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1

Większościowy system wyborczy do Senatu RP – postulat i analiza konsekwencji wprowadzenia wymogu większości bezwzględnej

100%

STOŚ K.

Zeszyt Prawniczy UAM

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2022

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issue Nr 12

175-194

EN

The Polish Senate’s electoral system is based on the majority formula for 33 years. The Electoral Code introduced a new element – single-member constituencies, which, in combination with the relative majority, imply the danger of omitting significant part of votes and the threat of winning by candidates with no majority support. The postulate of an absolute majority with the possibility of a second round of voting seems to be a solution supporting chamber’s representativeness and accepted in doctrine. The author also examines the last three elections in terms of the influence of the required majority on their results. The conclusions confirm the legitimacy of the formulated postulate and indicate the need of comprehensive reform of the Senate’s electoral system.

2

Anti-liberal, anti-establishment or constituency-driven? Spatial econometric analysis of polish parliamentary election results in 2015

100%

Lasoń A., Torój A.

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2019

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vol. 26

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issue 2

199-236

EN

We investigated the spatial variation patterns of voting results in Polish parliamentary election in 2015 across 380 regions. That election was a milestone event in Polish politics that substantially affected Poland’s internal and foreign policy directions and promoted two emerging political parties as runners-up against the well-established ones. While socio-economic, cultural and geographical factors such as economic activity, historical legacies (post-Russian East vs post-German West) and economic dichotomies (cities vs the countryside) explain most variations for most parties, they do not appeared to fit as determinants of the new parties’ support, especially of right-wing populists. Demographic target groups of individual parties appear to be relatively unresponsive to their pre-election offerings. The spatial specification of econometric models considerably improves their statistical properties. We also examined mixed-W models to account for the unobservable spatial effects stemming from the construction of constituencies. Their distinctive sets of candidates added significantly to the explanation of the spatial variation in voting.

3

Kto traci a kto zyskuje na systemie podziału mandatów pomiędzy okręgi w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego w Polsce

86%

Michalak B.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2015

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issue 1(126)

27-44

EN

In Poland, the system of election to the European Parliament is based on a multistage procedure for the division of seats, which has departed from Polish traditional and well-established model of territorial representation. As a result, seats are not permanently assigned to constituencies and are allocated “dynamically” depending on the distribution of the votes among the constituency list of candidates. Before the election, nobody knows how many seats will be finally obtained by the region. As a consequence of this system the distribution of seats is unjust and incompatible with the principle of substantive equality and which, at the starting point, discriminates against constituencies with less than 2.2 million voters. It does not provide for the proper performance of the function of territorial representation, nor does it reward (in a consistent manner) those constituencies in which the turnout is higher than the national one, instead leading to paradoxical divisions. This system, inconsistently and without reliance on any reasonable criteria, favours or discriminate against constituencies with of the same number or percentage of those taking part in voting. There is, no rational and justified reasons to keep it.

4

Okręgi wyborcze w wyborach do rad miast na prawach powiatu

72%

Rakowski M.

Studia Wyborcze

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2013

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vol. XV

7-48

PL

W Polsce jest 65 miast na prawach powiatu, to jest gmin, w których rada miejska wybierana jest w wyborach proporcjonalnych. Zgodnie z ustawą kodeks wyborczy z 5 stycznia 2011 r. gminy te podzielone są na okręgi wyborcze, w których wybieranych jest od 5 do 10 radnych. Ostatnie wybory samorządowe zostały przeprowadzone jeszcze na podstawie ordynacji wyborczej z 1998 r. W gminach tworzono wówczas okręgi wyborcze, w których obsadzano od 5 do 8 mandatów. Podział na okręgi dokonywany był przez radę gminy, przy czym ustawodawca sformułował zasadę stałości okręgów wyborczych. Autor artykułu przedstawia praktyczne aspekty podziału gmin będących miastami na prawach powiatu w wyborach samorządowych z 2010 r. Najmniejsze (pięciomandatowe) okręgi były wówczas zdecydowanie najpopularniejsze (161 na łączną liczbę 298 okręgów), zaś największych (ośmiomandatowych) było zaledwie 14 w całej Polsce. W gminach, w których utworzono najmniejsze okręgi wyborcze, zdarzało się, że 8% – a nawet 10% – głosów uzyskanych przez listę nie przekładało się na mandaty w radzie. Wykazano również, że im mniejsze były okręgi wyborcze, tym silniejsza była nadreprezentacja ugrupowania zwycięskiego. Związane z tym silne deformacje wyniku wyborczego występowały m. in. w Bytomiu, Szczecinie, Gdańsku, Łodzi i Chorzowie. Autor wyraził pogląd, że zdecydowanie bardziej sprawiedliwy byłby rozdział mandatów dokonywany w okręgu ogólnomiejskim, czyli bez podziału miasta na okręgi (przykładowa symulacja rozdziału mandatów w takich wyborach została przedstawiona w pracy).

