, in the framework of the review that the Commission is required to undertake by December 27, 2020
FR
La Directive 2014/104/UE sur l’application privée du droit de la concurrence a opté pour l’exclusion des dommages-intérêts punitifs de la catégorie des dommages recouvrables suite à la violation du droit de la concurrence. Cet article décrira la notion de dommages-intérêts punitifs et analysera la jurisprudence pertinente des tribunaux des États membres, de la CEDH et de la CJUE. Ensuite, il examinera le régime prévu par la Directive et examinera les raisons possibles pour lesquelles le législateur européen a opté pour cette exclusion. Donc, l’opportunité d’introduire une telle disposition dans le système juridique européen sera d’évaluée en prenant en considération le problème de la dissuasion excessive, celui de la répartition des fonctions entre l’application publique et privée du droit de la concurrence et en faisant une comparaison avec les dispositions pertinentes de la Directive 2004/48/ EC relative au respect des droits de propriété intellectuelle. Enfin, une éventuelle modification de l’article 3, paragraphe 3, de la Directive sera d’envisagée, dans le cadre d’une révision de la Directive que la Commission doit faire au plus tard le 27 décembre 2020
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