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1

Back to the Concrete: A Pragmatist Response to Oppression

100%
Morse D.
Human Affairs
|
2009
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vol. 19
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issue 1
28-35
EN
Pragmatism is a vital tool for society today, both because it addresses our more pressing social problems and because it advances beyond other available solutions. As a good deal of recent European philosophy has shown, as in the cases of Adorno and Agamben, for example, our social life is mediated by abstractions that oppress us. With its focus on the immediacy of experience, pragmatism enables us to overcome these abstractions and return to concrete life in a liberating way. I argue against Agamben, however, that the return to concrete life amounts to anarchism. I show that it leads to liberalism instead, along the lines laid out by Dewey in Liberalism and Social Action, in which freed individuality is compatible with the exercise of social intelligence and planning.
2

Jump into the Source. Return to the Beginning in Martin Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy

100%
Surzyn J.
Anthropos?
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2017
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issue 26 Podróż do źródła
1-14
EN
The presented text is an attempt to show Heidegger's conception of returning to the source as a jump - Ursprung. Heidegger presented this concept in his famous book by title Contributions to Philosophy. This book seems to be a breakthrough in his thinking, because it shows the way to being alone without the help of entity, it means, Heidegger in this book departs from the conception of fundamental ontology as shown in the work of Being and time, which meant discovering the truth of being by entity, specifically, through Dasein's analysis. Contributions to Philosophy shows a different path, namely by the enowning of being - Ereignis. Such position is referred as "return" - Kehre. The sense of return made by Heidegger is exacerbated by the question of the sense of being, the question that comes down to making a violent intrusion - jump into the source, which is being itself. The jump - Ursprung is fundamental importance here, because it is some kind of Dasein's command, but it also shows the proper meaning of the beginning - arche, principium as the power, the ground and the hidden source. Heidegger invites the reader to a journey to the philosophical source - he invites to the jump into the abyss of the mystery of being. In this way according to him philosophy shows his real and true face.
3
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Three candidates for first philosophy in Nietzsche’s Beyond good and evil 20–22

100%
Wood W.
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
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2022
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vol. 12
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issue 1
147-166
EN
Friedrich Nietzsche is not generally regarded as a “first philosopher”, but rather as a radical critic of the traditional aspiration of philosophy to be a “master science”, in relation to which the other sciences are subordinate or dependent. In this respect, he seems to have had more in common with the logical positivists and post-structuralists who came after him than with the whole galaxy of “first philosophers” who preceded him, from Aristotle and John Duns Scotus to René Descartes, Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. However, in a famous aphorism in Beyond good and evil, Nietzsche proposes that psychology ought to be recognised as “queen of the sciences”, a traditional formula for first philosophy. Although this passage is well known, it is more often taken as a rhetorical flourish than as a serious statement of intent. In this article, I focus on the three aphorisms (BGE 20–22) that lead up to this statement. I argue that these aphorisms form an interconnected sequence, in which Nietzsche considers and rejects three traditional candidates for first philosophy - cosmology (BGE 20), theology (BGE 21) and general ontology (BGE 22). By rejecting these traditional candidates for first philosophy one by one, this sequence clears the way for Nietzsche’s proposal in BGE 23 that psychology ought to be recognised as the true candidate for first philosophy. These aphorisms, then, form a crucial sub-section in the developing argument of the book as a whole, which is far more systematically organised than Nietzsche’s aphoristic manner of writing would appear to suggest.
4

Is There Still (if There Has Been At All) an Analytic–Continental Divide?

100%
d'Agostini F.
Edukacja Filozoficzna
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2022
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issue 74
9-36
EN
In this paper I reconstruct the nature, origins and survivals of the divide between the “analytic” and “continental” traditions – a famous dualism which has affected the development of philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. I also present a theory of it, stressing that its intra-philosophical causes are to be found in the mutual resistance between critical (transcendental) and semantic (logical) approaches in philosophy. I conclude by noting that good philosophers (more or less knowingly) are and have always been sensitive to the transcendental and logical aspects of the philosophical work.
5