EN

In Poland there are 65 cities which are communities with county rights, in which the city council is elected in the proportional elections. In accordance with the electoral code of 5th January 2011 in these cities the electoral districts elect from 5 to 10 members of the city council. The last local elections were conducted in accordance with the electoral law of 1998 and the communities were divided into districts electing from 5 to 8 councilors each. The division into electoral districts is done by the city council, and the principle of immutability of districts is declared by law. The author of the article presents the practical aspects of the division into electoral districts done in the cities with county rights – for the elections of 2010. The smallest districts were the most common (161 for the total number of 298), and the biggest ones – of 8 seats – the most rare (only 14 in all Poland). Where the elections were held in the small districts, 8% of votes for the list (and somewhere even 10%) wasn’t enough to get the representation in the council. It was also proved, that the smaller districts were in the community, the stronger was the overrepresentation of the winning party. The strong deformations of the results could be observed in cities like Bytom, Szczecin, Gdańsk, Łódź, Chorzów. The author presents the opinion, that much better and just would be the elections without dividing the town into electoral districts, so with one district for the whole city (the simulation of the results of the elections without districts was also presented in the text).

5

Równość materialna w wyborach do Senatu

72%

Składowski K.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego

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2023

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issue 5(75)

13-29

PL

Artykuł podejmuje analizę problematyki równości materialnej w wyborach do Senatu. System wyborczy w wyborach do izby wyższej parlamentu w Polsce w sposób radyklany narusza zasadę równości materialnej wyborów. Charakteryzuje się on dużą dysproporcją wielkości okręgów wyborczych z punktu widzenia liczby mieszkańców przypadających na poszczególne okręgi wyborcze. Obowiązujący podział na okręgi wyborcze, wynikający z załącznika do Kodeksu wyborczego narusza jego przepisy. Jest także kontrowersyjny z innych punktów widzenia. Rodzi również pytanie o jego zgodność z zasadą demokratycznego państwa prawnego.

EN

The article analyzes the issue of material equality in elections to the Senate. The electoral system in elections to the upper house of parliament in Poland radically violates the principle of material equality of elections. It is characterized by a large disproportion in the size of electoral districts in terms of the number of inhabitants in individual electoral districts. The current division into electoral districts, resulting from the annex to the Electoral Code, violates its provisions. It is also controversial from other points of view. It also raises the question of its compliance with the principle of a democratic state of law.

6

Przestrzenne zróżnicowanie wyników wyborów do Sejmu z 1957 roku

72%

Kowalski M., Instytut Geografii i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania PAN W.

Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Geographica Socio-Oeconomica

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2015

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issue 21

PL

Z wyborów organizowanych w czasach PRL na uwagę zasługują przede wszystkim te z 1957 roku. Przeprowadzono je w okresie popaździernikowej odwilży, a władze nie miały specjalnych powodów, by je fałszować. Liberalna atmosfera sprzyjała wyborczej konkurencji, a oficjalne wyniki wyborów uwidoczniły znaczące zróżnicowanie polskiego społeczeństwa w ujęciu przestrzennym.

