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EN
In order to better understand the notion of history proper to phenomenology, I un-dertake a brief case study. Namely, I investigate Martin Heidegger’s relation to Edmund Husserl in the years preceding Husserl’s appointment to Freiburg, with a special focus on an occasional writing by Heidegger from 1912. The application of historical method not only dismantles the teleological constructions which mark Heidegger’s own account of his early discovery of Husserl’s phenomenology, but also present a young thinker eager to absorb cutting edge, though not necessarily consistent, developments from contemporaneous philosophy. Heidegger’s early approach could also be conceived as a window onto an elusive brief period of phenomenology before its transformation into a Movement, thereby illustrating the positive contributions of the historical approach to the history phenomenology.
EN
The paper briefly looks at two nonstandard conditional constructions, if [Su] had have [pp] and if [Su] would have [pp], which present anomalous components. Various works mentioning them have been analysed, leading to the conclusion that the forms have not been treated seriously or exhaustively. Following a small study which tries to establish their spread in the language, the paper concludes that some questions remain unanswered, such as whether the constructions can be characterised according to their geographical spread, their exact vernacular status, and to what extent they may coexist alongside the standard form in a person’s idiolect.
EN
Results of a convincing causal statistical inference related to socio-economic phenomena are treated as an especially desired background for conducting various socio-economic programs or gov-ernment interventions. Unfortunately, quite often real socio-economic issues do not fulfil restrictive assumptions of procedures of causal analysis proposed in the literature. This paper indicates certain empirical challenges and conceptual opportunities related to applications of procedures of data depth concept into a process of causal inference as to socio-economic phenomena. We show how to apply statistical functional depths to indicate factual and counterfactual distributions commonly used within procedures of causal inference. Thus, a modification of Rubin causality concept is proposed, i.e., a cen-trality-oriented causality concept. The presented framework is especially useful in the context of con-ducting causal inference based on official statistics, i.e., on the already existing databases. Methodo-logical considerations related to extremal depth, modified band depth, Fraiman-Muniz depth, and multivariate Wilcoxon sum rank statistic are illustrated by means of example related to a study of an impact of EU direct agricultural subsidies on digital development in Poland in the period 2012–2018.
Studia Semiotyczne
|
2017
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vol. 31
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issue 1
131–151
PL
Przedmiotem prezentowanego artykułu jest spor o wartości logiczne kontrfaktycznych okresów warunkowych z niemożliwym poprzednikiem (tzw. kontrmożliwych okresów warunkowych). Zgodnie z rozpowszechnionymi analizami każdy taki okres warunkowy jest prawdziwy. Pogląd ten określany jest mianem ortodoksyjnego i przeciwstawiany jest mu pogląd nieortodoksyjny, który uznaje, że tylko niektóre spośród kontrmożliwych okresów warunkowych są prawdziwe, a inne są fałszywe. W jednym ze swoich ostatnich tekstów (Counterpossibles) Timothy Williamson argumentował na rzecz tezy, że konsekwencje poglądu nieortodoksyjnego są niespójne z motywacjami leżącymi u podstaw tego poglądu. Celem artykułu jest polemika z krytyką Williamsona oraz wskazanie na możliwość spójnego odczytania postulatów zwolenników stanowiska nieortodoksyjnego.
EN
According to the most popular (so-called “orthodox”) theories, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are vacuously true. Critiques of this view argue that contrary to this, we tend to consider only some of them true and others to be false. In his recent paper (“Counterpossibles”) Timothy Williamson has ingeniously explained the motivations for the orthodox view and argued that although there are some heuristic reasons that may suggest the plausibility of the unorthodox view, they are fallible. The most important of Williamson’s arguments is that the unorthodox interpretation is inconsistent with the heuristic assumption that supposedly motivates this very view. The aim of this paper is to consider Williamson’s critique and to support the unorthodox approach towards counterpossibles. In order to do so, we argue in favour of the modified version of the heuristic assumption.
EN
The essay deals with Montesquieu’s methodology of history. My crucial assumption is that Montesquieu intends to cultivate history as science. In the 18th century this ambition meant that he wanted to use the analytical method in the field of history. His works include many examples of the successful exploitation of analysis. Since the philosopher does not consider his methods, my aim will be to extract from his works the ideas that stand behind his historical investigations. In other words, I am going to answer how history can be practiced as science (in the Enlightenment sense of this term). First of all, I am going to explain why analysis was – and still is – so efficient in a realm of natural phenomena. My point will be that it indicated to early modern scientist how they should conduct their experiments. On the other hand, experiments give advantage to scientists due to the fact that they are able to construct and control their object. To put it differently: analysis and experiments are efficient because truth and action are convertible. Now, my crucial question is: ‘Are historians capable of gaining advantage over their objects as physicists are?’ Giambattista Vico, for example, agrees. According to him, researchers can comprehend historical events because history is man-made. Some parts of Montesquieu’s works indicate that he shares Vico’s assumptions. Hence, historians are able to scrutinize past factors, and they can perform thought experiments. Such experiments are means for validating and abolishing hypotheses by using counterfactuals.
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