Challenges of Climate Change from an Intercultural Perspective

88%
Vareikis Z. i.
Dialogue and Universalism
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2022
|
issue 2
211-218
EN
The paper proposes a comparative intercultural approach to the climate change. The author bases on the cases of Chinese Daoism and Norbert Bolz’s philosophy to present his personal general viewpoint. The today greatest challenge is the recovery after the Covid-19 pandemic by getting rid of the financial burden and by introducing individual economical solutions to each country as well as accepting international conventions on the reduction of climate change results. According to the author of the article, the increasing consequences of the climate change liven up international business and indifferent politicians to make positive decisions concerning it.
6
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The Two Cultures in Philosophy

75%
Sławkowski-Rode M.
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
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2020
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vol. 4
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issue 4
EN
In this paper I revisit the debate concerning the distinction, which is sometimes made between “analytic” and “continental” philosophy. I look at the historical context in which the distinction came to prominence in the twentieth century, the reasons why it subsequently declined in popularity, and eventually had begun to be undermined. I argue that the distinction possesses intuitive content, which the recent attempts at exposing it as conceptually flawed fail to account for. I suggest that the intuitive content of the distinction provides us with resources to usefully define two different ways philosophical reflection has been approached during the course of the twentieth century. I conclude by suggesting that we can bring these two ways of approaching philosophy into focus by appealing to the idea of philosophical temperament.
7
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The call and the response. Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber on responsibility

63%
Jewuła A.
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
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2013
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vol. 3
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issue 2
323-338
PL
Filozofia subiektywności dotarła w XX wieku do granic swoich możliwości. Jako odpowiedź na jej ograniczenia rozmaici filozofowie podjęli próby nowego rodzaju myślenia. Takie próby to m.in. myśl dialogiczna, która pierwszy wyraz znalazła w pismach takich filozofów, jak Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber czy Eberhard Grisebach. Innym przykładem jest postulat powrotu do pytania o bycie Martina Heideggera. W niniejszym artykule staram się pokazać, że obie próby mają ze sobą wiele wspólnego, choć ich przedstawiciele odnosili się do siebie nawzajem raczej krytycznie, o ile w ogóle to czynili. Okazuje się jednak, że myśl Martina Bubera oraz Martina Heideggera ujmują człowieka jako byt dynamiczny, który staje w obliczu nachodzącego go wezwana. Dlatego też analizuję najpierw koncepcję Martina Heideggera z okresu Bycia i czasu, następnie przedstawiam myślenie Martina Bubera, głównie w oparciu o jego traktat Ja i Ty. Na koniec dokonuję zestawienia i porównania wątków wspólnych obu filozofom, jak również zaznaczam różnice, które dzielą obie próby przekroczenia filozofii podmiotowości.
EN
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the philosophy of subjectivity reached its limits. Various attempts at new thinking appeared as a reaction to these limits. Such attempts involve, among others, the philosophy of dialogue, which was represented in the works of Franz Rosen- zweig, Martin Buber and Eberhard Grisebach. Another approach includes Martin Heidegger’s demand for returning to the question of Being. In this article, I intend to present that both attempts are similar in many ways, although their representatives tended to be critical of one another. However, the approaches of Martin Buber as well as Martin Heidegger prove to understand a man as a dynamic being who faces the calling. Firstly, I would like to analyse the thought of Martin Heidegger as presented in Being and time , then I will describe the thought of Martin Buber mainly based on his treaty I and Thou . Finally, I compare the similarities and differences in the thinking of both philosophers
8
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The relevance of “givenness” for the Indian religious traditions

51%
Schmücker M.
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
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2014
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vol. 4
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issue 1
43-54
EN
The paper focuses on a comparison by taking some of the main results of the European tradition of phenomenology of religion represented and further developed by Jean-Luc Marion. His views on the constitution of the “I” look promising for a comparison when contrasted with the views on the same phenomenon in Indian religious traditions. Marion, whose rich work is in the main part devoted to the philosophy of donation, discovered a new way that led him from the givenness of the object of knowledge/perception to the understanding of self-givenness of the subject up to a new understanding of the experience of god. The author chooses as a start¬ing point the central question in Marion’s work which refers to the constitution of the “I” and the problem of whether it is able to constitute itself or whether something exists that constitutes the “I” beforehand without leaving the concept of subjectivity. For the Indian side, he offers examples for the way in which the constitution of the “I” takes place or not and what relevance a kind of givenness has in this context not only for a concept of the subject but also for the theistic ideas in Indian traditions.
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