EN

When comparing the spatial differentiation of results of elections from the inter-war period (1918–1939) and the post-communist period (1989–2015), one sees a very clear similarity between the two (Kowalski, 2014). In the north-western part of the country the electoral preferences are with the left or the liberals, while in the south-eastern part – with the right. Given the persistence of this spatial setting, a supposition arises that the spatial differentiation of the political attitudes existed also during the times of the socialist People’s Poland. Lack of political freedom and electoral falsifications, performed by the communists, make the verification of this proposition quite difficult. Of the elections, organised in the socialist period, it is the ones, carried out in 1957, that deserve consideration, first of all. These elections were carried out in the short period of liberalisation after 1956, in conditions of an enthusiastic support for the new governing administration. The organisers of the elections could be fairly certain as to the outcome. That is why, side by side with the candidates, who were closely connected with the ruling establishment, also more independent persons, frequently enjoying high popularity in the society, were allowed to stand as candidates in these elections. In order to guarantee the victorious outcome, the authorities allowed for the formation of just a single list of candidates. The authorities lanced the appeal to vote for the candidates from the first places on the list, since it was on these places that the persons most convenient from the point of view of the establishment were listed. The few independent candidates were located at far-off positions. There was also an appeal for the possibly highest turnout at the elections, since this would constitute a signal of support for the new administration. These appeals were also shared by the Catholic Church in Poland. Despite the limitations and constraints mentioned, the relatively liberal atmosphere was conducive to the electoral competition within the framework of the candidate lists approved. This was yet enhanced by the fact that candidates represented, formally at least, various political organisms (communists, peasant activists, democratic party, non-aligned candidates) and communities, and, as indicated, the lists also included, even though on far-off places, persons of independent orientations. In addition, the liberal atmosphere and the conviction of the ruling group that they must win, limited, it appears, the electoral falsifications to the minimum. Owing to the advantageous social atmosphere and the appropriate construction of the lists of candidates, the communists could not lose these elections. Yet, in spite of this, the official results of the elections made visible the significant differentiation of the Polish society, both in global terms, and in space. The latter aspect represented a clear similarity to the spatial differentiation of the results of elections, taking place in other time periods, both the earlier ones (the interwar period) and those carried out later (after 1989).

7

Konstytucyjna zasada proporcjonalności wyborów a wielkość okręgu i metoda podziału mandatów. Symulacja zmiany parametrów na przykładzie wyników głosowania w wyborach do Sejmu RP

58%

Peszyński W., Tomczak Ł.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego

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2022

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issue 2 (66)

163-176

PL

Celem artykułu jest, na podstawie analizy przypadku polskich wyborów do Sejmu, udzielenie odpowiedzi na pytanie, który z czynników bardziej wpływa na wzrost proporcjonalności systemu wyborczego - zmniejszenie liczby okręgów czy zmiana metody podziału mandatów? Aby odpowiedzieć na to pytanie Autorzy ustalili wyniki wyborów do Sejmu z lat 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019 oraz wartości indeksu proporcjonalności w dwóch wersjach symulacji. Wyniki symulacji porównywano również do rzeczywistych wyników wyborów. W pierwszym wariancie, zmniejszono liczbę okręgów wyborczych z 41 na 16. W drugim, zmieniono metodę ustalania wyników wyborów z d’Hondta na zmodyfikowaną Sainte Lague (1.4). Wyniki przeprowadzonego badania okazały się dość zaskakujące.

EN

The aim of this article is to, on the basis of the case study of Polish elections to the Sejm, answer the question of which factor has a greater impact on the increase in the proportionality of the electoral system - the minimization of the number of constituencies or the change in the method. In order to do it, the Authors specified the results of six elections to the Sejm in the years 2005-2019 and the value of the proportionality index in two simulation versions. In the first one, the number of constituencies was limited from 41 to 16. In the second, the method of determining the result was changed from D’Hondt into modified Sainte Lague. The results were relatively surprising.

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2 Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego

1 Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Geographica Socio-Oeconomica

1 European Spatial Research and Policy

1 Przegląd Sejmowy

1 Studia Wyborcze

1 Zeszyt Prawniczy UAM

1 2023

2 2022

1 2019

2 2015

1 2013

1 Instytut Geografii i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania PAN W.

1 Kowalski M.

1 Lasoń A.

1 Michalak B.

1 Peszyński W.

1 Rakowski M.

1 STOŚ K.

1 Składowski K.

1 Tomczak Ł.