Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 9

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  conversational implicature
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The paper deals with the functioning of if-clauses in mathematical word problems and with their equivalents. First, the nature of a word problem as a text type is shown. Further, the difference between complex sentences with proper implicative-causal relation and a lay use of conditional clauses is examined. As its main goal, the paper presents a comparison of various instances of conditional clauses in mathematics word problems. Also, it shows the role of formulaic stereotypy and conventional assumptions in word problem texts as an integral part of both the mathematical and the communicative competence.
|
2016
|
vol. 32
|
issue 2
207-224
EN
The author undertakes a comparative analysis of text of the first speech as Prime Minister by Donald Tusk, on 18 November 2011, as well as by Beata Szydło, on 18 November 2015. The Prime Minister’s exposé is a form of political communication. The aim of the research paper is to examine how the communication theory of the British philosopher of language Paul Grice, in particular how the so-called cooperative principle he developed could be used in evaluating the quality of a political statement and the intentions behind it. The author also refers to so-called implicature and the above-mentioned cooperative principle.
EN
The author undertakes a comparative analysis of text of the first speech as Prime Minister by Donald Tusk, on 18 November 2011, as well as by Beata Szydło, on 18 November 2015. The Prime Minister’s exposé is a form of political communication. The aim of the research paper is to examine how the communication theory of the British philosopher of language Paul Grice, in particular how the so-called cooperative principle he developed could be used in evaluating the quality of a political statement and the intentions behind it. The author also refers to so-called implicature and the above-mentioned cooperative principle.
EN
This paper investigates the question whether implicative verbs should be considered as soft presupposition triggers, i.e., as triggers activating optional context repairs. I present the results of an experiment in which test subjects were asked to read short dialogues containing either presupposition triggers or conversational implicatures and, next, answer the questions regarding the information communicated on the level of presupposition or implicatures, respectively. The results of within-subject ANOVA show that presuppositions activated by the use of implicative verbs are significantly less accessible and illicit significantly longer response times than presuppositions activated by the use of hard triggers, suggesting that they can be classified as soft presupposition triggers. The obtained results also show that presuppositions activated by the use of different triggers are heterogenous in regards to the accessibility of information.
EN
According to Adams and his colleagues, fictional sentences, i.e. sentences featuring fictional names, lack any truth value. To explain intuitions to the contrary, they refer to the pragmatics of fictional assertions and claim that sincere utterances of those sentences generate some conversational implicatures. They argue that all who take fictional sentences to have a truth value tend to mistake implicatures of assertions of such sentences with their literal content. The aim of the paper is to show that this argument is not convincing. The challenge being that it doesn’t provide any satisfactory explanation as to what is negated in seemingly genuine disagreement cases in which fictional sentences are asserted. Sentential negation usually doesn’t affect (i.e. negate) a proposition which is conversationally implied, especially when it comes to the manner implicature. And, as I argue, an advocate of the pragmatic defence should maintain that this is the kind of conversational implicature that the assertion of fictional sentences generates.
EN
Pragmatics and Law is an important subfield of theoretical and practical (or “applied”) pragmatics. This article is about criminal speech acts. These are those speech acts for which one can be punished in a given legal system. Criminal speech acts do not form a separate speech act class like assertives or expressives, but occur in all classes. They can be realized both directly and indirectly. Indirect realization involves indirect speech acts in the sense of speech act theory or conversational implicatures in the sense of conversational implicature theory. Two sets of issues are considered in more detail. The first is the area of lying, where lying is regarded as an insincere assertion with the aim of deception. The law does not recognize a separate criminal offense of lying. Nevertheless, lying can be punished in certain contexts. A relevant case is lying in court under oath (perjury). Bullshitting differs from lying in that the bullshitter is indifferent to the truth. Bullshitting thus appears as a practical option to avoid committing to a fact. Moreover, it is asked whether lying is possible through the realization of a deceptive conversational implicature. The second set of issues is the field of insults and hate speech. In the case of insults, it is striking that in every language there are lexical expressions (insult words) that serve the purpose of realizing an insult. They are illocutionary indicators in the sense of speech act theory. Hate speech, which includes the denigration of certain groups in the sense of incitement to hatred, is understood as a type of insult. This means that hate speech is, in principle, covered by the rules for the execution of an insult. The legal assessment of criminal speech acts is based, on the one hand, on concrete utterances and, on the other hand, on an assessment of the utterance context. It turns out that there can be considerable differences in the assessment of criminal speech acts, which has to do with the inherent complexity of these concepts.
XX
The subject of the paper is the interaction of the functional aspects of language, i.e. of semantics and pragmatics. The author assumes that the interdependence of semantics and pragmatics determines the fuzzy border of these basic language categories. This fact is reflected in the research practices: the pragmatic phenomena are described in terms of semantics and, conversely, the semantic phenomena are described in terms of pragmatics. Additionally, substitution of terms, i.e. interpretation of semantic phenomena in the pragmatic field is also possible. As an example of this type of manipulation the concept of H.P. Grice's conversational rules is considered in more detail.
EN
In the article I deal with some paradoxes and errors caused by improper usage of logical and philosophical terms appearing in the arguments for existence of God and other philosophical issues. I point at first some paradoxes coming from improper usage of propositional calculus as an instrument for analysis of a natural language. This language is actually not using simple sentences but rather propositional functions, their logical connections, and some replacements for variables in them. We still have to deal with so called paradox of material implication. The second paragraph provides formal and metatheoretical critics of Charles Sanders Peirce’s theory of deduction, induction and abduction. I argue that what Peirce and his followers call abduction is actually deduction or some reasoning unable to describe in terms of the logic used by them. Both syllogistic and inferential theory of abduction generate some paradoxes and contradictions. In the last paragraph also some paradoxes and contradictions resulting from the theory of causation by Jan Łukasiewicz are presented. The central issue of the article is erroneous usage of the implication: in logical paraphrases of a natural language, in description of the scientific reasoning, and in description of causality. However, my objective is not to solve all problems mentioned above but rather to open a discussion over them.
PL
Artykuł jest próbą odpowiedzi na trzy pytania. Po pierwsze, czy klasyczna wersja teorii implikatur konwersacyjnych Paula Grice’a znajduje zastosowanie do opisu dyskursu prawnego. Odpowiedź udzielona w tekście na tak postawione pytanie jest negatywna. Po drugie, tekst charakteryzuje najbardziej popularną w debacie światowej teorię pragmatyki dyskursu prawnego, mianowicie teorię strategicznego dyskursu Andrei Marmora. Dyskurs strategiczny występuje najczęściej w niezdeterminowanym kontekście. Jest to kontekst, który zawiera elementy umożliwiające nawet sprzeczne inferencje pragmatyczne. Ponadto, praca identyfikuje problematyczne punkty tego pomysłu. Po trzecie, podjęta zostaje próba nakreślenia teorii, która mogłaby stawić czoła zarzutom stawianym pomysłom A. Marmora. Pomysł polega na modelowaniu mechanizmów prowadzących do strategicznej selektywności zjawisk pragmatycznych.
EN
In the present paper, I attempt to answer three questions. First, whether the classical Gricean version of the implicature theory can be applied to describe legal discourse. Second, I provide an outline of one of the most popular theories of the pragmatics of legal language. Namely, Andrei Marmor’s theory of strategic speech. Strategic speech occurs mostly in indeterminate contexts, which contain elements that license even contradictory pragmatic inferences. Next, I attempt to flesh out the problematic points of this account. Third, I attempt to formulate a descriptive model of the strategic selectivity of pragmatic elements in the law, that could face the objections to Marmor’s ideas.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.