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Odmowa mianowania sędziów konstytucyjnych (casus Słowacji)

100%
Chmielarz-Grochal A., Sułkowski J.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2016
|
issue 2(133)
29-46
EN
The procedure for appointing judges of the Constitutional Court in Slovakia does not differ significantly from the solutions adopted in other European countries. The Slovak model has similarities with the solutions adopted in 1991 in relation to the judges of the Constitutional Court of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. The procedure for appointing constitutional judges included — at the initial stage — the entities involved in legal practice and study of law, whereas the creative power was de lege ferenda based on the cooperation between the National Council and the President of the Slovak Republic. Despite the involvement of various stakeholders, the appointment is de facto a political process, since the fi nal decisions are taken by political authorities. An important issue, which concerns the nomination of judges, is the scope of discretionary powers of the head of state in the assessment of candidates for appointment to judicial office. Given that the President appoints judges from among candidates nominated at the request of the National Council, the we cannot accept the approach limiting the role of the President of the Republic to that of the notary public devoid of the possibility of effecting membership of the constitutional court. Disputable is also the view expressed in the judgment of 17 March 2015 imposing on the President an absolute obligation to appoint a judge from among of the two candidates. The appointment of judges is the responsibility of President of the Republic and is associated with its obligation to ensure continuous work of the constitutional court. Continuity may be threatened not only if the President refuses to appoint in an arbitrary manner, but also when he appoints to the membership of the court persons whose activities may interfere with its proper functioning. It is also hard to accept the idea that the head of state would have the full impact on the process of nominating judges. The President cannot freely decide who will be the judge, nor can he/she spontaneously assess whether the candidate meets the requirement of having appropriate work experience. Possessing a knowledge of law should be the subject of public debate, a kind of competition between the candidates, and not a tool by which the President may reject the candidates nominated to him.
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Výběr soudců Ústavního soudu ČR

72%
Ondřejková J.
Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)
|
2016
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vol. 155
|
issue 11
945-958
EN
The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic has been in existence for 22 years. During that time, the three Presidents of the Czech Republic have nominated 61 candidates for the position of Judge of the Constitutional Court. However, ensuing debates and arguments held during different terms of the Senate (during 1993 and 1994 of the Chamber of Deputies), only 41 of those 61 went on to be appointed to the post of Judge of the Constitutional Court. The aim of this article is to summarise the reasons that turned out to be decisive for the approval of the individual candidates. This enables us to test the extent to which the result of the appointment process of the constitutional judges reflects the vector sum of the political forces influencing the approval of candidates, as well as the emphasis put on the expertise and professional demeanour of the prospective constitutional judge.
CS
Za dvacet dva let existence Ústavního soudu ČR zastávalo funkci ústavního soudce 41 osob, které uspěly z celkem 61 nominací pocházejících od tří prezidentů a projednávaných v různých funkčních obdobích Senátu (v letech 1993 a 1994 Poslanecké sněmovny). Cílem tohoto článku je shrnout důvody, které se ukázaly být rozhodujícími při udělování souhlasu s jednotlivými kandidáty, a ověřit, nakolik výsledek nominačního procesu soudců Ústavního soudu ČR odráží jak vektorový součet politických sil působících při schvalování kandidátů, tak důraz, který v něm byl kladen na odbornost a profesionalitu budoucího ústavního soudce.
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