Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 4

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  cosmological argument
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

J.M. Bocheński’s Logical Analysis of Kant’s Criticism of the Cosmological Argument

100%
Porwolik M.
Edukacja Filozoficzna
|
2020
|
issue 70
59-79
EN
Józef Maria Bocheński is widely known as a promoter of the application of logic to theology and the philosophy of God. His analysis of St Thomas Aquinas’s quinque viae has become a traditional benchmark for numerous formal analyses of the arguments for the existence of God. Thus, we can say that he was a precursor of formal natural theology, which nowadays is undergoing dynamic developments. Bocheński used formal methods to analyze not only arguments for the existence of God, but also their counterarguments. Conducting those two types of analyses is postulated in his programme of studies on God. In this paper, I will discuss Bocheński’s only available case of the second type of analysis mentioned above, in which he considers Immanuel Kant’s objections to the cosmological argument.
2
Content available remote

Modalne argumenty teistyczne

100%
Oppy G., Łukasik A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2011
|
issue 14
5-14
EN
The aim of Oppy’s paper is to provide a general ground for rejecting all kinds of modal theistic arguments. The author claims that all such arguments are question begging – before proving the existence of God (defined as a being which exists in every possible world) theistic modalist must assume it when choosing his account of logical space (no matter which modal theory it relies on: Lewis’ modal realism, ersatz modal realism, combinatorialism or fictionalism). Two concrete arguments, Plantinga’s ontological argument and Leftow’s cosmological argument, are examples given by Oppy – both have premises which justification must refer to a non-modal question “Does God actually exist?”, concerning the nature of logical space. Oppy rejects suggestion that problems with modal theistic arguments show that there is simply something wrong with our standard modal analyses in terms of possible worlds. According to Oppy, problems with higher-level judgments about the nature of logical space are problems with propositional attitudes, not with modality, and they need an analysis distinct from the analysis of ground-level modal judgments.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Modalne argumenty teistyczne

100%
Oppy G., Łukasik A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2011
|
issue 14
5 - 14
EN
The aim of Oppy’s paper is to provide a general ground for rejecting all kinds of modal theistic arguments. The author claims that all such arguments are question begging – before proving the existence of God (defined as a being which exists in every possible world) theistic modalist must assume it when choosing his account of logical space (no matter which modal theory it relies on: Lewis’ modal realism, ersatz modal realism, combinatorialism or fictionalism). Two concrete arguments, Plantinga’s ontological argument and Leftow’s cosmological argument, are examples given by Oppy – both have premises which justification must refer to a non-modal question “Does God actually exist?”, concerning the nature of logical space. Oppy rejects suggestion that problems with modal theistic arguments show that there is simply something wrong with our standard modal analyses in terms of possible worlds. According to Oppy, problems with higher-level judgments about the nature of logical space are problems with propositional attitudes, not with modality, and they need an analysis distinct from the analysis of ground-level modal judgments.
4
Content available remote

Can Causal Chains Extend Back Infinitely? Entailment, Determinism, and a Cosmological Argument

86%
Dumsday T.
Forum Philosophicum
|
2014
|
vol. 19
|
issue 2
193–208
EN
I develop a new argument to the effect that past causal chains cannot extend back infinitely, but must instead terminate in a first uncaused cause (or causes). It has the advantage of sidestepping a historically prominent objection to cosmological arguments of this general type, one leveled by Aquinas and various other Scholastics.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.