Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  constitutionalisation
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

Konstytucjonalizacja prywatnych praw podmiotowych jako przejaw dekodyfikacji. „Prawo dziedziczenia” w Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku

100%
Nocuń M. J.
Studia Iuridica
|
2016
|
vol. 61
251-282
EN
A civil code and a written national constitution are the myths of the Age of Enlightenment and the legal positivism in legislation. Paradoxically, they were set against each other by the constitutionalisation of the subjective rights relating the area of private law, like ownership or the right of succession. The constitutionalisation of this type of subjective rights is an example of decodification. In the clear way, it symbolically diminishes the role of the civil code as a highest source of private law. Moreover, the basic aim of the codification – exclusion of uncertainty and arbitrariness in the application of law – was destroyed by allowing constitutional judges to creatively interpret the general terms and therefore, decide about the shape of valid law. „Right of succession” declared three times in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997 is an expression which can be understood in various, even quite conflicting ways. It introduces the uncertainty about the durability of some norms enclosed in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal clearly shows that the articles 21 and 64 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland are a central regulation of the Polish law of succession which (except Book IV of the Civil Code) also contains separate regulations of numerous special laws. Although sentences of the Constitutional Tribunal often lead to the agreement between these laws and the “spirit of the Code”, this happens only additionally when the Civil Code’s regulations are consistent with the received interpretation of the constitutional terms. It shows that in Polish private law the code’s centralism was replaced by the centralism of the constitutional guarantees for subjective rights. A constitutional regulation of the fundamental rights cannot include the whole of the private law with numerous and detailed regulations. However, the Constitutional Tribunal deduced the variety of fundamental (for present Polish law and European legal tradition) principles from the general guarantees of the right of succession. The examples include: the priority of the succession based on the will of a testator, the existence of the subsidiary order of succession based on family ties, the generality of the capacity to succeed and that the freedom of testation can be limited due to the family solidarity. By formulating these theses – which are not proclaimed in the Constitution, but are present in the European legal tradition – Polish constitutional judges have proven “thinking in the categories of the tradition”. It seems that the Polish legal system managed the problem of depreciation of the civil code’s position due to the existence of constitutions interfering with their fields. Because of this interference, some contradictions between the code and the constitution might have been present. The problem has been solved by filling the Constitution with “the spirit of tradition” from which also the code derives. This way, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal introduced general guidelines (created by the evolutionary development of the European tradition of the law of succession) to the legal system through the guarantee of subjective rights and granted them a higher rank than the code itself. Although the constitutionalisation of the private subjective rights is one of the elements breaking the clarity of the legal system, it probably gives a chance to overcome the crisis of the legal system by creating a new model – ridiculous from the Enlightenment’s dogmas of the age of codification point of view – in which a code is one of the special laws and is dependent directly on the general constitution regulation and indirectly, on the legal tradition which shows how constitution terms should be interpreted.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Konstytucjonalizacja prawa do ochrony danych osobowych w Polsce

100%
Sakowska-Baryła M.
Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego
|
2016
|
issue 4 (32)
125-144
PL
Celem publikacji jest zaprezentowanie genezy prawa do ochrony danych osobowych w Polsce oraz analiza jego istoty. W tekście zaprezentowano sposób regulowania tego prawa w projektach konstytucji, opisano jego charakter oraz relacje występujące pomiędzy tym prawem a innymi konstytucyjnymi prawami i wolnościami. Unormowania zawarte w art. 51 Konstytucji mają charakter kompleksowy i gwarantują należytą ochronę danym osobowym osoby fizycznej w sferze prywatnej i publicznej. Konstytucjonalizacja prawa do ochrony danych osobowych w prawie polskim pokazuje, że prawo to współcześnie ma istotne znaczenie oraz zapewnia publicznoprawną ochronę autonomii informacyjnej jednostki.
EN
The aim of the publication is to present the origins of the right to protection of person- al data in Poland the analysis the essence of this right. In the text the manner of the regulation of this right is being presented in projects of The Constitution, it describes the right’s character and relations occurrent among it and other constitutional rights and freedoms. The regulations contained in Art. 51 of the Constitution are comprehensive and provide adequate protection of the private and public information of the individual. Regulation of the right to the protection of personal data in Polish Constitution shows that nowadays the right has an essential meaning and assures a publicly protection of the information autonomy of the individual.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

System polityki historycznej w Polsce między konstytucyjną powinnością a instrumentalizacją prawa

100%
Cyuńczyk F., Wawrzyński P.
Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego
|
2024
|
issue 1(77)
151-165
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza związków prawa i polityki historycznej w Polsce w ujęciu systemowym, integrującym narzędzia nauk prawnych i politycznych. Głównym celem jest ukazanie wzajemnych zależności między prawem – ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem prawa konstytucyjnego – a zaangażowaniem państwa w politykę pamięci. Artykuł podsumowuje obecny stan prawny i jego ramy formalne dla systemu polityki historycznej oraz decyzje polityczne dotyczące realizacji konstytucyjnej powinności upamiętnienia przeszłości. Dyskutując elementy systemu polityki historycznej w Polsce, ich umiejscowienie w ramach prawnych oraz dynamikę działań politycznych autorzy ukazują, że pozorna służebna funkcja narzędzi prawnych wobec polityki jest w rzeczywistości złożoną współzależnością wynikającą z konstytucyjnych fundamentów prowadzenie polityki historycznej przez państwo.
EN
The paper analyzes relations between the law and the system of politics of memory in Poland, integrating legal and political research. The main objective is a discussion of co-dependencies between the law – including the constitutional law – and the government’s involvement in the politics of memory. The paper summarizes the legal status, the remembrance system’s formal framework and political decisions executing the constitutional obligation of commemorating the past. Considering the complexity of the remembrance policy system in Poland, its foundation in the legal system, and the dynamics of policymaking, the Authors present that the seeming servitude of law to politics is an apparent complex interdependence based on the constitutional bases of memory politics.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.